Organon F最新文献

{"title":"Normative Naturalism on Its Own Terms","authors":"Pekka Väyrynen","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2021.28302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28302","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49367813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Real Authors and Fictional Agents","authors":"A. Voltolini","doi":"10.31577/ORGF.2021.28104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/ORGF.2021.28104","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"28 1","pages":"60-75"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49096069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Anti-Realism about Fictional Names at Work: A New Theory for Metafictional Sentences","authors":"L. Rouillé","doi":"10.31577/ORGF.2021.28110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/ORGF.2021.28110","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I contribute to ongoing debates about the status of fictional names. The main debate in the philosophy of language focuses on whether fictional names should be thought of as non-referring terms (this is anti-realism) or referring terms (this is realism). This debate corresponds to a debate in metaphysics about the ontological status of fictional characters: the anti-realist claim that fictional characters do not exist while the realist say that they do exist in some sense. Although anti-realism is pre-theoretically intuitive, it has been challenged by a powerful argument in favour of realism based on so-called “metafictional” uses of fictional terms. This argument puts a lot of pressure on the anti-realist, for they have to come up with a theory of metafictional sentences which is in keeping with the anti-realist central tenet. I show that the existing antirealist account of metafictional statements is wrong-headed. I thus propose a new one. In doing so, I hope to free the anti-realist from the realist pressure. However, I do not offer any argument against realism. Consequently, I merely claim that anti-realism be a live","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"28 1","pages":"223-252"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42698661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Fictional Tellers","authors":"S. Predelli","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2021.28105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28105","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47240913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Fictional Names and Fictional Concepts: A Moderate Fictionalist Account","authors":"Eleonora Orlando","doi":"10.31577/ORGF.2021.28106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/ORGF.2021.28106","url":null,"abstract":"The main thesis I want to defend in this essay is that a fictional name refers to an individual concept, understood as a mental file that stores information, in the form of different descriptive concepts, about a purported individual. Given there is no material particular a fictional name could be referring to, it will be construed as referring to the concept of a particular, with which many descriptive concepts are associated, in the context of the set of thoughts constitutive of a fictional narrative. A fictional narrative will be thus characterised as a conceptual world, namely, a set of sentence-types semantically correlated with a set of thought-types.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"28 1","pages":"107-134"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43462806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How Can Millians Believe in Superheroes?","authors":"J. F. Lima","doi":"10.31577/ORGF.2021.28107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/ORGF.2021.28107","url":null,"abstract":"What is the content of beliefs expressed by sentences with fictional names? Millianism has notoriously struggled to give a satisfactory answer to this question. Some Millians have argued that fictional names are empty names. But such a view entails that the belief that Superman has impressive superpowers and the belief that Aquaman has impressive superpowers have the same content, contrary to our intuitions. Others have argued that fictional names refer to fictional entities. But this view has a long-standing problem, Frege’s Puzzle, and many philosophers are skeptical that Millians have successfully addressed it, despite commendable efforts. In this paper, I put forward a different Millian Theory of fictional proper names that by-passes these and other objections related to belief content. The novelty of my proposal partially rests on a distinction I draw between semantic content and belief content—as opposed to a distinction between belief content and belief state or a way of grasping the content, as it is commonly found in Millian accounts—in a framework where belief contents are not part of the meaning of names.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"28 1","pages":"135-167"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43277624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Frege’s Equivalence Thesis and Reference Failure","authors":"Nathan Hawkins","doi":"10.31577/ORGF.2021.28109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/ORGF.2021.28109","url":null,"abstract":"Frege claims that sentences of the form ‘A’ are equivalent to sentences of the form ‘it is true that A’ (The Equivalence Thesis). Frege also says that there are fictional names that fail to refer, and that sentences featuring fictional names fail to refer as a result. The thoughts such sentences express, Frege says, are also fictional, and neither true nor false. Michael Dummett argues that these claims are inconsistent. But his argument requires clarification, since there are two ways The Equivalence Thesis has been formulated, according as the thesis equates the senses or the referents of the relevant sentences. I have two aims in this paper. The first is to demonstrate that a sameness of sense thesis is inconsistent with Frege’s other theses. The second is to argue that a sameness of reference thesis is consistent with them. Thus, all else being equal, Frege ought to endorse a sameness of reference, rather than a sameness of sense thesis.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"28 1","pages":"198-222"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44581807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Fictional Names: Reference, Definiteness and Ontology","authors":"M. Sainsbury","doi":"10.31577/ORGF.2021.28103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/ORGF.2021.28103","url":null,"abstract":"Definite linguistic expressions, for example proper names and singular and plural pronouns, are easy to introduce. Indefinite expressions may pave the way, but are not essential. It is also not essential that there be entities to which the successfully introduced definites refer. This is the underlying fact that makes fiction possible, and it gives guidance about fictional names: we have no need in general to suppose that there exist entities to which they refer. 1. Discourse referents and speculation ... the appearance of an indefinite noun phrase establishes a discourse referent just in case it justifies the occurrence of a coreferential pronoun or a definite noun phrase later in the text. ... We maintain that the problem of coreference within a discourse is a linguistic problem and can be studied independently of any general theory of extra-linguistic reference. (Kartunnen 1976) Kartunnen is focused on the way in which an indefinite noun phrase can “justify” a subsequent definite one, as in the classic example “A man came into the bar. He ordered a martini”. A singular pronoun like “he” is normally supposed to refer to a specific (male) person, and it is natural to suppose that understanding a token of the pronoun requires knowing what it refers to. In a sense, we do know what this occurrence of “he” refers to: the man who came into the bar. But more demanding tests for knowledge of reference may fail: we may have no further information to offer concerning the man, and we might be unable to distinguish him from other men. Since we understand the classic two-sentence example perfectly well, including its occurrence of “he”, these failures shows that the tests for understanding were overdemanding: understanding a definite pronoun does requires neither any substantive ability to distinguish its referent from other things nor the possession of further information concerning the referent. Furthermore, our understanding is not undermined by our ignorance of whether the two sentences are true, and whether they were uttered with full assertive seriousness, or with some non-truth-involving intention. Understanding does not require that we believe that there exists a real referent for “he”, or even that we believe the utterer believes this or wants us to believe it. A discourse referent, as I understand its role in Kartunnen’s theory, and in the Discourse Representation Theories his work inspired, is a definite mental representational vehicle, singular or plural. There may or may not be some entity or entities to which it refers (so the expression","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"28 1","pages":"44-59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47663113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Revisiting the ‘Wrong Kind of Object’ Problem","authors":"M. Semeijn, E. Zalta","doi":"10.31577/ORGF.2021.28108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/ORGF.2021.28108","url":null,"abstract":"Any uniform semantic treatment of fictional names (e.g., ‘Frodo’) across parafictional statements (e.g., ‘In The Lord of the Rings, Frodo was born in the Shire’) and metafictional statements (e.g., ‘Frodo was invented by Tolkien’) runs into a variation of the ‘wrong kind of object’ problem. The problem arises when an analysis of one of these statements inappropriately attributes a property to an object. For example, it would be problematic if an analysis implied that flesh and blood individuals are invented by someone, and similarly problematic if an analysis implied that abstract objects are born in a certain region. Abstract object theory has provided a solution to this conundrum by distinguishing two modes of predication: encoding and exemplifying. Recently Klauk has argued that the problem reappears for the analysis of explicit parafictional statements in this theory. In this paper we formalize the objection and show that one can distinguish three issues in connection with the ‘wrong kind of object’ problem. We then address them in turn. ∗Copyright c © 2020, by Merel Semeijn and Edward N. Zalta. This paper is forthcoming in Organon F. The authors would like to thank the audience at PhiLang2019, Emar Maier and two anonymous Organon F reviewers for their valuable feedback. This research is supported by the Dutch Research Council (NWO), Vidi Grant 276-80-004 (Emar Maier). Merel Semeijn and Edward N. Zalta 2 1 The ‘wrong kind of object’ problem The semantics of statements about fictions requires a distinction between four different types of statements that feature fictional names (i.e., names of fictional entities). Consider the following four statements about Frodo: (1) Frodo had a very trying time that afternoon. (2) Frodo was born in the Shire. (3) In/According to The Lord of the Rings, Frodo was born in the Shire. (4) Frodo was invented by Tolkien. We shall categorize, and subsequently refer to these statements, using the following terminology: • (1) is a fictional statement, i.e., it is part of a fictional narrative (e.g., (1) is a quote from Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings). Such statements are usually understood as neither true nor false but rather as fictional truth-makers; the act of storytelling determines what is true in the fictional story. • (2) and (3) are parafictional statements, i.e., statements about what is true in some fiction but which are not part of the original storytelling. These statements are usually analysed as being true or false (depending on the content of the fictional story) and can be ‘explicit’ like (3) or ‘implicit’ like (2) (depending on whether the prefix ‘In/According to fiction/story s’ is overt). • (4) is a metafictional statement, i.e., a statement about a fictional entity as a fictional entity that can be true or false. Any uniform semantic treatment of fictional names across these different types of statements runs into a variation of ‘the problem of the wrong kind of object’. If we adopt a realist appr","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"28 1","pages":"168-197"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41825721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Preface","authors":"Piotr Stalmaszczyk","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2021.28101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28101","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43286807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}