Journal of Financial Regulation最新文献_第4页

The Rise and Fall of Dagong Global Credit Rating Agency: A Geopolitical Challenge for the Rating Industry 大公国际信用评级机构的兴衰:评级行业的地缘政治挑战

IF 2.6

Journal of Financial Regulation Pub Date : 2021-06-29 DOI: 10.1093/jfr/fjab007

Chunping Bush

引用次数: 1

Enforcement against the Biggest Banks 对大银行的强制执行

IF 2.6

Journal of Financial Regulation Pub Date : 2021-05-04 DOI: 10.1093/jfr/fjab005

David Zaring

{"title":"Enforcement against the Biggest Banks","authors":"David Zaring","doi":"10.1093/jfr/fjab005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jfr/fjab005","url":null,"abstract":"Being a big bank means the regular payment of huge fines to a number of different regulators, paired with profuse apologies, and promises to do better next time. This article makes use of a hand-collected dataset to show how this enforcement worked in the United States after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act. American regulators have tended to hunt the big banks in packs, with multiple regulators pursuing fines against financial institutions for the same misconduct. Regulators frequently enforce in a ‘viral’ manner: once they sanction one bank for a type of misconduct, the chances that they will sanction another bank for the same sort of misconduct increases. Some regulators like to bundle a variety of different unlawful actions by banks into one global settlement. Enforcement by the Department of Justice can result in spectacularly expensive settlements compared to the level of enforcement by primary banking regulatory agencies; overall, Department of Justice sanctions in dollars dwarf those of all other agencies policing part of what a bank does. American enforcement, despite suspicion to the contrary, does not appear to protect domestic banks and discriminate against foreign ones. Although this article’s primary goal is to make sense of the federal government’s overall enforcement practices, one recommendation is made: criminal prosecutors should consult with safety and soundness regulators before unveiling indictments and settlements against banks.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":"235 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Impact of Cryptocurrency Regulation on Trading Markets 加密货币监管对交易市场的影响

IF 2.6

Journal of Financial Regulation Pub Date : 2021-03-10 DOI: 10.1093/jfr/fjab003

Brian D Feinstein, Kevin Werbach

{"title":"The Impact of Cryptocurrency Regulation on Trading Markets","authors":"Brian D Feinstein, Kevin Werbach","doi":"10.1093/jfr/fjab003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jfr/fjab003","url":null,"abstract":"The meteoric growth of global cryptocurrency markets presents novel challenges to regulators. Some policymakers and scholars warn that regulation will cause trading activity to cross borders into less-regulated jurisdictions—or even smother a promising new financial asset class. Others believe regulatory actions will stimulate activity by providing clarity to market participants. Standing behind this disagreement is a debate about the desirability of either outcome. Some believe that governments should promote development of the cryptocurrency sector within their countries, while others view cryptocurrencies as conduits of illegality and fraud that should be restricted through strict regulation or even outright bans. Yet these debates have, to date, been conducted almost entirely without data concerning the effects of regulation on market activity. As a corrective, in this article we assembled original data on cryptocurrency regulations worldwide and used them to empirically examine movement in trading activity at a number of exchanges following key regulatory announcements. We found that a wide variety of models yielded almost entirely null results. From the creation of bespoke licensing regimes to targeted anti-money-laundering and anti-fraud enforcement actions, as well as many other categories of government activities, we found no systemic evidence that regulatory measures cause traders to flee, or enter into, the affected jurisdictions. These findings at last provide an empirical basis for regulatory decisions concerning cryptocurrency trading. Among other things, they call into question that capital flight or chilling effects should be a first-order concern.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":"228 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Banks’ Sovereign Exposures: In Search of New Rules 银行主权风险敞口:寻找新规则

IF 2.6

Journal of Financial Regulation Pub Date : 2021-02-08 DOI: 10.1093/jfr/fjab002

Angelo Baglioni, Francesco Cefalà

{"title":"Banks’ Sovereign Exposures: In Search of New Rules","authors":"Angelo Baglioni, Francesco Cefalà","doi":"10.1093/jfr/fjab002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jfr/fjab002","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we examine the reform of the prudential treatment of banks’ sovereign exposures with the purpose of introducing risk-sensitive capital charges and limiting home bias. We consider six different options and measure their impact on the common equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio of 82 banks fom 10 euro-area countries, participating in the 2019 European Banking Authority EU-wide transparency exercise and subject to European Central Bank supervision. Our evidence shows that the proposal put forward by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 2017 is the proposal which leads to the most evenly distributed impact across countries, in terms of CET1 ratio decline. That proposal targets the goals of risk sensitivity and diversification, with two independent instruments: rating-based risk weights and concentration add-ons. As a consequence, it is the only proposal which introduces an incentive for banks located in all countries, whether low rated or high rated, to reduce their home bias. Some proposals focus on one objective only: either risk sensitivity or diversification. Others introduce heavy penalization for banks located in low-rated countries, without addressing the home bias of banks located in high-rated countries. Several options are prone to pro-cyclicality, and we measure this effect by simulating the impact of a two-notch downgrading of high debt countries on the CET1 ratio of banks. Some relevant cross-country effects emerge from our analysis, due to the large cross-country exposures of a few intermediaries.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":"229 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2021-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Is Dodd-Frank the Biggest Law Ever? 多德-弗兰克法案是有史以来最大的法案吗?

IF 2.6

Journal of Financial Regulation Pub Date : 2021-02-07 DOI: 10.1093/jfr/fjab001

Patrick A McLaughlin, Oliver Sherouse, Mark Febrizio, M Scott King

引用次数: 0

Twelve Years after the Financial Crisis—Too-big-to-fail is still with us 金融危机12年后——“大到不能倒”仍在我们身边

IF 2.6

Journal of Financial Regulation Pub Date : 2021-01-27 DOI: 10.1093/JFR/FJAA012

M. Hellwig

引用次数: 2

OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件

IF 2.6

Journal of Financial Regulation Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/jfr/fjab010

引用次数: 1

OUP accepted manuscript OUP接受稿件

IF 2.6

Journal of Financial Regulation Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/jfr/fjab011

引用次数: 0

Legal Air Cover 合法空中掩护

IF 2.6

Journal of Financial Regulation Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.1093/jfr/fjab004

P. Bolton, U. Panizza, Mitu G. Gulati

引用次数: 7

Decentralized Finance 分散的财政

IF 2.6

Journal of Financial Regulation Pub Date : 2020-09-30 DOI: 10.1093/jfr/fjaa010

Zetzsche D, Arner D, Buckley R.

{"title":"Decentralized Finance","authors":"Zetzsche D, Arner D, Buckley R.","doi":"10.1093/jfr/fjaa010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jfr/fjaa010","url":null,"abstract":"<span><div>ABSTRACT</div>DeFi (‘decentralized finance’) has joined FinTech (‘financial technology’), RegTech (‘regulatory technology’), cryptocurrencies, and digital assets as one of the most discussed emerging technological evolutions in global finance. Yet little is really understood about its meaning, legal implications, and policy consequences. In this article we introduce DeFi, put DeFi in the context of the traditional financial economy, connect DeFi to open banking, and end with some policy considerations. We suggest that decentralization has the potential to undermine traditional forms of accountability and erode the effectiveness of traditional financial regulation and enforcement. At the same time, we find that where parts of the financial services value chain are decentralized, there will be a reconcentration in a different (but possibly less regulated, less visible, and less transparent) part of the value chain. DeFi regulation could, and should, focus on this reconcentrated portion of the value chain to ensure effective oversight and risk control. Rather than eliminating the need for regulation, in fact DeFi requires regulation in order to achieve its core objective of decentralization. Furthermore, DeFi potentially offers an opportunity for the development of an entirely new way to design regulation: the idea of ‘embedded regulation’. Regulatory approaches could be built into the design of DeFi, thus potentially decentralizing both finance and its regulation, in the ultimate expression of RegTech.</span>","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":"220 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0