TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic)最新文献

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Disparities and Equity Issues in Electric Vehicles Rebate Allocation 电动汽车返利分配中的差距与公平问题
TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-09-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3687504
Shuocheng Guo, Eleftheria Kontou
{"title":"Disparities and Equity Issues in Electric Vehicles Rebate Allocation","authors":"Shuocheng Guo, Eleftheria Kontou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3687504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3687504","url":null,"abstract":"The path towards light-duty vehicle electrification promises benefits like lower costs for drivers and reduced environmental externalities for all. Incentives such as electric vehicle rebates assist with alleviating high capital costs of alternative fuel cars. We uncover distributional effects of plug-in electric vehicle rebates, focusing on a program in the State of California. We leverage economic attributes representative of populations of census tracts as well as data on rebates distributed to plug-in electric vehicle buyers through the Clean Vehicle Rebate Project from 2010 to 2018. Horizontal and vertical equity measures are evaluated, while measurement of spatial association characterizes spatial patterns of rebates allocation across the State. We evaluate the distributional fairness of rebates allocation between income groups and disadvantaged communities. We find that rebates have been predominantly given to higher-income electric vehicle buyers. However, the share of rebates distributed to low-income groups and disadvantaged communities increased after an income-cap policy was put into effect. Spatial analysis shows high spatial clustering effects and rebates concentration in major metropolitan regions. We reveal neighborhood effects: communities with lower median income or disadvantaged receive higher rebate amount when these are close to spatial clusters characterized as high income and high rebate amount receivers.","PeriodicalId":424593,"journal":{"name":"TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126629648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 34
The Fast and the Usurious: Putting the Brakes on Auto Lending Abuses 快速和高利贷:制止汽车贷款滥用
TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-04-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3438528
Adam J. Levitin
{"title":"The Fast and the Usurious: Putting the Brakes on Auto Lending Abuses","authors":"Adam J. Levitin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3438528","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3438528","url":null,"abstract":"The car loan market is rife with consumer abuses: inflated pricing, discriminatory lending, and a variety of deceptions and scams. These abuses all stem from the dealer-centric nature of the auto finance market that ties the vehicle purchase to the vehicle financing. \u0000 \u0000The overwhelming majority of consumers finance their purchases through the car dealer, but consumers cannot learn dealer financing terms in advance. They learn the offered financing terms only after spending substantial time and energy negotiating a car price, a trade-in price, warranties, insurance, and vehicle add-ons. At this point, because most consumers lack alternative financing options, they face a take-it-or-leave-it choice that leaves them especially vulnerable to dealer abuses. \u0000 \u0000Not only does the lack of alternative financing options deprive consumers of the protection of competition in auto loans, but competition in the dealer-based lending market also actually works against consumers. Dealers auction off loans to financial institutions based largely on which institution allows the dealer the greatest compensation in the form of a markup on the loan. These ultimate lenders compete for the dealers’ business, not the consumers’, which results in consumers paying supracompetitive rates because of the dealer markup. The discretionary nature of the markups also enables discriminatory lending, with minorities often charged more for car loans, as well as a number of outright frauds and scams that cannot occur with third-party financing. \u0000 \u0000This Article proposes to fix these auto lending abuses by requiring a three-business-day waiting period before delivery of the vehicle for con- sumers who do not have a bona fide third-party financing offer, as well as a prominently disclosed, penalty-free prepayment right for the loan during this period, and a system of mandatory data collection on auto loans to enable regulatory oversight. A penalty default waiting period would incentivize consumers to shop for financing separately from the vehicle purchase transaction, which will create positive competitive forces lowering dealers’ supracompetitive markups of financing, reduce opportunities for discriminatory lending, and protect consumers from other deceptive practices.","PeriodicalId":424593,"journal":{"name":"TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131117923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Drinking and Driving 酒后驾车
TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-02-01 DOI: 10.3386/w26779
F. Sloan
{"title":"Drinking and Driving","authors":"F. Sloan","doi":"10.3386/w26779","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26779","url":null,"abstract":"Driving while intoxicated causes many traffic accidents and deaths. Two decisions are closely related, whether to engage in heavy drinking, and to drive, conditional on heavy drinking. This paper reviews the extensive literature on heavy drinking, addiction, and driving after heavy drinking. Relevant public policies involve a combination of deterrence, incapacitation, and treatment. While there is empirical support for the rational addiction model applied to heavy drinking, some attributes of drinker-drivers differ from others (e.g., impulsivity in domains other than alcohol consumption, hyperbolic discounting). Policies most effective in reducing drinking and driving are alcohol excise taxes, minimum drinking age and zero tolerance laws for underage persons, dram shop and social host liability, and criminal sanctions overall. Empirical studies have not determined which specific criminal sanctions are most effective. A major impediment to criminal sanctions as a deterrent is that the probability of being stopped/arrested when driving while intoxicated is extremely low,","PeriodicalId":424593,"journal":{"name":"TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129145562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Regulation and the Geography of Inequality 监管与不平等地理
TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-01-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3527055
Ganesh Sitaraman, M. Ricks, C. Serkin
{"title":"Regulation and the Geography of Inequality","authors":"Ganesh Sitaraman, M. Ricks, C. Serkin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3527055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3527055","url":null,"abstract":"We live in an era of widening geographic inequality. Around the country, the spread between economically and culturally thriving places and those that are struggling has been increasing. “Superstar” cities like New York, San Francisco, Boston, and Atlanta continue to attract talent and grow, while the economies of other cities and rural areas are left behind. Troublingly, escalating geographic inequality in the United States has arrived hand-in-hand with serious economic, social, and political problems. Areas that are left behind have not only failed to keep up with their thriving peers; in many ways they have stagnated and seen opportunities evaporate. At the same time, superstar cities are running up against extreme housing affordability problems, rendering middle-class life all but unsustainable. To make matters worse, the widening gulf between dynamic and stagnant places increasingly feeds into a democratic crisis of unrepresentative government at the federal level. \u0000 \u0000The dominant explanations for widening geographic inequality focus largely on inexorable economic trends. Forces like “agglomeration effects” and globalization have reshaped the economy, benefitting some areas and harming others. We think these explanations leave out a crucial factor: the effects of specific regulatory choices on economic geography. The Progressive Era and New Deal regulatory order in the United States promoted geographic dispersion in economic activity. The unraveling of this regulatory order around 1980 coincided with the reversal in geographic convergence and the beginning of an era of growing divergence. More specifically, regulatory policies in the areas of transportation, communications, trade, and antitrust helped construct an era of geographic convergence in the mid-twentieth century and deregulation in those same areas contributed to the rise of geographic inequality over the last generation. To combat geographic inequality and its attendant downsides, we make the case for reincorporating geographic factors into federal regulatory policymaking in transportation, communications, trade, antitrust, and other domains.","PeriodicalId":424593,"journal":{"name":"TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129170421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Liability Design for Autonomous Vehicles and Human-Driven Vehicles: A Hierarchical Game-Theoretic Approach 自动驾驶汽车和人类驾驶汽车的责任设计:一种层次博弈论方法
TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-11-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3509569
Xuan Di, Xu Chen, E. Talley
{"title":"Liability Design for Autonomous Vehicles and Human-Driven Vehicles: A Hierarchical Game-Theoretic Approach","authors":"Xuan Di, Xu Chen, E. Talley","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3509569","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3509569","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are inevitably entering our lives with potential benefits for improved traffic safety, mobility, and accessibility. However, AVs’ benefits also introduce a serious potential challenge, in the form of complex interactions with human-driven vehicles (HVs). The emergence of AVs introduces uncertainty in the behavior of human actors and in the impact of the AV manufacturer on autonomous driving design. This paper thus aims to investigate how AVs affect road safety and to design socially optimal liability rules in comparative negligence for AVs and human drivers. A unified game is developed, including a Nash game between human drivers, a Stackelberg game between the AV manufacturer and HVs, and a Stackelberg game between the lawmaker and other users. We also establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the game. The game is then simulated with numerical examples to investigate the emergence of human drivers’ moral hazard, the AV manufacturer’s role in traffic safety, and the lawmaker’s role in liability design. Our findings demonstrate that human drivers could develop moral hazard if they perceive their road environment has become safer and an optimal liability rule design is crucial to improve social welfare with advanced transportation technologies. More generally, the game-theoretic model developed in this paper provides an analytical tool to assist policy-makers in AV policymaking and hopefully mitigate uncertainty in the existing regulation landscape about AV technologies.","PeriodicalId":424593,"journal":{"name":"TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic)","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133917740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
The Coastline Paradox 海岸线悖论
TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-08-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3445756
R. Stoa
{"title":"The Coastline Paradox","authors":"R. Stoa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3445756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3445756","url":null,"abstract":"How long is the coastline of the United States? While it may sound counter-intuitive, there is no objectively true answer to this question. In fact, it is impossible to precisely measure the length of any coastline. \u0000 \u0000A coastline features an endless array of bays and promontories at all scales, from hundreds of miles to fractions of an inch. Thus, the length of a coastline depends on the unit of measurement being used. The smaller the unit of measurement, the more of these bays and promontories are detected, and thus, the longer the coastline becomes. Follow this logic down to the atomic level, and the length of a coastline – any coastline – approaches infinity. \u0000 \u0000This phenomenon is known as the “coastline paradox,” and it is more than just a mathematical curiosity. Because coastlines play such a prominent role in legal frameworks, the coastline paradox presents troubling legal implications at all scales. From international maritime jurisdictions to local real estate markets, the complexities created by this phenomenon are disconcertingly understudied. In fact, the coastline paradox has never been considered as a significant source of legal problems. \u0000 \u0000This article is the first to address the legal implications of the coastline paradox. It begins with an explanation of the coastline paradox and other, similar characteristics of coastlines that defy accurate measurement. Then the legal implications for international, federal, and local legal frameworks are introduced and examined. It is apparent that awareness of the coastline paradox is low, and challenges are scarcely being addressed. While a mathematical solution to the coastline paradox may be impossible, the article concludes with a set of recommendations for coastal stakeholders.","PeriodicalId":424593,"journal":{"name":"TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic)","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131571302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Data-Sharing in IoT Ecosystems from a Competition Law Perspective: The Example of Connected Cars 竞争法视角下物联网生态系统中的数据共享:以互联汽车为例
TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-08-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3445422
Wolfgang Kerber
{"title":"Data-Sharing in IoT Ecosystems from a Competition Law Perspective: The Example of Connected Cars","authors":"Wolfgang Kerber","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3445422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3445422","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses whether competition law can help to solve problems of access to data and interoperability in IoT ecosystems, where often one firm has exclusive control of the data produced by a smart device (and of the technical access to this device). Such a gatekeeper position can lead to the elimination of competition for aftermarket and other complementary services in such IoT ecosystems. This problem is analysed both from an economic and a legal perspective, and also generally for IoT ecosystems as well as for the much discussed problems of “access to in-vehicle data and re-sources” in connected cars, where the “extended vehicle” concept of the car manufacturers leads to such positions of exclusive control. The paper analyses, in particular, the competition rules about abusive behavior of dominant firms (Art. 102 TFEU) and of firms with “relative market power” (§ 20(1) GWB) in German competition law. These provisions might offer (if appropriately applied and amended) at least some solutions for these data access problems. Competition law, however, might not be sufficient for dealing with all or most of these problems, i.e. that also additional solutions might be needed (data portability, direct data (access) rights, or sector-specific regulation).","PeriodicalId":424593,"journal":{"name":"TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126191734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in the UK: A Lyapunov View 英国的公私伙伴关系(PPP):李亚普诺夫的观点
TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-08-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3436050
Fred Amonya
{"title":"Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in the UK: A Lyapunov View","authors":"Fred Amonya","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3436050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3436050","url":null,"abstract":"Explication of reality may draw tools outside the phenomenon. That is the essence of case study, and the epistemological motivation of this paper. The paper illuminates the space of PPP policy in the UK. Yet, that illumination raises questions that stand to guide other countries, and the paper is most concerned about the younger states. The paper uses the M40 motorway management contract as a stud in illuminating the policy space of PPP in the UK. The space is a dynamical system and the paper uses Lyapunov function as lens. Ultimately, the paper asks how the younger states can pursue PPP without the holonomic control of the state, which the UK possesses. Either option leads to a fuzzy path. The dominant concessions rely on the market driving policy and use holonomic structures outside the country. That is not sustainable. On the other hand, management contract requires a holonomic state. The younger states have moulding structures, and they are non-ergodic. Therefore, management contracts will be unstable. Whichever path, policy designers must install incremental and reflexive functions to navigate the complex spaces.","PeriodicalId":424593,"journal":{"name":"TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic)","volume":"85 7-8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124330543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Passport Revocation and Denial for Seriously Delinquent Tax Debts: New IRS Procedures Signal More Stringent Enforcement 严重拖欠税款的护照吊销和拒绝:新的国税局程序标志着更严格的执法
TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3216001
Megan L. Brackney
{"title":"Passport Revocation and Denial for Seriously Delinquent Tax Debts: New IRS Procedures Signal More Stringent Enforcement","authors":"Megan L. Brackney","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3216001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3216001","url":null,"abstract":"In January 2018, the IRS published procedures to begin enforcement of Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 7345, which requires the State Department to deny the application for, or revoke the passport of, any individual whom the IRS certifies as having a “seriously delinquent tax debt.” IRC section 7345 was enacted on December 5, 2015, as part of the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act). Prior to January 2018, the IRS had not been enforcing IRC section 7345, and there were many questions about how the passport revocation/denial process would work, such as whether there would be any additional exceptions, how the IRS would exercise its discretion, and how the IRS would interact with the State Department. Recently, the IRS has answered many of these questions through the issuance of Notice 2018-01 (Jan. 16, 2018), new Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) provisions, and updates on its website. Now that the IRS has procedures in place to enforce IRC section 7345, it is important for CPAs to advise individual clients about this new and very serious consequence to being noncompliant with their tax liabilities. Below is a description of the provisions of IRC section 7345 and the IRS guidance, followed by answers to common questions that affected individuals may have.","PeriodicalId":424593,"journal":{"name":"TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129370738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reserva de Cabotaje Marítimo y Libre Competencia: El Caso Chileno (Maritime Cabotage Restriction and Competition: The Chilean Case) cababtaje Reserva de Cabotaje Marítimo y Libre Competencia: El Caso Chileno(海上运输限制和竞争:智利案例)
TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-06-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3234367
Benjamín Mordoj, Claudio A. Agostini, I. Briones
{"title":"Reserva de Cabotaje Marítimo y Libre Competencia: El Caso Chileno (Maritime Cabotage Restriction and Competition: The Chilean Case)","authors":"Benjamín Mordoj, Claudio A. Agostini, I. Briones","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3234367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3234367","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Spanish Abstract:</b> Se analiza la reserva de cabotaje marítimo bajo el régimen de defensa de la libre competencia. Junto con describir sus aspectos jurídicos, se busca estimar cuantitativamente los eventuales impactos económicos para el país, o pérdidas en bienestar asociados. Complementariamente, se analiza la regulación accesoria, que consiste en un impuesto adicional del 20% al uso o goce temporal de naves extranjeras que se destinen a servicios de cabotaje. En base al análisis realizado, y de conformidad con el Decreto Ley Nº 211 de 1973, se propone la derogación de la reserva de cabotaje marítimo y del impuesto adicional a servicios de cabotaje con naves extranjeras, de modo de introducir una mayor competencia en este mercado en beneficio de los consumidores chilenos y de la eficiencia económica <b>English Abstract:</b> This paper analyzes the maritime cabotage restriction pursuant to the competition law. In addition to explaining its legal aspects, it aims to make a quantitative estimate of the potential economic impacts for the country, or welfare losses associated. Furthermore, it analyzes a current ancillary regulation, which consists of a 20% surtax on the use or temporary possession of foreign vessels that are allocated or used for cabotage services. Based on the analysis conducted, and pursuant to the Decree Law No. 211 of 1973, this paper proposes repealing the maritime cabotage restriction and the surtax for cabotage services by foreign vessels in order to introduce greater competition in this market to benefit Chilean consumers and economic efficiency.","PeriodicalId":424593,"journal":{"name":"TransportRN: Transportation Policy (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122385478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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