Filosofia Unisinos最新文献_第8页

Sobre o conhecimento em Ludwig Feuerbach: uma investigação a partir dos Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit (1830) 关于路德维希·费尔巴哈的知识:来自Gedanken uber Tod und Unsterblichkeit(1830)的研究

4区哲学

Filosofia Unisinos Pub Date : 2021-08-02 DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2021.222.03

José Edmar Lima Filho

{"title":"Sobre o conhecimento em Ludwig Feuerbach: uma investigação a partir dos Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit (1830)","authors":"José Edmar Lima Filho","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2021.222.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.222.03","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000A presente exposição se orienta pela investigação de um possível interesse de Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) pelo tema do conhecimento, neste caso específico tomando por base o escrito Pensamentos sobre a morte e a imortalidade (Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit [1830]). Embora esta temática pareça constituir um objeto lateral no interior da obra e, por isso, ali não exista um tratamento sistemático da mesma, procuro justificar a legitimidade de concluir que a questão do conhecimento não está apenas presente, mas que dela decorrem implicações diretas para a compreensão de outros problemas que aparecem seja no referido texto de 1830, seja em obras futuras, algo que sugere a importância de examinar tal questão mais demoradamente. Neste texto investigo o problema com base em uma tipologia do saber, para daí avaliar pontos como a distinção entre subjetividade e objetividade, assim como sobre as capacidades humanas a propósito de uma compreensão da exterioridade – em que comparece a centralidade da sensibilidade como condição de possibilidade do conhecimento –, sem desconsiderar a viabilidade da abstração. Finalizo anunciando o tema da valorização da natureza, que parece já estar considerado aqui em 1830 (e que virá retomado no pensamento feuerbachiano posterior), procurando igualmente compreender a questão do conhecimento a partir de um vínculo com a natureza e com a dimensão espácio-temporal que determina qualquer existência real.\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000Palavras-chave: Ludwig Feuerbach, conhecimento, Pensamentos sobre a morte e a imortalidade.\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44401010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Martha Nussbaum y la literatura como filosofía moral 玛莎·努斯鲍姆与作为道德哲学的文学

4区哲学

Filosofia Unisinos Pub Date : 2021-08-02 DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2021.222.02

Hernan Medina-Botero

引用次数: 0

Jacques Derrida’s philosophy of forgiveness 雅克·德里达的宽恕哲学

4区哲学

Filosofia Unisinos Pub Date : 2021-08-02 DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2021.222.01

S. Ivic

{"title":"Jacques Derrida’s philosophy of forgiveness","authors":"S. Ivic","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2021.222.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.222.01","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000This paper presents social and political dimensions of forgiveness within Jacques Derrida’s philosophy. Derrida’s philosophy of forgiveness is an example of how philosophy can help us understand and resolve contemporary social and political issues. Derrida believes that traditional concept of forgiveness should be broadened beyond the bounds of the rational and the imaginable. According to Derrida, traditional concept of forgiveness needs rethinking because of the phenomenon of proliferation of scenes of forgiveness after the Second World War that produced globalization of forgiveness and trivialized and decharacterized this term. According to Derrida, the act of forgiveness can only be thought beyond the limits of common sense and in the space of the impossible, and that is the forgiveness of something that common sense cannot forgive. Derrida’s philosophy of forgiveness has wide social and political implications as it transcends binary oppositions: present/past, self/other, friend/enemy and so forth. All concepts within Derrida’s philosophy of politics (friendship, enemy, hospitality, forgiveness, justice, and so on) are significant for societies eroded with traumas of wars and ethno-national divisions and conflicts.\u0000Keywords: Derrida, philosophy, forgiveness, enemy, migration, asylum, hospitality.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45162764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

A private language argument to elucidate the relation between mind and language 阐明心灵与语言关系的私人语言论证

4区哲学

Filosofia Unisinos Pub Date : 2021-03-15 DOI: 10.4013/FSU.2021.221.06

Hannes Fraissler

引用次数: 0

Nature-Life continuity: is there a necessary method of inquiry? 自然-生命的连续性:有必要的探究方法吗?

4区哲学

Filosofia Unisinos Pub Date : 2021-03-15 DOI: 10.4013/FSU.2021.221.12

S. Stein

{"title":"Nature-Life continuity: is there a necessary method of inquiry?","authors":"S. Stein","doi":"10.4013/FSU.2021.221.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/FSU.2021.221.12","url":null,"abstract":"1 Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos UNISINOS Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia. Av. Unisinos, 950, Prédio B09, 4o. Andar, 93022-000, São Leopoldo, RS, Brasil. Email: siastein@me.com. ABSTRACT In Linguistic Bodies, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, Elena Clare Cuffari and Hanne De Jaegher (2018) propose a dialectic method to explain organism’s movements and exchanges, i.e., life interactions and evolution, that can also explain the evolution from life to cultural relations, that include linguistic interactions. One of the main questions Linguistic Bodies wants to answer is how to explain human life and culture without a reductive scientific thought. If one defies radical reductionism, one of the central risks is to dissociate physical inquiries from biological investigations. In the book, the authors oppose the analytical mode of thinking present in many natural sciences to a dialectical mode of thinking that would explain living beings’ interactions. It is relevant to question if they succeeded in defending the dialectical model they profess to be the best suited to explain human social phenomena. Following this line of rationale, in this paper, I will, first, show that dialectical methods are over-ambitious and, second, inquire into the anti-reductionist attitude present in the dialectical model advocated in Linguistic Bodies.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"22 1","pages":"102-107"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43498722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

The sense of agency does not evidence regulative control 代理意识不能证明监管

4区哲学

Filosofia Unisinos Pub Date : 2021-03-15 DOI: 10.4013/FSU.2021.221.08

Beatriz Sorrentino Marques

引用次数: 0

Brain as agent and conscious mind as action guide: from Libet-style experiments to necessary conditions for free will 大脑作为代理人，意识作为行动指南:从利比亚式实验到自由意志的必要条件

4区哲学

Filosofia Unisinos Pub Date : 2021-03-15 DOI: 10.4013/FSU.2021.221.09

J. Coelho

{"title":"Brain as agent and conscious mind as action guide: from Libet-style experiments to necessary conditions for free will","authors":"J. Coelho","doi":"10.4013/FSU.2021.221.09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/FSU.2021.221.09","url":null,"abstract":"Many neuroscientific experiments, based on monitoring brain activity, suggest that it is possible to predict the conscious intention/choice/decision of an agent before he himself knows that. Some neuroscientists and philosophers interpret the results of these experiments as showing that free will is an illusion, since it is the brain and not the conscious mind that intends/chooses/decides. Assuming that the methods and results of these experiments are reliable the question is if they really show that free will is an illusion. To address this problem, I argue that first it is needed to answer three questions related to the relationship between conscious mind and brain: 1. Do brain events cause conscious events? 2. Do conscious events cause brain events? 3. Who is the agent, that is, who consciously intends/chooses/ decides, the conscious mind, the brain, or both? I answer these questions by arguing that the conscious mind is a property of the brain due to which the brain has the causal capacity to interact adaptively with its body, and trough the body, with the physical and sociocultural environment. In other words, the brain is the agent and the conscious mind, in its various forms cognitive, volitional and emotional and contents, is its guide of action. Based on this general view I argue that the experiments aforementioned do not show that free will is an illusion, and as a starting point for examining this problem I point out, from some exemplary situations, what I believe to be some of the necessary conditions for free will.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"22 1","pages":"78-83"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43384120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Artefacts: the big picture in broad terms 人工制品:广义上的大图景

4区哲学

Filosofia Unisinos Pub Date : 2021-03-15 DOI: 10.4013/FSU.2021.221.05

A. Leclerc

{"title":"Artefacts: the big picture in broad terms","authors":"A. Leclerc","doi":"10.4013/FSU.2021.221.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/FSU.2021.221.05","url":null,"abstract":"My aim in this programmatic paper is to explore the relationship among three important notions: intentionality, disposition and artefact. There wouldn’t be artefacts without what I call “intentional work,” a sustained activity directed to the production of some good. I first present contextualism as a method. Then I use it to delimit the problematic concept ARTEFACT, with the intention to apply it to repertoires of mental dispositions that affect directly our personal identity. The unavoidable but loose criterion of human intervention is used, at least to some degree. Attitudes are intentional states with conceptual content, and concepts are dispositions. We acquire concepts during our lives, sometimes unconsciously, sometimes explicitly through definition of some kind, and each cognitive agent has a unique repertoire of concepts and a unique idiolect as well. The idea that our mental representations (at least some of them) are artefacts might sound strange at first sight, but I shall try to show that it makes full sense. Most of our mental dispositions –those provided with a conceptual content– are themselves artefacts. At the end, we are all different psychologically and culturally because our idiolects and repertoires of concepts are different. For a large part, what makes our species so special is an ongoing process through which homo sapiens makes itself what it is.Keywords: Intentionality, disposition, artefact, contextualism, repertoire.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"22 1","pages":"40-47"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48619782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Ver-como y epistemología hinge 视形和认识论铰链

4区哲学

Filosofia Unisinos Pub Date : 2021-03-15 DOI: 10.4013/FSU.2021.221.04

Maria Sol Yuan

{"title":"Ver-como y epistemología hinge","authors":"Maria Sol Yuan","doi":"10.4013/FSU.2021.221.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/FSU.2021.221.04","url":null,"abstract":"El presente articulo tiene como objetivo establecer en que sentido resultan justificables desde un punto de vista epistemico las proposiciones englobadas bajo el empleo perceptual de ‘ver-como’, desarrollado por Wittgenstein en la Segunda Parte de Philosophical Investigations. Para ello, en primer lugar, se aclarara el vinculo interno entre ‘experiencia visual’ e ‘interpretacion’ en la clase de casos mencionados. En segundo lugar, se mostrara como el ‘ver-como’ respeta la solucion a la paradoja del seguimiento de reglas, en tanto no presupone ningun intermediario ni necesita alguno para dar cuenta de lo percibido, resaltando las nociones de ‘practica’, ‘familiaridad’ y ‘contexto’ comunes tanto en la mencionada solucion como en los casos de ‘ver-como’. En tercer lugar, se recurrira a la distincion general entre certezas o ‘hinges’ y ‘proposiciones’ de caracter epistemico presentada por Wittgenstein en On Certainty. Dicha distincion servira para ubicar el caso de la percepcion de aspectos presentes en los empleos de ‘ver-como’ como un posible campo de aplicacion de la denominada Epistemologia Hinge, mostrando como, en casos particulares, las certezas perceptuales que modelan nuestra forma de vida y que carecen de fundamento, pueden ser recontextualizadas y ameritar una justificacion razonable.Palabras claves: Wittgenstein, percepcion de aspectos, ver-como, ejes, certezas, justificacion.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"22 1","pages":"29-37"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42093782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Cognitive penetration and taste predicates: making an exception to the rule 认知渗透与味觉谓词：破例

4区哲学

Filosofia Unisinos Pub Date : 2021-03-15 DOI: 10.4013/FSU.2021.221.02

David Bordonaba-Plou

{"title":"Cognitive penetration and taste predicates: making an exception to the rule","authors":"David Bordonaba-Plou","doi":"10.4013/FSU.2021.221.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/FSU.2021.221.02","url":null,"abstract":"The relevance of cognitive penetration has been pointed out concerning three fields within philosophy: philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. This paper argues that this phenomenon is also relevant to the philosophy of language. First, I will defend that there are situations where ethical, social, or cultural rules can affect our taste perceptions. This influence can cause speakers to utter conflicting contents that lead them to disagree and, subsequently, to negotiate the circumstances of application of the taste predicates they have used to describe or express their taste perceptions. Then, to account for the proper dynamics of these cases, I will develop a theoretical framework build upon two elements: the Lewisian idea of the score of a conversation (Lewis, 1979), and Richard’s (2008) taxonomy of the different attitudes speakers can have in taste disagreements. In a nutshell, I will argue that speakers can accommodate these conflicting contents as exceptions to the rule that determines the circumstances of application of taste predicates.Keywords: Cognitive penetration, Common ground, Circumstances of application, Accommodation, Exceptions, Score of the conversation, Taste predicates.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"22 1","pages":"12-20"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42056376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0