CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic)最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
The Resilience of French Companies to the COVID-19 Crisis 法国企业应对新冠肺炎危机的韧性
CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-06-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3616734
Alexandre Garel, Arthur Petit-Romec
{"title":"The Resilience of French Companies to the COVID-19 Crisis","authors":"Alexandre Garel, Arthur Petit-Romec","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3616734","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3616734","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the resilience of French listed companies to the COVID-19 shock. We examine the effect of numerous firm characteristics related to financial flexibility, ownership structure, corporate governance, and corporate social responsibility on the stock returns during the COVID-19 shock. Our results show that French companies with more debt and less profitability experience worse stock returns, indicating the role played by financial flexibility. We also find that firms with greater ownership by short-term investors or active investors experience worse stock returns during the COVID-19 shock, suggesting that a base of shareholders with long-term orientation and commitment helps firms to weather the effect of market-wide shocks.","PeriodicalId":418861,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic)","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121241715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Bankruptcy’s Role in the COVID-19 Crisis 破产在COVID-19危机中的作用
CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-04-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3567127
E. Morrison, A. Saavedra
{"title":"Bankruptcy’s Role in the COVID-19 Crisis","authors":"E. Morrison, A. Saavedra","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3567127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3567127","url":null,"abstract":"Policymakers have minimized the role of bankruptcy law in mitigating the financial fallout from COVID-19 Scholars too are unsure about the merits of bankruptcy","PeriodicalId":418861,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125840596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Global Financial Crisis and State’s Social-Economic Differences – A Deterrent to Corporate Governance Convergence? 全球金融危机与国家社会经济差异——公司治理趋同的阻碍?
CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-09-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3457939
Yomi Olalere
{"title":"Global Financial Crisis and State’s Social-Economic Differences – A Deterrent to Corporate Governance Convergence?","authors":"Yomi Olalere","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3457939","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3457939","url":null,"abstract":"Various socio-economic incidences have placed a strain on the abilities of global organization to effectively implement a corporate convergence, the challenge that continues to have impact on the cross-border business transactions. Couple with the Enron, World-Com, Pamlat, Nortel Networks and many other financial scandals that plagued multinationals, each nation has kept mum on the convergence of corporate governance systems rather, they have implemented a divergent approach that encourages individualism over collectivism. The actions of the European Union through the International Financial Corporation has focused on establishing directives to enhance transparency, for greater shareholder engagement and to support company growth and competitiveness. Other programs and institutions were launched to further support effective corporate governance across European union countries. <br><br>Organization of Economic and Community Development (OECD), Basel Committee for Banking (BCBS), EU developments, Investor developments, Accounting, Audit, and Ethics Standards developments are some of the recent developments across Europe. In America, programs like Sarbanes Oxley (SOX), Dodd Franklin were important legislation aimed at curbing financial misappropriation and lack of transparency in publicly traded companies. In Ontario Canada, Bill 198 was implemented to protect investors against fraud. <br><br>For the purpose of this project, emphasis will be laid on the convergence of the corporate governance. Can it be achieved, and under what circumstances can there be a global convergence of corporate governance. What are the constraints, and the possible solutions? The pace at which the globalization is connecting the world together on a common market place called cyberspace, the need to have a convergent corporate governance that will outlaw divergent, and or, the peculiarities of divergence over convergence. Can the two work together, yet able to address the concerns of differences in legal, cultural, ownership, actors and other structural differences. In the end, recommendations will be proposed on the best strategy to unite the global organizations around common corporate governance systems. <br>","PeriodicalId":418861,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic)","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127683051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rethinking Corporate Law During a Financial Crisis 金融危机中公司法的反思
CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-01-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3105175
Yair Listokin, Inho Mun
{"title":"Rethinking Corporate Law During a Financial Crisis","authors":"Yair Listokin, Inho Mun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3105175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3105175","url":null,"abstract":"Since the Financial Crisis of 2008, most reform measures and discussions have asked how the law of financial regulation could be improved to prevent or mitigate future crises. These discussions give short shrift to the role played by corporate law during the Financial Crisis of 2008 and other financial crises. One critical regulatory tool during the crisis was “regulation by deal,” in which healthy financial firms (“acquirers”) would hastily acquire failing firms (“targets”) to mitigate the crisis. The deals were governed by corporate law, so corporate law played an outsize role in the response to the crisis. But few observers have asked how corporate law—in addition to financial regulation—should govern dealmaking in financial crises. To fill in this gap, this Article focuses on the role played by corporate law during the Financial Crisis of 2008, and asks whether corporate law should be different during a financial crisis than in ordinary times. Using an externality framework—failure of a systemically important firm can harm the entire economy, and not just the shareholders of the failed firm—this Article identifies a key problem with the current corporate law regime as applied in financial crises: the shareholder value maximization principle as applied to failing target companies. This principle, manifested in the form of shareholder voting rights on mergers and board fiduciary duties to shareholders, is inapplicable to systemically important target firms whose failure would have enormous negative externalities on the rest of the economy. This Article contends that corporate law as applied to systemically important, failing target firms during crises should change as follows: (1) replace shareholder merger voting rights with appraisal rights, and (2) alter fiduciary duties so that directors and officers of those failing target firms consider the interests of the broader economy.","PeriodicalId":418861,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115780014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Public and Private Corporate Governance Historical Analysis and Development Prospects 全球金融危机对公私合营公司治理影响的历史分析与发展展望
CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-09-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3034679
Danilo Stentella
{"title":"Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Public and Private Corporate Governance Historical Analysis and Development Prospects","authors":"Danilo Stentella","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3034679","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3034679","url":null,"abstract":"The issue of financial crises is mainly due to its ability to compromise the lasting economic function of companies, profits and non-profit, public and private. What the economic world is facing in the apparently acute phase since the second half of 2008, is the result of a number of factors, more thoroughly analysed in the body of this paper, which illustrious observers have identified in a perverse financialization of the economy. Often compared to the Great Depression of 1929, the current turmoil shows greater similarities with the turbulence that occurred in the Italian peninsula between the end of the 13th and the beginning of the 14th century, begun in 1294 with the bankruptcy of the financial company of the Ricciardi di Lucca.","PeriodicalId":418861,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133926475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social Justice and Capitalism: An Assessment of the Teachings of Pope Francis from a Law and Macroeconomics Perspective 社会正义与资本主义:从法律和宏观经济学的角度评价教皇方济各的教诲
CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3024951
S. Ramirez
{"title":"Social Justice and Capitalism: An Assessment of the Teachings of Pope Francis from a Law and Macroeconomics Perspective","authors":"S. Ramirez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3024951","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3024951","url":null,"abstract":"Pope Francis’s application and extension of longstanding Catholic social teachings to compelling contemporary problems helps to focus attention on such problems. Global economic inequality and growing economic inequality in the United States has already imposed trillions in excess costs on the economy for the enhanced wealth of a relative handful of global elites. Now global warming promises another massive wealth transfer of trillions of dollars from the global economy and the poorest among us for the benefit of a small number of energy industry elites. This article puts the teachings of Pope Francis on inequality and the environment in macroeconomic perspective.","PeriodicalId":418861,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133567436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Managerial Performance Incentives and Firm Risk during Economic Expansions and Recessions 经济扩张与衰退时期的管理绩效激励与企业风险
CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-08-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2476964
Tanseli Savaşer, Elif Şişli Ciamarra
{"title":"Managerial Performance Incentives and Firm Risk during Economic Expansions and Recessions","authors":"Tanseli Savaşer, Elif Şişli Ciamarra","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2476964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2476964","url":null,"abstract":"We argue that the relationship between managerial pay-for-performance incentives and risk taking is procyclical. We study the relationship between incentives provided by stock-based compensation and rm risk for U.S. non- nancial corporations over the two business cycles between 1992 and 2009. We show that a given level of pay-for-performance incentives results in signi cantly lower rm risk when the economy is in a downturn. The documented procyclical relationship between incentives and risk taking is consistent with state-dependent risk aversion. Our ndings contribute to the literature on the depres- sive e¤ects of performance incentives on rm risk by documenting the importance of the interaction between performance incentives and risk aversion.","PeriodicalId":418861,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128938744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
Systemically Important Banks (SIBs) in the Post-Crisis Era: 'The' Global Response, and Responses Around the Globe for 135 Countries 后危机时代的系统重要性银行(sib):“全球应对”以及全球135个国家的应对
CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-07-16 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2294641
James R. Barth, C. Brummer, Tong Li, Daniel E. Nolle
{"title":"Systemically Important Banks (SIBs) in the Post-Crisis Era: 'The' Global Response, and Responses Around the Globe for 135 Countries","authors":"James R. Barth, C. Brummer, Tong Li, Daniel E. Nolle","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2294641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2294641","url":null,"abstract":"Financial system policymakers around the world continue to respond vigorously to the problems in financial markets, financial institutions, and financial system regulation and supervision brought into high relief by the global financial crisis. However, the overall understanding of what those responses are remains rather vague and limited. Our study contributes to improving the state of knowledge by focusing on one particularly relevant issue, the regulation and supervision of systemically important banks (SIBs). The heart of our contribution is the presentation of information heretofore obscure, or new, or both. Our approach is to develop two complementary perspectives. The first perspective is what we have characterized as \"the global view.\" That discussion begins by noting that the G20 and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) are the architects of the most significant agenda in the world to reform the global financial system, including in particular as that system operates through systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). We explain what the G20 and the FSB are, how they came to occupy the driver's seat so to speak, and the evolution of their major financial system reform initiatives since the darkest days of the global financial crisis. Our discussion highlights SIFIs initiatives, emphasizing in particular those pertaining to global systemically important financial institutions/banks (G-SIFIs and G-SIBs). Our second perspective is a country-specific one. It starts by making the important observation that while most of the largest banks around the world have not been designated as \"globally\" systemically important, they are nevertheless systemically important when considered in a national or \"domestic\" context. Under those circumstances it is therefore fortunate that, due to recent World Bank efforts, a large set of information exists about the regulation and supervision of SIBs. Our study summarizes and highlights the new data collected by the World Bank on the post-crisis regulation and supervision of SIBs by 135 countries around the world. Broadly, that analysis shows that countries are more similar than different in the measures they have adopted for regulating and supervising SIBs. We conclude our study by suggesting that, although that fact should aid countries in coordinating policies internationally, there is a very long way to go in that respect.","PeriodicalId":418861,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic)","volume":"386 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124785157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Corporate Governance in the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide 2007-2008年金融危机中的公司治理:来自全球金融机构的证据
CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-01-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1397685
David H. Erkens, Mingyi Hung, Pedro Matos
{"title":"Corporate Governance in the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide","authors":"David H. Erkens, Mingyi Hung, Pedro Matos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1397685","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1397685","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the influence of corporate governance on financial firms' performance during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Using a unique dataset of 296 financial firms from 30 countries that were at the center of the crisis, we find that firms with more independent boards and higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during the crisis period. Further exploration suggests that this is because (1) firms with higher institutional ownership took more risk prior to the crisis, which resulted in larger shareholder losses during the crisis period, and (2) firms with more independent boards raised more equity capital during the crisis, which led to a wealth transfer from existing shareholders to debtholders. Overall, our findings add to the literature by examining the corporate governance determinants of financial firms' performance during the 2007–2008 crisis.","PeriodicalId":418861,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125079882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1157
Internal Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Lessons for Banks, Regulators and Supervisors 公司内部治理与金融危机:给银行、监管机构和监管者的教训
CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-12-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1971659
E. Gualandri, E. Mangone, A. Stanziale
{"title":"Internal Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Lessons for Banks, Regulators and Supervisors","authors":"E. Gualandri, E. Mangone, A. Stanziale","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1971659","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1971659","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to highlight the importance of banks’ Internal Corporate Governance (ICG), viewed as an operational mitigation instrument, in a context where banks enjoy a high degree of organisational flexibility due to principle-based regulatory and risk-based supervisory approaches. The recent crisis has shown, on the one hand, that financial mitigations (i.e. capital requirements) are, per se, not sufficient to ensure the stability of the banks (which underpins the soundness of the entire financial system) and, on the other hand, the failure of the light-touch supervisory approach. The main research question is whether the improvement of ICG, involving proper protection for stakeholders and the switch to a more intrusive supervisory model, will be able to offset the failures of market discipline revealed by the crisis and, together with Basel 3’s reinforced capital adequacy regime, strengthen the resilience of the financial system, without the reintroduction of structural reforms. In the European Union, the new European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and, above all, the three new European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) will play a crucial role in this process.","PeriodicalId":418861,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Effects on Corporate Governance in Financial & Economic Crises (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128078866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 22
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信