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Spectators Versus Stakeholders With/Without Information: The Difference it Makes for Justice 有/没有信息的旁观者与利益相关者:对正义的影响
CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2012-02-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2007180
L. Becchetti, G. Degli Antoni, Stefania Ottone, N. Solferino
{"title":"Spectators Versus Stakeholders With/Without Information: The Difference it Makes for Justice","authors":"L. Becchetti, G. Degli Antoni, Stefania Ottone, N. Solferino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2007180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2007180","url":null,"abstract":"We document that being spectators (no effect on personal payoffs) and, to a lesser extent, stakeholders without information on relative payoffs, induces subjects who can choose distribution criteria after task performance to prefer rewarding talent (vis a vis effort, chance or strict egalitarianism) after guaranteeing a minimal egalitarian base. Information about distribution of payoffs under different criteria reduces dramatically such choice since most players opt or revise their decision in favor of the criterion which maximizes their own payoff (and, by doing so, end up being farther from the maximin choice). Large part (but not all) of the stakeholders’ choices before knowing the payoff distribution are driven by their performance beliefs since two thirds of them choose the criterion in which they assume to perform and earn relatively better.","PeriodicalId":416571,"journal":{"name":"CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134271029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Public Debt, Distortionary Taxation, and Monetary Policy 公共债务、扭曲税收和货币政策
CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2012-02-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2000714
A. Piergallini, Giorgio Rodano
{"title":"Public Debt, Distortionary Taxation, and Monetary Policy","authors":"A. Piergallini, Giorgio Rodano","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2000714","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2000714","url":null,"abstract":"Since Leeper's (1991, Journal of Monetary Economics 27, 129-147) seminal paper, an extensive literature has argued that if fiscal policy is passive, i.e., guarantees public debt stabilization irrespectively of the inflation path, monetary policy can independently be committed to inflation targeting. This can be pursued by following the Taylor principle, i.e., responding to upward perturbations in inflation with a more than one-for-one increase in the nominal interest rate. This paper analyzes an optimizing framework in which the government can only finance public expenditures by levying distortionary taxes. It is demonstrated that households' market participation constraints and Laffer-type effects can render passive fiscal policies unfeasible. For any given target inflation rate, there exists a threshold level of public debt beyond which monetary policy independence is no longer possible. In such circumstances, the dynamics of public debt can be controlled only by means of higher inflation tax revenues: inflation dynamics in line with the fiscal theory of the price level must take place in order for macroeconomic stability to be guaranteed. Otherwise, to preserve inflation control around the steady state by following the Taylor principle, monetary policy must target a higher inflation rate.","PeriodicalId":416571,"journal":{"name":"CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123028205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Living Under the ‘Right’ Government: Does Political Ideology Matter to Trust in Political Institutions? 生活在“正确的”政府下:政治意识形态对政治制度的信任有影响吗?
CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2011-09-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1944169
J. Fischer
{"title":"Living Under the ‘Right’ Government: Does Political Ideology Matter to Trust in Political Institutions?","authors":"J. Fischer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1944169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1944169","url":null,"abstract":"This paper asks whether trust in political institutions depends on individual’s political leaning and the political ideology of the national government. We employ information on 140'000 individuals in 30 democratic OECD countries from the World Values Survey, 1981 – 2007, and estimate so-called micro-based pseudo-panel two-way fixed effects models. Distinguishing between extreme and moderate versions of leftist and rightist political leaning, our estimates reveal that political trust increases non-linearly in the degree of individual’s conservatism. We also find that political leaning is not instrumental to improving one's own socio-economic situation, thus rather constituting an expressive behavior. If government ideology matches individual’s political preferences, trust in political institutions is increased. In contrast, the ‘apolitical’ appears to distrust the political system as such. We also find evidence for a symmetric, but incomplete convergence of party ideologies to the median voter position. Implications for vote abstention are discussed.","PeriodicalId":416571,"journal":{"name":"CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115862243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games 竞争机制博弈中的信息披露
CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2011-07-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1885606
A. Attar, E. Campioni, Gwenaël Piaser
{"title":"Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games","authors":"A. Attar, E. Campioni, Gwenaël Piaser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1885606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1885606","url":null,"abstract":"We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. In this context, we identify a class of direct and incentive compatible mechanisms: each principal privately recommends to each agent to reveal her private information to the other principals, and each agent behaves truthfully. We show that there is a rationale in restricting attention to this class of mechanisms: if all principals make use of direct incentive compatible mechanisms, there are no incentives to unilaterally deviate towards more sophisticated mechanisms. We develop two examples to show that private recommendations are a key element of our construction, and that the restriction to direct incentive compatible mechanisms is not sufficient to provide a complete characterization of equilibria.","PeriodicalId":416571,"journal":{"name":"CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series","volume":"146 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124719691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
The Causal Effect of Family Difficulties During Childhood on Adult Labour Market Outcomes 童年时期家庭困难对成年劳动力市场结果的因果影响
CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2011-07-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1883433
Emanuele Millemaci, D. Sciulli
{"title":"The Causal Effect of Family Difficulties During Childhood on Adult Labour Market Outcomes","authors":"Emanuele Millemaci, D. Sciulli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1883433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1883433","url":null,"abstract":"Applying a propensity score matching approach to UK National Child Development Study, we find that experiencing family difficulties during childhood determines a negative and long-lasting impact on adult employment probabilities and wage. Standard econometric techniques and simulation based sensitivity analysis support our findings. The intensity of the disadvantage appears to increase with the number of recorded family difficulties. Moreover, we find that housing and economic problems are responsible for the more serious disadvantage, while disability of family members and disharmony act statistically significantly only if associated with other problems. Finally, the effect appears not to decline over the cohort working life.","PeriodicalId":416571,"journal":{"name":"CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series","volume":"150 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134223220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Relative Efficiency of Public and Private Health Care 公立和私立医疗保健的相对效率
CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2011-07-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1879136
T. Tacke, R. Waldmann
{"title":"The Relative Efficiency of Public and Private Health Care","authors":"T. Tacke, R. Waldmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1879136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1879136","url":null,"abstract":"A health care system is efficient when an increase in spending results in significant improvements in the health of a population. We test the relative efficiency of public and private health care spending in reducing infant and child mortality using cross-national data for 163 countries. There are two remarkable findings: First, an increase in public funds is both, significantly correlated with a lower mortality and significantly more efficient in reducing mortality than private health care expenditure. Second, private health care expenditure is in all estimations associated with higher, not lower, mortality, although this association is often not statistically significant. The results suggest, holding total health care expenditure constant, a potential decrease in total infant mortality in the 163 countries from 6.9 million deaths (2002) to 4.2-5.3 million deaths for completely publicly financed health care systems, but an increase to 9.0-10.0 million deaths for completely privately financed health care. We can explain some of the estimated difference in the efficiency of public and private health care expenditure by geographies and socioeconomic factors such as HIV prevalence, sanitation standards, corruption, and income distribution. However, the efficiency dfference remains large and statistically significant in all regressions.","PeriodicalId":416571,"journal":{"name":"CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124440048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Theoretical Analysis of Public Funding for Research 公共科研经费的理论分析
CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2011-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1875758
Gianni De Fraja
{"title":"A Theoretical Analysis of Public Funding for Research","authors":"Gianni De Fraja","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1875758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1875758","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies government funding for scientific research. Funds must be distributed among different research institutions and allocated between basic and applied research. Informational constraints prevent less productive institutions to be given any government funding. In order to internalise the beneficial effects of research, the government requires the most productive institutions to carry out more applied research than they would like. Funding for basic research is used by the government to induce more productive institutions to carry out more applied research then they would like.","PeriodicalId":416571,"journal":{"name":"CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129577810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Post-Tender Corruption and Risk Allocation: Implications for Public-Private Partnerships 投标后腐败和风险分配:对公私伙伴关系的影响
CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2011-05-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1846507
E. Iossa, D. Martimort
{"title":"Post-Tender Corruption and Risk Allocation: Implications for Public-Private Partnerships","authors":"E. Iossa, D. Martimort","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1846507","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1846507","url":null,"abstract":"Whilst a lot has been said about how to fight corruption at tender stage in public procurement, post-tender corruption is an issue that remains almost unexplored. In this paper, we make a step towards filling this gap, by studying the relationship between the quality of a country's institutions, in particular its monitoring technologies and corruption, and the level and form of risk transfer to the contractor. We discuss the desirability of state-contingent clauses, which provide insurance to the contractor but are at high risk of manipulation. We derive implications on the benefit and cost of procurement forms which are based on high levels of risk transfer to the private sector, such as Public Private Partnerships (PPPs).","PeriodicalId":416571,"journal":{"name":"CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125660233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
Endogenous Growth, Monetary Shocks and Nominal Rigidities 内生增长、货币冲击和名义刚性
CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2011-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1781035
Barbara Annicchiarico, Alessandra Pelloni, L. Rossi
{"title":"Endogenous Growth, Monetary Shocks and Nominal Rigidities","authors":"Barbara Annicchiarico, Alessandra Pelloni, L. Rossi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1781035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1781035","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce endogenous growth in a standard NK model with staggered prices and wages. We find that the source of nominal rigidities, the shock persistence and the type of Taylor rule affect the relationship between monetary volatility and growth.","PeriodicalId":416571,"journal":{"name":"CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series","volume":"151 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115182024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 29
Science and Technology in World Agriculture: Narratives and Discourses 世界农业中的科技:叙事与话语
CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2010-11-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1705750
P. Scandizzo
{"title":"Science and Technology in World Agriculture: Narratives and Discourses","authors":"P. Scandizzo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1705750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1705750","url":null,"abstract":"The narratives characterizing the current debate on world agricultural research tend to be part of a discourse that rationalizes past experience and future tendencies along the lines of extreme recounts of successes and failures. Stories of agricultural development and of accomplishments of research and science in agriculture tend to be organized according with either a conservative or a radical paradigm, which are in sharp contrast with each other and are at the origin of basic disagreements and biased information. For the neutral observer these contrasting views, to the extent that they seem to concern facts more than opinions, cause disorientation and stress in the form of the well known phenomenon of cognitive dissonance. Among the international institutions, the World Bank appears to have taken on the responsibility of attenuating such a phenomenon by providing, through its own narratives, stylized truths and balanced interpretations.","PeriodicalId":416571,"journal":{"name":"CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124604626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
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