Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal最新文献_第5页

Corporate Charters with Competitive Advantages 具有竞争优势的公司章程

Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal Pub Date : 1998-01-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.245691

S. Turnbull

引用次数: 56

Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth 管理层价值转移与股东财富

Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal Pub Date : 1996-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.10049

L. Bebchuk, Christine Jolls

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引用次数: 71

OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 经合组织公司治理原则

Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.174229

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

{"title":"OECD Principles of Corporate Governance","authors":"Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.174229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.174229","url":null,"abstract":"The OECD Council, meeting at Ministerial level on 27-28 April 1998, called upon the OECD to develop, in conjunction with national governments, other relevant international organizations and the private sector, a set of corporate governance standards and guidelines. In order to fulfil this objective, the OECD established the Ad-Hoc Task Force on Corporate Governance to develop non-binding principles that embody the view of Member countries on this issue. The Principles are intended to assist Member and non-member governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, institutional and regulator framework for corporate governance in their countries, and to provide guidance and suggestions for stock exchanges, investors, corporations, and other parties that have a role in the process of developing good corporate governance. The Principles focus on publicly traded companies. However, to the extent they are deemed applicable, they might also be a useful tool to improve corporate governance in non-traded companies, for example, privately held and state-owned enterprises. The Principles represent a common basis that OECD Member countries consider essential for the development of good government practice. They are intended to be concise, understandable and accessible to the international community. They are not intended to substitute for private sector initiatives to develop more detailed \"best practice\" in governance.","PeriodicalId":415084,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115586920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

UK Company Board Structures and Corporate Performance: A Cohort Study of 1990s Ipos in the UK 英国公司董事会结构与公司绩效:1990年代英国ipo的队列研究

Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.269807

R. Buckland

{"title":"UK Company Board Structures and Corporate Performance: A Cohort Study of 1990s Ipos in the UK","authors":"R. Buckland","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.269807","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.269807","url":null,"abstract":"The publication of the Cadbury and Hampel Reports in the UK drew attention to the concern with the 'proper' governance of organisations; and in particular the governance of public, quoted companies. This paper uses UK IPOs in 1990-1994 to establish a pattern of corporate board structure and qualifications and then considers the empirical issue of whether variant board structures and qualifications can be associated with the conduct and the performance of quoted companies. Specifically, it questions whether the structure and qualifications of boards and board members, the combination of the roles of chairman and chief executive in one individual and the numbers and independence of non-executive members of boards of directors can be shown to explain variation in corporate performance, growth, or survival. In exploring performance, the paper adopts a multi-dimensional perspective, addressing performance from several stakeholder perspectives, including those of shareholders (equity returns), employees (growth and salaries) and society. It concludes that the Cadbury Code of Practice has been inappropriate as a model for the boards of directors of emergent quoted businesses and that there is little evidence that the structure or qualifications of boards and board members are connected with subsequent performance.","PeriodicalId":415084,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130657236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7