The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy最新文献_第3页

The Normative Potency of Sexually Exclusive Love 1 性排他性之爱的规范性效力

The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-12-21 DOI: 10.4324/9781315645209-8

Jennifer Ryan Lockhart

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Love in the Jewish Tradition 犹太传统中的爱

The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-12-21 DOI: 10.4324/9781315645209-33

L. Goodman

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Eros and Agape in Interpersonal Relationships 人际关系中的爱欲与爱欲

The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-12-21 DOI: 10.4324/9781315645209-11

Daniel G. Campos

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Love and Marriage 爱情与婚姻

The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-12-21 DOI: 10.4324/9781315645209-13

Brook J. Sadler

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On the Love of Nature 论对自然的热爱

The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-12-21 DOI: 10.4324/9781315645209-18

R. A. Furtak

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(The Varieties of) Love in Contemporary Anglophone Philosophy 当代英语国家哲学中的爱的多样性

The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-12-21 DOI: 10.4324/9781315645209-38

Benjamin Bagley

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Queer Bodies and Queer Love 酷儿的身体和酷儿的爱

The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-12-21 DOI: 10.4324/9781315645209-9

M. Behrensen

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Reasons of Love 爱的理由

The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-12-21 DOI: 10.4324/9781315645209-25

K. Schaubroeck

引用次数: 6

Threats, Warnings, and Relationship Ultimatums 威胁、警告和关系最后通牒

The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-12-21 DOI: 10.4324/9781315645209-12

H. Liberto

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Caring to Be Green 关心环保

The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-12-21 DOI: 10.4324/9781315645209-19

Cheryl Hall

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