CGN: Insolvency & Reorganization Law (Sub-Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Hidden Wealth Transfers in Bankruptcy Asset Sales: A Real Option Analysis","authors":"Jordan B. Neyland, Kathryn St John","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3789763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3789763","url":null,"abstract":"Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, company-debtors can sell assets, out of the ordinary course of business, if there is a “good business reason”, before creditors, shareholders and other claimants have agreed to a plan (§363). Such asset sales are frequently contested amongst claimants. This paper focuses on the conflicts that arise during such assets sales between creditors of different priorities and between creditors and shareholders. We use option theory to describe the payoffs and incentives of the two parties and show, under a limited set of assumptions, how permitting these sales affects the value of parties’ interests. We show large wealth-redistributive effects from early sale that can dwarf the value losses that courts use to justify early asset sales. This brings into question recent decision making and trends in bankruptcy that trade off speed at the expense of shareholders’ rights and safeguards.","PeriodicalId":413651,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Insolvency & Reorganization Law (Sub-Topic)","volume":"160 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129259308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Priorities Dilemma in the EU Restructuring Directive: Absolute or Relative Priority Rule?","authors":"Giulia Ballerini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3661191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3661191","url":null,"abstract":"The EU Directive on preventive restructuring frameworks gives the EU Member States (‘MSs’) the choice between implementing two fairness rules in cross-class cram-down: the US-style absolute priority rule (‘APR’) or the newly conceived relative priority rule (‘RPR’). This Article argues that there is no good reason for the MSs to implement the RPR in domestic law. While the APR effectively protects the rights of the dissenting classes to get what they are entitled for, the RPR increases moral hazard and opportunism. Also, it might make debt investments in the EU unattractive. On top of that, this Article shows that the RPR lacks a clear theoretical justification. One of the main reasons why the RPR was introduced in the Directive alongside the APR is that the RPR was thought to provide a solution to some of the APR problems. This Article considers three of these problems (i.e., the ‘valuation problem’, the ‘holdout problem’ and the ‘problem of the relevant shareholders’) and explains the reasons why the RPR is not an appropriate solution to them. Among these three problems, the most troublesome one from the perspective of the EU is that the APR makes it difficult to award value to equity of SMEs (the ‘problem of the relevant shareholders’). This Article argues that using the RPR to deal with this problem would incentivize the shareholders to behave opportunistically and to orchestrate the restructuring. Instead of the RPR, this Article suggests two alternative techniques which MSs can enact to better address the issue: the new value exception ‘in kind’ and the disposable income method.","PeriodicalId":413651,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Insolvency & Reorganization Law (Sub-Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115834355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Pre-packaged Insolvency in India: Lessons from USA and UK","authors":"Himani Singh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3518287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3518287","url":null,"abstract":"Pre-packaged bankruptcy, commonly referred to as “Pre-packs” finds its roots in United States and United Kingdom; but is yet to be formally integrated in the Indian bankruptcy regime. While the latest Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 has been helpful in improving the stressed asset statistics, the statute is still undergoing teething troubles and has scope for bringing in many improvements such as introducing Pre-packs. In this backdrop, this term paper discusses the basic features of Indian insolvency structure and how Pre-packs will fare in the market given the current regulatory regime. The paper analyses the corporate insolvency resolution process in India, highlights specific challenges to introduction of Pre-packs and presents a holistic overview of the benefits as well as disadvantages that Pre-packs would bring along with them.","PeriodicalId":413651,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Insolvency & Reorganization Law (Sub-Topic)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120950188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Private Benefits Without Control? Modern Chapter 11 and the Market for Corporate Control","authors":"O. Couwenberg, S. Lubben","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3386029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3386029","url":null,"abstract":"Outside of bankruptcy, a board of directors’ decision to take control rights away from existing shareholders and grant them to another is subject to heightened fiduciary duties. As the sale of control represents a kind of end game, shareholders have one last chance to realize the full value for their investment. In such a context, their interests warrant special protection. \u0000 \u0000A similar sale of control can happen in a chapter 11 procedure when a bankruptcy plan revamps the capital structure of the firm. In such a restructuring of the firm, control rights can be newly created, redefined and redistributed to corporate stakeholders. As bankruptcy always implicates many more stakeholders than only shareholders, a sale of control thus implicates a wider array of control rights owners than a normal control transaction. However, in a chapter 11 procedure fiduciary duties protecting interests of such owners of control rights do not arise and this creates the potential for agency misdeeds. \u0000 \u0000We discuss three recent chapter 11 or 15 cases in which the bankruptcy plans lead to a restructuring of the capital structures, redistributing control in the process. Our viewpoint is that in such complex restructuring processes, private benefits of control provide incentives to a select group of investors to twist the plan to their advantage. Our three cases show: 1) a lack of openness to other investors who are not part of the plan proposing classes; 2) that plans redistribute control via penny warrants, private placements, and other similar devices, shutting out other shareholders or diluting holdings significantly; and 3) a deal and fee structure that explicitly rewards specific groups and not others. \u0000 \u0000We conclude that in chapter 11 procedures, a redistribution of benefits is possible to an extent not possible under state corporate law. However, as we discuss only three exemplary cases, caution is warranted at the moment as we cannot provide a full empirical picture of private benefits in chapter 11 and chapter 15 procedures.","PeriodicalId":413651,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Insolvency & Reorganization Law (Sub-Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123334245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Evolutionary Landscape of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code in India – Analysis and Key Observations","authors":"Shikha Rawal","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3079292","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3079292","url":null,"abstract":"The inability to pay debts by a corporation or an individual is termed as “insolvency”. The inability to pay debts could be either ‘cash flow insolvency’ or ‘balance sheet insolvency’. Irrespective of the financial context, the paucity of funds whether current or contingent, can result into declaring, in case of an individual “an insolvent” or in case of a corporation, “bankrupt”. A good insolvency and bankruptcy code balances the three interests: (i) to effectively rehabilitate the enterprise and help promote the interest of the debtor in his business; (ii) to protect the interests of the creditors who have supplied credit and (iii) the future creditors who would likely participate in the business. It is difficult to establish a legal system wherein the interests of both the debtor as well as the creditor are maximized.","PeriodicalId":413651,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Insolvency & Reorganization Law (Sub-Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125975920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"O “Dinheiro Novo” Como Elemento De Interpretação Do Conceito De “Crédito Existente” Na Recuperação Judicial ('New Money' As a Key Element for the Interpretation of 'Existing Credit' in Judicial Reorganization)","authors":"Francisco Satiro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3058053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3058053","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Portuguese Abstract:</b> Aparentemente simples, a regra constante do caput do art. 49 da Lei 11.101 – que submete à recuperação judicial, somente os créditos existentes na data do pedido - vem gerando polêmica especialmente quando a formalização da obrigação não ocorre concomitantemente com o fato jurídico que lhe dá causa. O STJ demonstrou importante evolução na interpretação do dispositivo ao referir-se ao “fato gerador da obrigação” como elemento chave na sua interpretação. No texto, o que proponho é um próximo passo: que o conceito de “dinheiro novo” – assim considerada qualquer utilidade (recursos em dinheiro, claro, mas também serviços, bens, tecnologia, etc) fornecida ao devedor para satisfazer uma necessidade posterior ao pedido de recuperação judicial e que não seja condicionada a um pagamento imediato ou antecipado – seja adotado como chave para classificar um crédito como “existente ao tempo do pedido” (e portanto submetido ao regime da recuperação judicial) ou “não existente”. A primeira parte do texto apresenta uma visão resumida da lógica de negociação coletiva da recuperação judicial. São apresentados os fundamentos de um procedimento de reorganização em contraste com a liquidação do devedor insolvente, com foco principal nos problemas de ação coletiva decorrentes da “tragédia dos comuns”. Mostra-se com isso que há claros fundamentos objetivos para que a Lei estabeleça mecanismos que viabilizem a negociação coletiva em busca de uma solução negociada e como os credores se vinculam. Na segunda parte, apresento uma brevíssima evolução da interpretação do conceito de “crédito existente na data do pedido” e introduzo a sugestão de utilização do conceito de “dinheiro novo” como chave de interpretação, fornecendo argumentos sistêmicos e axiológicos que podem oferecer uma solução ao mesmo tempo técnica e segura para a questão. <b>English Abstract:</b> The paper analyses the evolution of the definition of \"existing credit\" under Brazilian reorganization proceeding (\"recuperação judicial\"). The term is important as it determines if a credit will be submitted to the reorganization procedure or not. It is quite easy to define it when the reason of the credit immediately generates the correspondent obligation. However, when the date of the formalization of the obligation is far away from the date that the reason of the credit occurs (and after the filing for reorganization), the STJ (superior court of justice) has already ruled that the second one shall prevail. In my paper, I propose new criteria to define if a creditor will be submitted to the reorganization or not: only credits related to \"new money\" (utilities necessaries to satisfy company's needs occurred after the filing) shall not be submitted to the reorganization effects. The paper also brings a brief explanation of reorganization objectives and fundaments, under an economic approach. .","PeriodicalId":413651,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Insolvency & Reorganization Law (Sub-Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127171047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"패스트트랙 기업회생절차가 법정관리 기업의 이자보상비율에 미친 영향 (The Effect of the Fast-Track Corporate Rehabilitation Program on the ICR of the Companies Under Court Receivership)","authors":"Young Jun Choi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3090751","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3090751","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Korean Abstract:</b> 최근 부실기업 처리과정에서 워크아웃 제도의 한계가 노정되면서 시장주도적 기업구조조정 기반 마련의 필요성이 강조되는 가운데 부실기업 구조조정에 대한 법원의 역할도 강화되고 있다. 법원에서는 신속한 회생절차 진행을 위해 패스트트랙(Fast-Track) 기업회생제도를 도입하는 한편 최근에는 워크아웃과 법정관리의 장점을 결합한 회생전문법원(서울회생법원)도 설립하였다. 이러한 배경 하에 본고에서는 기업회생에서 자산가치 하락 등 영업기반 붕괴 때문에 신속한 회생절차 진행이 매우 중요하다는 점을 감안하여 신속한 부실기업 처리를 위해 도입된 패스트트랙 기업회생제도의 효과를 평가해 보고자 한다. 분석방법으로는 정책실시 전?후 효과를 비교?분석할 수 있는 계량적 기법인 이중차분(Differences- in-Differences) 모형을 사용하였다. 분석결과 동 제도가 법정관리 기업의 회생척도로 간주되는 이자보상비율 개선에 미친 효과는 긍정적으로 나타났으나 통계적인 유의성은 떨어지는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 법정관리 시작 전후 기업의 영업기반이 훼손된 데다 법정관리 종료 이후에도 과거 법정관리 기업이었다는 낙인효과(bankruptcy stigma) 등으로 동 제도의 효과가 제한된 데 기인한 것으로 보인다. 이러한 결과는 기업규모 및 주요 업종별로 구분하여 추정해 보아도 동일하게 나타났다. 한편 최근 정부에서 구조조정을 추진하고 있는 철강, 화학 및 조선업에 대한 패스트트랙 기업회생절차 제도의 효과를 분석해 본 결과 화학업을 제외한 여타 업종에 대해서는 통계적인 유의성이 떨어졌다. 화학업은 국내 기업의 높은 경쟁력에 힘입어 패스트트랙 제도를 통해 회생정도를 높일 수 있었으나 철강, 조선업은 중소기업을 중심으로 한 산업 경쟁력 약화로 패스트트랙 제도의 효과가 제한된 것으로 해석된다. 이러한 분석결과는 다음과 같은 시사점을 제시한다. 첫째 기업회생에 대한 패스트트랙 기업회생제도의 효과를 제고하기 위해서는 법정관리 기업에 대한 낙인효과 등에 기인한 신용등급 하락, 높은 위험 프리미엄 부담 등 불이익을 줄이기 위한 제도적인 노력이 요구된다. 다음으로 철강, 조선업에 대한 실증분석 결과에서와 같이 산업 경쟁력이 약화되어 있을 경우 동 제도의 효과가 제한될 수 있으므로 사업재편 등 구조조정 노력도 필요할 것으로 생각된다. 이러한 점들이 개선될 경우 패스트트랙 기업회생제도의 효과가 점진적으로 나타나 동 제도가 성공적으로 정착하는 데 큰 도움이 될 것으로 보인다. <b>English Abstract:</b> The limitation of the work-out system, revealed in the process of addressing insolvent companies, brings the necessity for markets to prepare the grounds of corporate restructuring. In addition, the role of the court in restructuring insolvent firms is emphasized. The court employees the Fast-Track corporate rehabilitation program for swift rehabilitation proceedings; and recently, the rehabilitation-specialized court has been set up, combining the advantages of work-out and legal management. Given the fact that a swift rehabilitation procedure is very critical due to the risk of the collapse of business foundation (e.g. falling asset value), this paper analyzes the effect of the Fast-Track program, introduced for a swift rehabilitation procedure. We use a Differences-in-Differences model, an econometric technique, to analyze and compare prior-and-post effects of policy implementation. The analysis result shows that the effect of this program on the ICR of the companies under court receivership is positive except enough statistical significance. Their business foundation has been undermined before and after court receivership and they have difficulties in securing funds due to bankruptcy stigma even after the termination of receivership, resulting in curbing the effect of the program. The same result is observed in the estimation by size and business (e.g. large companies, small and medium companies, and manufacturing). As for certain industries, subject to government restructuring, we do not find enough statistical significance in the analysis of Fast-Track effect, except for chemistry. In the case of chemistry, the Fast-Track program is helpful to increase the chances for rehabilitation owing to domestic compa","PeriodicalId":413651,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Insolvency & Reorganization Law (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131056081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Effect of the Fast-Track Corporate Rehabilitation Program on the ICR of the Companies Under Court Receivership (패스트트랙 기업회생절차가 법정관리 기업의 이자보상비율에 미친 영향)","authors":"Young Jun Choi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3059316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3059316","url":null,"abstract":"The limitation of the work-out system, revealed in the process of addressing insolvent companies, brings the necessity for markets to prepare the grounds of corporate restructuring. In addition, the role of the court in restructuring insolvent firms is emphasized. The court employes the Fast-Track corporate rehabilitation program for swift rehabilitation proceedings; and recently, the rehabilitation-specialized court has been set up, combining the advantages of work-out and legal management. Given the fact that a swift rehabilitation procedure is very critical due to the risk of the collapse of business foundation (e.g. falling asset value), this paper analyzes the effect of the Fast-Track program, introduced for a swift rehabilitation procedure. We use a Differences-in-Differences model, an econometric technique, to analyze and compare prior-and-post effects of policy implementation. The analysis result shows that the effect of this program on the ICR of the companies under court receivership is positive except enough statistical significance. Their business foundation has been undermined before and after court receivership and they have difficulties in securing funds due to bankruptcy stigma even after the termination of receivership, resulting in curbing the effect of the program. The same result is observed in the estimation by size and business (e.g. large companies, small and medium companies, and manufacturing). As for certain industries, subject to government restructuring, we do not find enough statistical significance in the analysis of Fast-Track effect, except for chemistry. In the case of chemistry, the Fast-Track program is helpful to increase the chances for rehabilitation owing to domestic companies' strong competitiveness. For steel and shipbuilding, however, the effect of Fast-Track seems to be not enough; their industrial competitiveness has been weakened, notably, in small and medium sized companies. This result has following implications. First, to improve the effect of Fast-Track, institutional efforts are required to reduce disadvantages induced by bankruptcy stigma (e.g. a fall in credit rating and high risk premiums). In particular, specific measures are needed for companies, graduating from court receivership, to do business as normal companies. Next, as observed in the empirical analysis of steel and shipbuilding, the effect of Fast-Track may not be exercised to the full with weakened industrial competitiveness. Therefore, restructuring efforts such as business reshuffle seem to be necessary. If these issues are resolved, the Fast-Track effect will be gradually improved, and consequently the Fast-Track program will be successfully settled.","PeriodicalId":413651,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Insolvency & Reorganization Law (Sub-Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115237468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Technically Bankrupt","authors":"Brook E. Gotberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2942871","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2942871","url":null,"abstract":"What is the difference between a robot and a lawyer? The answer is not a joke, and may soon be a matter of great urgency for attorneys, as the legal field attempts to adjust to disruptive technologies that are likely to permanently alter the way that law is practiced throughout the United States. The consequences for failing to adjust to technological disruption for any industry, as demonstrated in recent years by big-name, bankrupt companies, can be disastrous. Legal tools founds in the chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code are largely intended to assist debtors in reorganizing their business affairs, preserving value by shedding unprofitable business activities and redirecting resources to more profitable venues. However, these tools grow less effective as companies become more insolvent. Further, although law firms may file for bankruptcy like other businesses, they have historically struggled to reorganize due in large part to the ability and propensity of firm assets – the attorneys themselves – to simply leave the company. Accordingly, law firms, faced with an array of new and disruptive technologies, should draw on the lessons of prior industry failures and make adjustments swiftly, before finding themselves “technically” bankruptcy.","PeriodicalId":413651,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Insolvency & Reorganization Law (Sub-Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121495340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Toward a European Business Rescue Culture","authors":"Gert‐Jan Boon, Stephan Madaus","doi":"10.4324/9781315738116-13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315738116-13","url":null,"abstract":"Since 2011, the European legislator has taken a new course of action on business failure and insolvency. For a long time, substantive harmonisation was considered unfeasible in the area of insolvency law, however, the developments over the past years have shown that the EU is committed to develop a shared European approach to facilitate the rescue of economically viable but financially distressed businesses. This Chapter discusses the incremental process of harmonisation that has unfolded, the areas in which this harmonization is pursued, and the barriers that the EU faces in achieving a European business rescue culture.<br><br>This chapter portrays, in particular, how the European Union has been working to develop a European business rescue culture. Part one of this chapter will elaborate on the efforts of the European Parliament and European Commission to develop a shared perspective on rescuing distressed businesses. Subsequently, part two will discuss the role of current research in this field. The authors discuss a research project of the European Law Institute on ‘Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law’. In part three some observations will be made with regard to the recent developments in the EU, including a discussion on several barriers that need to be overcome to successfully achieve a European business rescue culture.<br><br>","PeriodicalId":413651,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Insolvency & Reorganization Law (Sub-Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123614511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}