ERN: Information Asymmetry Models (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"The Effect of Information on Market Activity; Evidence From Vehicle Recalls","authors":"Inge van den Bijgaart, Davide Cerruti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3712092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3712092","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We evaluate the effect of vehicle recalls on vehicle transactions in the second-hand market. Using a rich dataset of Dutch vehicle registrations, we exploit the quasiexperimental variation in recalls across nearly-identical cars. We find strong heterogeneities across market segments: transactions increased for cars with lower listed price or with defects, and decreased for those with higher price or no defects. Based on our theoretical model, this suggests that recalls increase sorting in low-end markets, yet exacerbate adverse selection in high-end markets. Our results shed light on the effect of information arrival in markets subject to uncertainty and information asymmetries.","PeriodicalId":411364,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Information Asymmetry Models (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127727353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: On-Demand Contracts As a Screening Device","authors":"Alexander Braun, Markus Haas, C. Hildebrand, P. Thistle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3694973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3694973","url":null,"abstract":"We show that on-demand insurance contracts, an innovative form of coverage recently introduced through the InsurTech sector, can serve as a screening device. To this end, we develop a new adverse selection model consistent with Wilson (1977), Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978). Consumers have private information on their risk profile and the frequency with which they activate coverage. We show that the emergence of on-demand providers alters known market equilibria as low-frequency users are drawn away from the standard policy, receiving more coverage. Thus, the new equilibrium exhibits a higher utilitarian welfare. Our theoretical predictions are supported by additional experimental evidence.","PeriodicalId":411364,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Information Asymmetry Models (Topic)","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126272801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Merchants of Reputation: Privatization Under Elites' Manipulation of Information","authors":"A. Tomasi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3658375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3658375","url":null,"abstract":"An economic elite wants to buy a public asset as cheaply as possible. Its ownership is decided by an incumbent politician who can be of high or low competence. The elite can make a buying offer for the asset and manipulate the information that is available to voters about the incumbent's competence. By attacking the incumbent (trying to uncover bad news about his competence before making him an offer) or threatening him (with uncovering bad news if he refuses to sell), I show that the elite can reduce the prices that the incumbent would accept for selling the asset. I also show that the elite often (but not always) uses threats against a leading incumbent (one who has better reputation than his challenger) and attacks against a trailing one. I further find that a better reputation can actually render an incumbent more susceptible to the elite's influence.","PeriodicalId":411364,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Information Asymmetry Models (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122185780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Quality Signaling through Crowdfunding Pricing","authors":"E. Bolandifar, Zhong Chen, P. Kouvelis, Weihua Zhou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3689946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3689946","url":null,"abstract":"Problem definition: This paper studies an entrepreneur’s pricing strategy in a reward-based crowdfunding campaign under asymmetric product quality information. We propose two signaling mechanisms and investigate how entrepreneurs can leverage their pricing strategy to signal a high-quality project. Academic/practical relevance: This problem is relevant to practice, as asymmetric quality information is a significant concern in reward-based crowdfunding. High-quality entrepreneurs seek credible mechanisms to signal the quality of projects to customers. Methodology: We develop a stylized game-theoretic signaling model with funding and regular selling periods that captures asymmetric quality information between an entrepreneur and customers. Results: We propose a new theory on quality signaling in crowdfunding. We show that contingent access to the regular selling market after running a successful crowdfunding campaign allows high-quality entrepreneurs to signal their quality through low funding prices (one-price signaling). A high-quality entrepreneur can increase his funding price and still signal his high-quality level if he commits to the future regular selling price (two-price signaling). We show that the distinct feature of crowdfunding, that is, the probabilistic nature of crowdfunding, plays different roles in one- and two-price signaling. It is the driving force for the separating equilibrium in one-price signaling, and in two-price signaling, it affects how the entrepreneur should manipulate his funding and regular selling prices to reduce signaling cost. Managerial implications: Entrepreneurs should be mindful of pricing in funding and regular selling periods because it could play an essential role in signaling quality information. Our findings suggest practical tools for quality signaling in crowdfunding. We also investigate when price commitment is the most beneficial for a high-quality entrepreneur, looking for potential signaling mechanisms. Funding: W. Zhou acknowledges financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72192823 and Grant 71821002]. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1177 .","PeriodicalId":411364,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Information Asymmetry Models (Topic)","volume":"369 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124629052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Asymmetric Returns to Housing? Evidence from Landlords and Real Estate Agents","authors":"Luis A. Lopez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3686278","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3686278","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines variation in the returns to housing investments using novel data on rental contracts. Real estate agents are found to obtain higher contract rents by approximately 1% more for themselves (and family members) than for other landlords, which has an average value of about $1,165. Such rent disparities increase at the higher end of the market where finding a tenant is costlier but decrease when landlords observe many comparable rental properties. The typical landlord asks for less rent, experiences longer vacancies, and hedges less against eviction risk than landlords who hold a real estate license or are related to someone who does. These findings shed light on disparities in tenant search costs that affect the returns to housing.","PeriodicalId":411364,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Information Asymmetry Models (Topic)","volume":"163 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128797181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bargaining and War: On the Communication Equilibrium in Conflict Games","authors":"Youngseok Park, Colin F. Campbell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3700758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3700758","url":null,"abstract":"We present a version of Baliga and Sjostrom’s (2012a) conflict games with two asymmetric players. The players contemplate whether to take an active engagement action to compel the leader of a neighboring state (an extremist) to give up his risky weapons. We show that a player with greater damage from the extremist is more likely to choose an active engagement action than a player with lesser damage. Furthermore, we examine cheap-talk communication equilibria with the extremist. The likelihood of both players choosing the active engagement action decreases by a hawkish extremist who can send a provocative message, if both players are coordination types. If both players are opportunistic types, a dovish extremist can send an appeasement message that causes one player to be more active while another to be more inactive. Lastly, we show that there does not exist any other communication equilibrium for either kind of extremist, for any other combination of player types.","PeriodicalId":411364,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Information Asymmetry Models (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125423199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Sorting Expertise","authors":"Ayça Kaya, G. Vereshchagina","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3662492","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3662492","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the optimal sorting of experts, who differ in their ability to acquire information, into production teams. Once a team is formed, experts individually acquire information about the joint project, communicate it to each other, and then engage in team production. Misalignment of preferences at the production stage creates incentives for belief manipulation at the communication stage. We show that the cost associated with misaligned incentives is minimized if experts of similar abilities are placed in the same team. Consequently, surplus maximization may lead to non-diversified teams, even when in the absence of misaligned incentives optimal sorting is negative. Thus, our analysis provides a novel rationale for creation of non-diversified teams of experts.","PeriodicalId":411364,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Information Asymmetry Models (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130337558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Pricing Unverifiable Information","authors":"Salil Sharma, E. Tsakas, M. Voorneveld","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3569640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3569640","url":null,"abstract":"We study markets for information in the form of Bayesian signals. The main feature of such markets is that information is costly for the seller to acquire and cannot be verified by the buyer. We provide a full characterization of the set of all compensation schemes (viz., menus) which guarantee that the demanded signal will be chosen by the seller. We then show that for all such menus, the seller's surplus will always be strictly positive. This is true even in ideal settings for the buyer (e.g., when the buyer is perfectly informed and has all the strategic power), implying that information is always overpriced irrespective of the market characteristics. This prediction is strikingly distinct from the corresponding one in markets for commodities, and it is attributed to the fact that information is unverifiable.","PeriodicalId":411364,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Information Asymmetry Models (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124292226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Opportunity Cost, Inattention and the Bidder's Curse","authors":"David Freeman, Erik O. Kimbrough, J. Reiß","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2915309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2915309","url":null,"abstract":"Auction winners sometimes suffer a \"bidder's curse\", paying more for an item at auction than the fixed price charged for an identical item by other sellers. This seemingly irrational behavior is puzzling because the information necessary to avoid overpaying would appear to be readily available to bidders, yet they seem to ignore it. To understand this behavior, we consider the bidders' decisions whether to acquire information about the fixed price before bidding, in the presence of opportunity costs. Our theory introduces costly information acquisition into an auction model, with a fixed price aftermarket selling an identical good. When information about the fixed price is costly, bidders sometimes remain rationally ignorant and overbid in the auction, generating the bidder's curse. To assess the empirical validity of our proposed explanation, we study the model's predictions in an experiment where subjects have an opportunity cost of looking up a fixed price and bid in an auction. We find that information acquisition decreases and overbidding increases with opportunity cost as predicted. Most observed lookup behavior is rationalizable and rational ignorance reliably generates the bidder's curse.","PeriodicalId":411364,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Information Asymmetry Models (Topic)","volume":"48 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132496797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"'It's Not About the Money. It's About Sending a Message!': Unpacking the Components of Revenge","authors":"A. Molnár, Shereen J. Chaudhry, G. Loewenstein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3524910","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3524910","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether belief-based preferences - caring about what transgressors believe - play a crucial role in punishment decisions: Do punishers want to make sure that transgressors understand why they are being punished, and is this desire to affect beliefs often prioritized over distributive and retributive preferences? We test whether punishers derive utility from three distinct sources: material outcomes (their own and the transgressor’s payoff), affective states (the transgressor’s suffering), and cognitive states (the transgressor’s beliefs about the cause of that suffering). In a novel, preregistered experiment (N = 1,959) we demonstrate that consideration for transgressors’ beliefs affects punishment decisions on its own, regardless of the considerations for material outcomes (distributional preferences) and affective states (retributive preferences). By contrast, we find very little evidence for pure retributive preferences (i.e., to merely inflict suffering on transgressors). We also show that people who would otherwise enact harsh punishments, are willing to punish less severely, if by doing so they can tell the transgressor why they are punishing them. Finally, we demonstrate that the preference for affecting transgressors’ beliefs cannot be explained by deterrence motives (i.e., to make transgressors behave better in the future).","PeriodicalId":411364,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Information Asymmetry Models (Topic)","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125029117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}