Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice最新文献

Outsourcing Bank Loan Screening: The Economics of Third-Party Loan Guarantees 外包银行贷款筛选:第三方贷款担保的经济学

IF 0.4

Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice Pub Date : 2019-01-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2024425

Chenyu Shan, Dragon Yongjun Tang

引用次数: 6

Iceland's Capital Controls and the Resolution of its Problematic Bank Legacy 冰岛的资本管制及其银行遗留问题的解决

IF 0.4

Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice Pub Date : 2017-07-03 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2996631

F. M. Baldursson, R. Portes, Eirikur Elis Thorlaksson

{"title":"Iceland's Capital Controls and the Resolution of its Problematic Bank Legacy","authors":"F. M. Baldursson, R. Portes, Eirikur Elis Thorlaksson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2996631","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2996631","url":null,"abstract":"Iceland’s capital controls were imposed in October 2008 in order to prevent massive capital flight and a complete collapse of the exchange rate. The controls were in place for more than eight years, primarily because of the risk of large outflows of domestic holdings of the failed Icelandic banks. As argued in a precursor to this paper (Baldursson and Portes, 2014), significant restructuring of domestic holdings of foreign creditors of the banks was required before the controls could be lifted. Such a restructuring was finally accomplished in January 2016. Broadly in line with the recommendations of Baldursson and Portes (2014), the resolution involved a voluntary – in much the same sense as the Greek debt restructuring was voluntary – restructuring of the banks’ debt, under which most of the Icelandic krona assets of the banks were relinquished to the state or tied up in Iceland. An attempt at resolving so-called ‘offshore kronas’ – the remains of the carry trade into Iceland in the years before the 2008 crisis – failed resulting in a dispute with international investors. We model the strategic interaction between Iceland and creditors on the resolution of the failed banks as well as the interaction between Iceland and investors on the resolution of the offshore krona holdings. The model explains why the bank resolution was successful and why the offshore krona auction was not. Resolution of the old banks will cut Iceland’s public debt, but it will still be substantially higher than before the crisis. The net international investment position of Iceland has, however, turned positive and is stronger than it has been in decades. In March 2017, the capital controls were removed in practice, albeit not by statute. Inflow measures remain.","PeriodicalId":41061,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2017-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85451553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Regulatory Competition and Cross-Fertilization in the US Banking Markets 美国银行业市场的监管竞争与相互促进

IF 0.4

Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice Pub Date : 2014-05-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2441279

Dogan Tirtiroglu, Başak Tanyeri, E. Tirtiroğlu, Kenneth N. Daniels

引用次数: 0

Blockholder Power, Shareholder Conflicts and Legal Protection: Evidence from Tax Preferences and Payout Decisions 大股东权力、股东冲突和法律保护:来自税收优惠和派息决策的证据

IF 0.4

Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice Pub Date : 2013-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2024014

C. Kaserer, M. S. Rapp, O. Trinchera

{"title":"Blockholder Power, Shareholder Conflicts and Legal Protection: Evidence from Tax Preferences and Payout Decisions","authors":"C. Kaserer, M. S. Rapp, O. Trinchera","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2024014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2024014","url":null,"abstract":"Tax codes regularly create conflicts of interests between small and large shareholders with respect to the payout decision of firms. We use this fact to study (i) whether firm behavior reflects preferences of blockholders and (ii) the effectiveness of minority shareholder protection on blockholders’ power to promote corporate behavior at the expense of minority shareholders. Based on an extensive data set covering 3,944 European firms over the 1999-2008 period, we find that payout behavior strongly reflects tax preferences of a firm’s largest shareholder. However, as minority shareholder protection increases tax preferences of minority shareholders are more likely to be partially reflected in the payout decision. Our results are stable against a battery of robustness tests. This includes endogeneity issues, which may be relevant because of the well-known clientele effect. Thus, our analysis documents that firm behavior (i) is affected by blockholder preferences and (ii) legal minority shareholder protection effectively restricts the power of blockholders in case of conflicting interest among shareholders.","PeriodicalId":41061,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2013-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86553290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4