{"title":"Hedge Funds and Financial Misreporting","authors":"Philippe Jorion","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.20","url":null,"abstract":"The growth of the hedge fund industry can be ascribed to its performance-based incentive compensation system as well as a lighter regulatory environment. These features, however, could also potentially create more opportunities for financial misreporting and even fraud. In response, recent research has attempted to detect misreporting by using due diligence information or by examining patterns in hedge fund returns. Empirical evidence suggests that hedge fund fraud can be usefully predicted from due diligence information, especially evidence of previous misrepresentation. Predicting misreporting from hedge fund returns, however, is much more difficult. This is because returns may reflect patterns in underlying assets instead of manager manipulation. For hedge fund investors, the good news is that the accumulated body of experience about detecting misreporting should help improve the quality of hedge fund investments. In addition, newly-imposed registration requirements for hedge fund advisors should also lower occurrences of misreporting.","PeriodicalId":409673,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126443241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Misconduct at Hedge Funds","authors":"Nicolas P. B. Bollen","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.19","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses crime in the context of hedge fund management and reviews some of the relevant academic work in the area. The chapter provides examples of the different types of misconduct that have been perpetrated and prosecuted in hedge funds. Thereafter, it reviews relevant regulation of hedge funds and the resulting available information which regulators and investors can use to assess the risk of misconduct. Academic work related to hedge fund crime often relies on commercially available databases that are described in the chapter. The chapter further presents techniques developed in the academic literature to quantify the risk of misconduct and assesses their information content in empirical analyses.","PeriodicalId":409673,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds","volume":"165 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114927578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introducing Hedge Funds","authors":"D. Cumming, S. Johan, G. Wood","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.1","url":null,"abstract":"This introduction reviews recent research on hedge funds. The Handbook of Hedge Funds comprises 21 chapters from authors around the world. The chapters describe hedge fund industry governance, flows, limited partnership contracts, compensation, fund strategies, performance, activism, effects on investee firms, misconduct, misreporting, fraud, and financial regulation. Further, the chapters highlight differences with other types of intermediaries, such as private equity funds and mutual funds. The chapters feature both US and international analyses. This introductory chapter summarizes papers that appear in the handbook, provide a theoretical framework for research on hedge funds, and highlight research trends on topic.","PeriodicalId":409673,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123534442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Review of Hedge Fund Activism: Impact on Shareholders vs. Stakeholders","authors":"H. Aslan","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.27","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter reviews the growing empirical literature on shareholder activism by hedge funds, summarizing the sources and nature of the activist data and examining the evidence on target firm outcomes. Target firms do not exist in a vacuum, however; they have industry competitors, suppliers, customers, debtholders, and employees. Hedge fund activists often demand a reformulation of the target firm’s product market strategy to enhance its ability to earn inframarginal profits. This positive strategic effect may be especially significant for target firms that are economically distressed and facing predatory moves from deep-pocketed rival firms to induce exit. The putative significant effects of hedge fund activism on targets should generate spillover effects on their stakeholders. The chapter considers these spillover effects in a number of well-defined categories: industry rivals, customers, suppliers, debtholders, and employees.","PeriodicalId":409673,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds","volume":"154 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131618478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Omololu Bajulaiye, M. Fenwick, I. Škultétyová, E. Vermeulen
{"title":"Convergence and Diversity in the Hedge Fund and Private Equity Industry","authors":"Omololu Bajulaiye, M. Fenwick, I. Škultétyová, E. Vermeulen","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.11","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter identifies differences in hedge fund and private equity strategies in terms of investments, strategies, and fundamental terms. These underlying structural differences have implications for the type of investor attracted to each investment style. Previously, investment decisions could be made on a set of trade-offs, but increased competition in the hedge fund industry is now the main factor driving the type of fund operating and competing in investment markets. This chapter describes the terms and conditions which address fund formation and operation, fees and expenses, profit sharing and distributions, as well as corporate governance. No matter how appealing the prospects of hedge fund and private equity convergence, there are significant concerns: can both types of fund combine different investment styles without affecting the level of returns?; can the transition toward financial convergence be blocked if hedge fund investors object to valuations based on subjective, and not actual, market trading?;can ‘side pockets’ in a hedge fund be isolated from the costs of accounting for the two streams of capital?","PeriodicalId":409673,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131079054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hedge Fund Activism vs Other Activist Investors","authors":"Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal, Jan Schnitzler","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.8","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter reviews the growing empirical literature on shareholder activism by hedge funds. The aim is a comparative approach contrasting the impact of hedge fund activism on target firms with outcomes for other types of activist investors. Following recent research, the chapter provides an empirical analysis based on the disclosure of equity blockholdings by activist investors in a large sample of all US listed companies. In addition, it summarizes which types of investors engage in other events linked to activism, such as takeovers, proxy contests, or shareholder proposals. Overall, there is evidence that not only hedge funds but also other types of investors can be effective monitors, but there are nuanced differences with respect to targeting decisions and payout policies.","PeriodicalId":409673,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126944631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hedge Fund Strategies in the Post-Crisis Era","authors":"Yigit Atilgan, Turan G. Bali, A. D. Gunaydin","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.24","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the performances of various hedge fund strategies based on various reward-to-risk ratios after the 2008 global crisis. We document that a majority of hedge fund strategies deliver lower average returns compared to equities and bonds; yet the volatilities of their returns have also been low. The equity hedge strategy has the highest reward-to-risk ratios among the major strategy categories, whereas the relative value arbitrage strategy has the lowest. Technology/healthcare, merger arbitrage, discretionary thematic, and asset-backed arbitrage strategies tend to have the highest reward-to-risk ratios in their respective categories. Time-series regressions of hedge fund strategy returns on various fund pricing factors provide evidence that hedge funds, on average, do not generate abnormal returns once the pricing factors are controlled for. We also document that hedge fund strategy returns generally load negatively on the bond market and aggregate credit risk factors and positively on the market portfolio.","PeriodicalId":409673,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124505787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hedge Funds and Herding Behavior","authors":"N. Kellard","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.14","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines whether hedge funds herd, how this herding occurs, and any potential market wide effects. Bringing together the mainstream finance literature and that from a more management and sociological perspective, it is shown that hedge funds herd, although there is some evidence this is less than other large institutional investors. Mechanistically, such consensus trades occur because hedge firms communicate within tight knit clusters of trusted and smart managers, who share and analyze trading positions together. This industry structure is a function of the hyper decision-making environment faced by hedge fund managers, coupled with a desire for legitimization and to maintain reputation. Finally, note that hedge fund herding can have market wide effects either directly via network risk and indirectly, as follower institutional investors amplify hedge fund trading patterns.","PeriodicalId":409673,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124566187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tax Optimization of Hedge Funds","authors":"F. Lhabitant","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.6","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses the major legal structures available for hedge fund investing, and how different categories of investors— taxable US investors, tax-exempt US investors, and non-US investors—may use these to reduce the risk of double or triple taxation. Although sometimes complex, these structures allow investors to enjoy the benefits of characteristics inherent in hedge fund investments while being taxed as if they owned the same assets directly.","PeriodicalId":409673,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124962933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate Innovation","authors":"R. Santos, S. L. Sun","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198840954.013.17","url":null,"abstract":"While the jury is out on whether hedge fund activism encourages corporate innovation, there is mounting evidence to suggest that this is the case. A firm’s ability to innovate is crucial for its long-term survival. Through multiple mechanisms, activist hedge fund interventions can “shake things up” and stir corporations out of their myopic innovation investments. By bringing an end to the squandering of precious R&D resources, hedge fund activism stimulates and reshapes corporate competitiveness and enhances innovation performance. This chapter explores the strategies and mechanisms that activist hedge funds employ to influence corporate innovation and also offers avenues for future research.","PeriodicalId":409673,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129752256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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