Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society最新文献

Facet: Streaming over Videoconferencing for Censorship Circumvention 面向:流媒体视频会议的审查规避

Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2665943.2665944

Shuai Li, Michael Schliep, Nick Hopper

引用次数: 93

Private Browsing: an Inquiry on Usability and Privacy Protection 隐私浏览:可用性与隐私保护的探讨

Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2665943.2665953

Xianyi Gao, Yulong Yang, Huiqing Fu, J. Lindqvist, Yang Wang

引用次数: 31

Oblivious Evaluation of Non-deterministic Finite Automata with Application to Privacy-Preserving Virus Genome Detection 非确定性有限自动机的遗忘评价及其在隐私保护病毒基因组检测中的应用

Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2665943.2665954

Hirohito Sasakawa, Hiroki Arimura, David duVerle, H. Arimura, K. Tsuda, Jun Sakuma

引用次数: 18

Sybil-Resistant Mixing for Bitcoin 比特币的抗sybil混合

Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2665943.2665955

G. Bissias, A. P. Ozisik, B. Levine, M. Liberatore

{"title":"Sybil-Resistant Mixing for Bitcoin","authors":"G. Bissias, A. P. Ozisik, B. Levine, M. Liberatore","doi":"10.1145/2665943.2665955","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2665943.2665955","url":null,"abstract":"A fundamental limitation of Bitcoin and its variants is that the movement of coin between addresses can be observed by examining the public block chain. This record enables adversaries to link addresses to individuals, and to identify multiple addresses as belonging to a single participant. Users can try to hide this information by mixing, where a participant exchanges the funds in an address coin-for-coin with another participant and address. In this paper, we describe the weaknesses of extant mixing protocols, and analyze their vulnerability to Sybil-based denial-of-service and inference attacks. As a solution, we propose Xim, a two-party mixing protocol that is compatible with Bitcoin and related virtual currencies. It is the first decentralized protocol to simultaneously address Sybil attackers, denial-of-service attacks, and timing-based inference attacks. Xim is a multi-round protocol with tunably high success rates. It includes a decentralized system for anonymously finding mix partners based on ads placed in the block chain. No outside party can confirm or find evidence of participants that pair up. We show that Xim's design increases attacker costs linearly with the total number of participants, and that its probabilistic approach to mixing mitigates Sybil-based denial-of-service attack effects. We evaluate protocol delays based on our measurements of the Bitcoin network.","PeriodicalId":408627,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129305826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 135

Stylometric Linkability of Tweets 推文的文体链接性

Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2665943.2665966

M. A. Mishari, Dali Kaafar, Ekin Oguz, G. Tsudik

引用次数: 26

Fast and Private Genomic Testing for Disease Susceptibility 快速和私人基因组检测疾病易感性

Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2665943.2665952

G. Danezis, Emiliano De Cristofaro

引用次数: 34

General Area or Approximate Location?: How People Understand Location Permissions 大致区域还是大致位置?:人们如何理解位置权限

Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2665943.2665957

Huiqing Fu, J. Lindqvist

引用次数: 11

Sensible Privacy: How We Can Protect Domestic Violence Survivors Without Facilitating Misuse 明智的隐私:我们如何保护家庭暴力幸存者而不助长滥用

Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2665943.2665965

B. Arief, Kovila P. L. Coopamootoo, M. Emms, A. Moorsel

{"title":"Sensible Privacy: How We Can Protect Domestic Violence Survivors Without Facilitating Misuse","authors":"B. Arief, Kovila P. L. Coopamootoo, M. Emms, A. Moorsel","doi":"10.1145/2665943.2665965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2665943.2665965","url":null,"abstract":"Privacy is a concept with real life ties and implications. Privacy infringement has the potential to lead to serious consequences for the stakeholders involved, hence researchers and organisations have developed various privacy enhancing techniques and tools. However, there is no solution that fits all, and there are instances where privacy solutions could be misused, for example to hide nefarious activities. Therefore, it is important to provide suitable measures and to make necessary design tradeoffs in order to avoid such misuse. This short paper aims to make a case for the need of careful consideration when designing a privacy solution, such that the design effectively addresses the user requirements while at the same time minimises the risk of inadvertently assisting potential offenders. In other words, this paper strives to promote \"sensible privacy\" design, which deals with the complex challenges in balancing privacy, usability and accountability. We illustrate this idea through a case study involving the design of privacy solutions for domestic violence survivors. This is the main contribution of the paper. The case study presents specific user requirements and operating conditions, which coupled with the attacker model, provide a complex yet interesting scenario to explore. One example of our solutions is described in detail to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach.","PeriodicalId":408627,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132676606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 28

Measuring the Leakage of Onion at the Root: A measurement of Tor's .onion pseudo-TLD in the global domain name system 测量洋葱在根部的泄漏:Tor的。Onion伪顶级域名在全球域名系统中的测量

Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2665943.2665951

Matthew Thomas, Aziz Mohaisen

引用次数: 19

IMUX: Managing Tor Connections from Two to Infinity, and Beyond IMUX:管理Tor连接从2到无限，以及超越

Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2014-11-03 DOI: 10.1145/2665943.2665948

John Geddes, Rob Jansen, Nicholas Hopper

引用次数: 27