2020 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)最新文献

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Ostraka: Secure Blockchain Scaling by Node Sharding Ostraka:通过节点分片实现安全的区块链扩展

2020 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW) Pub Date : 2019-07-07 DOI: 10.1109/EuroSPW51379.2020.00060

Alex Manuskin, Michael Mirkin, Ittay Eyal

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引用次数: 34

Explainable Security 可辩解的安全

2020 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW) Pub Date : 2018-07-11 DOI: 10.1109/EuroSPW51379.2020.00045

L. Viganò, D. Magazzeni

引用次数: 52

Nethammer: Inducing Rowhammer Faults through Network Requests Nethammer:通过网络请求诱导Rowhammer故障

2020 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW) Pub Date : 2018-05-13 DOI: 10.1109/EuroSPW51379.2020.00102

Moritz Lipp, Misiker Tadesse Aga, Michael Schwarz, D. Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Lukas Raab, Lukas Lamster

{"title":"Nethammer: Inducing Rowhammer Faults through Network Requests","authors":"Moritz Lipp, Misiker Tadesse Aga, Michael Schwarz, D. Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Lukas Raab, Lukas Lamster","doi":"10.1109/EuroSPW51379.2020.00102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSPW51379.2020.00102","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we present Nethammer, a remote Rowhammer attack without a single attacker-controlled line of code on the targeted system, i.e., not even JavaScript. Nethammer works on commodity consumer-grade systems that either are protected with quality-of-service techniques like Intel CAT or that use uncached memory, flush instructions, or non-temporal instructions while handling network requests (e.g., for interaction with the network device). We demonstrate that the frequency of the cache misses is in all three cases high enough to induce bit flips. Our evaluation showed that depending on the location, the bit flip compromises either the security and integrity of the system and the data of its users, or it can leave persistent damage on the system, i.e., persistent denial of service. We invalidate threat models of Rowhammer defenses building upon the assumption of a local attacker. Consequently, we show that most state-of-the-art defenses do not affect our attack. In particular, we demonstrate that target-row-refresh (TRR) implemented in DDR4 has no aggravating effect on local or remote Rowhammer attacks.","PeriodicalId":405252,"journal":{"name":"2020 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116751693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 94

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