{"title":"The Minds of Insects","authors":"Barbara Webb","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190662813.003.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190662813.003.0019","url":null,"abstract":"Insect systems can provide useful “edge cases” against which to test the generality of Clark’s views on the nature of perception, cognition, and action. Insect brains emerged from an independent evolutionary pathway to the mammalian brain but show a comparable capacity in some key areas, such as prediction (internal emulation?), cue integration for spatial memory (Bayesian?), and exploiting structures in the world to extend their behavioural repertoire (extended minds?). Have they converged on the same solutions? Or are there different principles for cognition that they exploit? Reviewing some of the relevant current evidence about behavioural and brain function in insects suggests there is some remaining tension between Clark’s endorsement of the predictive processing principle and his account of the embodied mind.","PeriodicalId":404667,"journal":{"name":"Andy Clark and His Critics","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128214375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Quick’n’Lean or Slow and Rich?","authors":"J. Hohwy","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190662813.003.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190662813.003.0015","url":null,"abstract":"Andy Clark’s exciting work on predictive processing provides the umbrella under which his hugely influential previous work on embodied and extended cognition seeks a unified home. This chapter argues that in fact predictive processing harbours internalist, inferentialist and epistemic tenets that cannot leave embodied and extended cognition unchanged. Predictive processing cannot do the work Clark requires of it without relying on rich, preconstructive internal representations of the world, nor without engaging in paradigmatically rational integration of prior knowledge and new sensory input. Hence, next to Clark’s image of fluid “uncertainty surfing” is an equally valid image of more emaciated and plodding world-modelling. Rather than underpinning orthodox embodied and extended approches, predictive processing therefore presents an opportunity for a potentially fruitful new synthesis of cognitivist and embodied approaches to cognition.","PeriodicalId":404667,"journal":{"name":"Andy Clark and His Critics","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121079904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Extended Cognition and Extended Consciousness","authors":"D. Chalmers","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190662813.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190662813.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 1 discusses two questions about the extended mind. First, what is the extended mind thesis? Second, can there be extended consciousness, and if not, why not? The chapter answers the first question by arguing that the thesis should be formulated in terms of perception and action: a subject’s cognitive processes and mental states can be partly constituted by entities that are external to the subject, in virtue of the subject’s interacting with these entities via perception and action. The second question is answered by appealing to direct availability for global control as the physical correlate of consciousness: extended processes always involve indirect availability for global control, mediated by perception and action, so there is no extended consciousness.","PeriodicalId":404667,"journal":{"name":"Andy Clark and His Critics","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120922993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The World Well Gained","authors":"Michael L. Anderson, A. Chemero","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190662813.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190662813.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"Many commentators on Clark’s writings on predictive processing have wondered how well the predictive processing model actually fits with embodied and extended cognition. The former seems to imply that cognition is secluded from the environment, while the latter implies that cognition is in and of the environment. This chapter argues that a reconciliation with embodied and extended cognition is possible but requires that predictive processing proponents reject environmental seclusion. To do so means adopting ecological information in place of the Shannon information most typically invoked by proponents of predictive processing, and giving many of the other semantic-sounding terms they use (e.g., “prediction,” “model,” “representation”) deflationary understandings.","PeriodicalId":404667,"journal":{"name":"Andy Clark and His Critics","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124886843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Matters of the Flesh","authors":"Lawrence A. Shapiro","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190662813.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190662813.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Andy Clark has defended a view of the body’s relationship to the mind that he calls the Larger Mechanism Story (LMS). At the same time, he has criticized an alternative account, the Special Contribution Story (SC). After first clarifying the commitments of these two stories, I argue that Clark’s favored LMS is of less psychological interest than SC, and that SC offers an interesting and viable research program.","PeriodicalId":404667,"journal":{"name":"Andy Clark and His Critics","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122247227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Extended Affectivity, Reconsidered","authors":"M. Maiese","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190662813.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190662813.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"According to Andy Clark’s Extended Mind Thesis, the operations that realize certain forms of human cognition do not do not stay neatly in the brain, but instead span brain, body, and world. While this thesis is best known as the hypothesis of extended cognition, Clark himself has wondered whether it also might be applied to affective states. What Colombetti and Roberts call the Hypothesis of Extended Affectivity says that a variety of occurrent and dispositional affective phenomena can extend. However, there are important reasons to reject this hypothesis. First, extended functionalism is in tension with the claim that affective states are essentially embodied. Second, these authors’ examples do not make a convincing case for extended affectivity. Third, their componential approach to occurrent emotions falls short given that they fail to establish that each of the components of emotion is not merely environmentally embedded, but also can extend.","PeriodicalId":404667,"journal":{"name":"Andy Clark and His Critics","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125711727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ways of Mindmaking","authors":"J. Prinz","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190662813.003.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190662813.003.0017","url":null,"abstract":"Andy Clark has been an agenda-setting figure since the dawn of his career, and, in book after book, he has laid out grand theories that invite his readers to see the human mind in new ways. With each book, Clark delivers a new and exciting vision of how the mind works. His fans can hardly keep up, and each is left wondering which of Clark’s theories to sign up for. Are they progressive stages in one grand narrative? A protracted plea for pluralism? Or a succession of new paradigms that displace their predecessors? Some noted philosophers have early, late, and even middle periods. With Clark, one might ask if each book is a metamorphosis. If so, how do we decide which Clark to follow? This chapter is about that question, and about the broader issue, which it begs: What is a theory of mind?","PeriodicalId":404667,"journal":{"name":"Andy Clark and His Critics","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116885749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Beyond the Desert Landscape","authors":"Karl J. Friston","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190662813.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190662813.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"To what extent is predictive processing enactivist? This overview of predictive processing and active inference offers an account of embodied exchange with the world that associates neuronal processing with inferring the causes of our sensations. Crucially, one of the most important causes of the sensorium is our own behaviour, which—perhaps counterintuitively—has to be inferred. The agenda—in active inference—is to link formal (mathematical) descriptions of dynamical systems to a description of active perception in terms of beliefs and goals. In short, it tries to understand why and how we gather evidence for our own existence. There are several approaches to this sort of formulation. This chapter compares and contrasts a Helmholtzian or Kantian (bottom-up) approach—via perception—with the sort of (top-down) approaches offered by the statistical physics of self-organisation in sentient systems.","PeriodicalId":404667,"journal":{"name":"Andy Clark and His Critics","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121118513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Is a Mind Extended?","authors":"D. Kirsh","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190662813.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190662813.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores four conditions for operationalizing the concept of cognitive extension. (1) Temporal tightness of the coupling—interaction between inner and outer processes must be fast, tight, and fluid, interacting at the speed of thought. (2) External mind parts must be transparent extensions of ourselves like glasses or prosthetic limbs that are psychologically absorbed into the subject’s body sense. We act through these parts or processes rather than on them. (3) Cognitive extensions are “owned”; they are not independent functioning units that could be a source of cognition themselves; inner processes confer cognitive status on the outer. (4) Extended parts or processes interact bidirectionally; causation is reciprocal, though controlled from the biological side. The chapter concludes that extension does exist. Through interaction we create an extended cognitive envelope. The parts of this envelope are episodic processes enacting external thinking rather than being an enduring assemblage of parts. To make the final leap to durable mind parts—external assemblages that are parts of a person even when not in use—requires reasoning of the sort lawyers and judges do best, not scientists.","PeriodicalId":404667,"journal":{"name":"Andy Clark and His Critics","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128241420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Supercharged Apes versus Super-Sized Minds","authors":"L. Barrett","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190662813.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190662813.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"Clark’s philosophy brings body, brain, and world together again, offering a new conception of both human and nonhuman cognition. This chapter agrees that the predictive processing framework provides our best bet for a species-neutral cognitive science. However, the use of cognitivist, representational language often seems unnecessary, especially when J. J. Gibson introduced a “resonance” metaphor to replace notions of representation, hypothesis, and inference. This chapter is therefore interested to know why Clark resists embracing Gibson, when this seems one of the best ways to embrace evolutionary continuity. The chapter also raises the apparent tension between the predictive processing position and that of the extended mind: Is the brain the principal seat of information-processing activity? Or is it userless tools all the way down? Finally, the chapter raises the issue of epistemic artefacts, and whether these increase or decrease cognitive load.","PeriodicalId":404667,"journal":{"name":"Andy Clark and His Critics","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114459326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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