Problems in Metaphilosophy – I最新文献

Science, common sence, and a problem for scientific realism 科学，常识，科学现实主义的问题

Problems in Metaphilosophy – I Pub Date : 1975-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82710

Stephen J. Noren

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Metaphysics and science 形而上学与科学

Problems in Metaphilosophy – I Pub Date : 1975-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82712

R. Harré

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The present state of the philosophy of science 科学哲学的现状

Problems in Metaphilosophy – I Pub Date : 1975-01-02 DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-6456-6_2

J. Agassi

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The domain of justification: common sense 辩护的领域:常识

Problems in Metaphilosophy – I Pub Date : 1975-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82709

J. Kekes

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Forms of realism 现实主义的形式

Problems in Metaphilosophy – I Pub Date : 1975-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82713

R. Bhaskar

引用次数: 3

Truth and theory in philosophy: post-positivist view 哲学中的真理与理论:后实证主义观点

Problems in Metaphilosophy – I Pub Date : 1975-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82708

R. Meyers

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Science and metaphysics 科学与形而上学

Problems in Metaphilosophy – I Pub Date : 1975-01-02 DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82711

R. Gruner

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