Third IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop (SISW'05)最新文献

Lazy revocation in cryptographic file systems 加密文件系统中的延迟撤销

Third IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop (SISW'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-13 DOI: 10.1109/SISW.2005.7

M. Backes, C. Cachin, Alina Oprea

引用次数: 35

Adding secure deletion to your favorite file system 为您喜爱的文件系统添加安全删除功能

Third IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop (SISW'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-13 DOI: 10.1109/SISW.2005.1

N. Joukov, E. Zadok

{"title":"Adding secure deletion to your favorite file system","authors":"N. Joukov, E. Zadok","doi":"10.1109/SISW.2005.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SISW.2005.1","url":null,"abstract":"Files or even their names often contain confidential or secret information. Most users believe that such information is erased as soon as they delete a file. Even those who know that this is not true often ignore the issue. Nevertheless, recovering deleted files is trivial and can be performed even by novice hackers. The problem is exacerbated by the widespread of portable and mobile storage devices. This type of unwanted after-deletion data recovery is in part an education problem. Users believe that deleted files are erased, even though they are not. Retraining and educating users is difficult. Therefore, storage systems should behave appropriately - the data should be erased from the storage on a per-delete basis. We found that existing solutions are either inconvenient, inefficient, or insecure. We have designed Purgefs: a file system extension that transparently overwrites files on the per-delete basis. Purgefs can be automatically added to a number of existing and future file systems, including networked and stackable file systems. Purgefs supports multiple policies to trade-off performance with the level of purging guarantees. We demonstrate that Purgefs does not add overheads or perturb users' activity under typical user workloads","PeriodicalId":402347,"journal":{"name":"Third IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop (SISW'05)","volume":"127 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122109659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 57

File system design with assured delete 文件系统设计与保证删除

Third IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop (SISW'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-13 DOI: 10.1109/SISW.2005.5

R. Perlman

引用次数: 172

Towards protecting sensitive files in a compromised system 在被入侵的系统中保护敏感文件

Third IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop (SISW'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-13 DOI: 10.1109/SISW.2005.17

Xin Zhao, Kevin Borders, A. Prakash

{"title":"Towards protecting sensitive files in a compromised system","authors":"Xin Zhao, Kevin Borders, A. Prakash","doi":"10.1109/SISW.2005.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SISW.2005.17","url":null,"abstract":"Protecting sensitive files from a compromised system helps administrators to thwart many attacks, discover intrusion trails, and fast restore the system to a safe state. However, most existing file protection mechanisms can be turned off after an attacker manages to exploit a vulnerability to gain privileged access. In this paper we propose SVFS, a secure virtual file system that uses virtual machine technology to store sensitive files in a virtual machine that is dedicated to providing secure data storage, and run applications in one or more guest virtual machines. Accesses to sensitive files must go through SVFS and are subject to access control policies. Because the access control policies are enforced independently in an isolated virtual machine, intruders cannot bypass file protection by compromising a guest VM. In addition, SVFS introduces a virtual remote procedure call mechanism as a substitute of standard RPC to deliver better performance in data exchanging across virtual machine boundaries. We implemented SVFS and tested it against attacks on a guest operating system using several available rootkits. SVFS was able to prevent most of the rootkits from being installed, and prevent all of them from persisting past reboot. We also compared the performance of SVFS to the native Ext3 file system and found that performance cost was reasonable considering the security benefits of SVFS. Our experimental results also show VRPC does improve the file system performance","PeriodicalId":402347,"journal":{"name":"Third IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop (SISW'05)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123366055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 50

Efficiently binding data to owners in distributed content-addressable storage systems 有效地将数据绑定到分布式内容可寻址存储系统中的所有者

Third IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop (SISW'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-13 DOI: 10.1109/SISW.2005.4

Patrick R. Eaton, Hakim Weatherspoon, J. Kubiatowicz

引用次数: 13

Optimization of covert channel identification 隐蔽信道识别的优化

Third IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop (SISW'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-13 DOI: 10.1109/SISW.2005.9

Jianjun Shen, S. Qing, Qingni Shen, Liping Li

引用次数: 9

Efficient authentication of large, dynamic data sets using Galois/counter mode (GCM) 使用伽罗瓦/计数器模式(GCM)高效地验证大型动态数据集

Third IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop (SISW'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-13 DOI: 10.1109/SISW.2005.3

D. McGrew

引用次数: 20

The consequences of decentralized security in a cooperative storage system 协作存储系统中分散安全的后果

Third IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop (SISW'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-13 DOI: 10.1109/SISW.2005.11

D. Thain, C. Moretti, Paul Madrid, P. Snowberger, J. Hemmes

引用次数: 5

The OSD security protocol OSD安全协议

Third IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop (SISW'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-13 DOI: 10.1109/SISW.2005.12

M. Factor, D. Nagle, D. Naor, E. Riedel, J. Satran

引用次数: 38

POTSHARDS: storing data for the long-term without encryption POTSHARDS:长期存储数据而不加密

Third IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop (SISW'05) Pub Date : 2005-12-13 DOI: 10.1109/SISW.2005.10

K. Greenan, M. Storer, E. L. Miller, C. Maltzahn

{"title":"POTSHARDS: storing data for the long-term without encryption","authors":"K. Greenan, M. Storer, E. L. Miller, C. Maltzahn","doi":"10.1109/SISW.2005.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SISW.2005.10","url":null,"abstract":"Many archival storage systems rely on keyed encryption to ensure privacy. A data object in such a system is exposed once the key used to encrypt the data is compromised. When storing data for as long as a few decades or centuries, the use of keyed encryption becomes a real concern. The exposure of a key is bounded by computation effort and management of encryption keys becomes as much of a problem as the management of the data the key is protecting. POTSHARDS is a secure, distributed, very long-term archival storage system that eliminates the use of keyed encryption through the use of unconditionally secure secret sharing. A (m, n) unconditionally secure secret sharing scheme splits an object up into n shares, which provably gives no information about the object, unless m of the shares collaborate. POTSHARDS separates security and redundancy by utilizing two levels of secret sharing. This allows for secure reconstruction upon failure and more flexible storage patterns. The data structures used in POTSHARDS are organized in such a way that an unauthorized user attempting to collect shares will not go unnoticed since it is very difficult to launch a targeted attack on the system. A malicious user would have a difficult time finding the shares for a particular file in a timely or efficient manner. Since POTSHARDS provides secure storage for arbitrarily long periods of time, its data structures include built-in support for consistency checking and data migration. This enables reliable data churning and the movement of data between storage devices","PeriodicalId":402347,"journal":{"name":"Third IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop (SISW'05)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114866195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11