{"title":"Our Polarized, Presidential Federalism","authors":"M. Greve","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2885932","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2885932","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past three-plus decades, American federalism has taken on a decidedly executive, presidential coloration. The trend has persisted under Republican and Democratic administrations, and on all accounts it has accelerated. Moreover, federalism has become increasingly polarized at the federal and, perhaps more consequentially, at the state level. Controversies over environmental policy, immigration, health care, and other salient issues have been fought by remarkably cohesive, sharply polarized blocs of states. The extant literature has ably limned executive, presidential federalism’s contours and especially its intergovernmental dynamics. This Article seeks to extend and broaden the scholarly inquiry. It urges greater attention to questions of political economy; comparative politics; fiscal federalism; and constitutionalism and judicial capacity.Those lines of inquiry and especially a comparative perspective provide cause for concern. Polarized, presidential federalism is a defining feature of political systems (especially in Latin America) that share our formal institutional arrangements, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. Those systems tend toward a highly personalized style of executive government, political and fiscal instability, and institutional corruption. The Article expresses no view on the likelihood of a similar scenario in the United States, let alone predict it. However, it suggests that such a trajectory is within the range of possibilities.","PeriodicalId":402199,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Political Institutions: The President & Executives (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134095392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Honest Abe Was a Co-Op Dude: How the G.O.P. Can Save America from Despotism","authors":"S. Ziliak","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2521197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2521197","url":null,"abstract":"Abraham Lincoln was a co-op dude. He had a hip neck beard, sure. Everyone knows that. But few have bothered to notice that the first Republican President of the United States was an economic democrat who put labor above capital. Labor is prior to and independent of capital, Lincoln believed, and “deserves much the higher consideration”, he told Congress in his first annual address of 1861. Capital despotism is on the rise again, threatening the stability of the economy and union. The biggest problem of democracy now is not the failure to fully extend political rights, however important. The bigger problem is economic in nature. The threat today is from a lack of economic democracy — a lack of ownership, of self-reliance, of autonomy, and of justice in the distribution of rewards and punishments at work. From the appropriation of company revenue to lack of protection against pension raids, capital despotism is rife. “The road to serfdom” has many paths to choose from, Hayek warned in his important book of 1944. But too many Americans — including economists and policymakers — are neglecting the economic path, the road to serfdom caused by a lack of economic democracy. Cooperative banks and firms can help.","PeriodicalId":402199,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Political Institutions: The President & Executives (Topic)","volume":"174 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124606242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political Leaders' Socioeconomic Background and Fiscal Performance in Germany","authors":"B. Hayo, Florian Neumeier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1945128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1945128","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates whether the socioeconomic status of the head of government helps explain fiscal performance. Applying sociological research that attributes differences in people's ways of thinking and acting to their relative standing within society, we test whether the social status of German prime ministers can help explain differences in fiscal performance among the German Laender. Our empirical findings show that the tenures of prime ministers from a poorer socioeconomic background are associated with higher levels of public spending and debt financing. Social mobility has an asymmetric influence: social climbers adapt to their new class, whereas downwardly mobile prime ministers remain primarily influenced by their parents' upper-class status.","PeriodicalId":402199,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Political Institutions: The President & Executives (Topic)","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117279796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Gridlock versus Harmony: The Effect of Presidential Cycle","authors":"Oumar Sy, Ashraf Al Zaman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2210039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2210039","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we investigate the impact of the interactions between presidential cycle and political environment on stock returns. We find that neither presidential cycle nor political environment has a significant impact on big firms. In contrast, we find that small firms perform significantly better under Democratic presidencies (relative to Republican presidencies) during harmonies, when one party simultaneously controls the executive and legislative bodies. Our results suggest that the recent evidence by Beyer, Jensen, and Johnson (2006) that a harmonious political environment is better for small firm investors is true only when the Democrats are in power.","PeriodicalId":402199,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Political Institutions: The President & Executives (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116848566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Presidential Political Risk and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns","authors":"R. Gregory","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1313126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1313126","url":null,"abstract":"The effects of political risk emanating from unexpected changes in the economic policies of the US presidency are measured on a cross-section of stock portfolios. Unlike previous efforts to measure the effects of the \"presidential puzzle\", this paper makes use of advances in the measurement of ideology and political activity that allows measurement of political risk that is both reproducible without the use of dummy variables, and allows for finer distinctions. Surprises to the market associated with presidential policy are significant in both explaining the cross-section of returns and in minimizing pricing errors, even when controlling for other factors.","PeriodicalId":402199,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Political Institutions: The President & Executives (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126855784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}