Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law最新文献_第5页

Presidential Permitting for Pipelines: Constitutionality and Reviewability 输油管道的总统许可:合宪性和可复审性

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.36640/mjeal.8.1.presidential

Joan Campau

引用次数: 1

Environmental Aesthetics and Free Speech: Toward a Consistent Content Neutrality Standard for Outdoor Sign Regulation 环境美学与言论自由:走向户外标识规范一致的内容中立标准

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.36640/mjeal.2.1.environmental

B. Connolly

{"title":"Environmental Aesthetics and Free Speech: Toward a Consistent Content Neutrality Standard for Outdoor Sign Regulation","authors":"B. Connolly","doi":"10.36640/mjeal.2.1.environmental","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36640/mjeal.2.1.environmental","url":null,"abstract":"First Amendment challenges by billboard companies and other sign owners to local sign regulations have become a frequent occurrence in the past thirty years. The stakes are high for both commercial sign owners and local governments. Sign control has emerged as an important front in the environmental protection movement, as it focuses on the visual or scenic quality of the environment. Courts have begun to recognize and accept local governments’ interest in controlling the proliferation of signage as part of their efforts to improve environmental quality, but courts have applied First Amendment doctrine in an inconsistent manner. The courts’ inconsistent treatment of the constitutional requirement of content neutrality has undermined state and local efforts to maintain aesthetic environments free from noxious signage. One of the consequences of this inconsistency is a false sense of security among sign regulators that their content-based regulations are somehow consistent with the First Amendment. This Note argues in favor of a strict approach to content neutrality, placing a greater burden on sign regulators to develop the most content-neutral ordinances possible. The proposed approach would beat billboard companies and sign owners at their own litigation game, limiting governments’ exposure to litigation and lessening the risk of sign regulations being invalidated, which in turn denigrates aesthetic quality. Furthermore, the recommended approach would reaffirm the First Amendment rights of sign owners while ensuring that regulatory bodies have sufficient guidance and encounter less risk in ensuring aesthetic environmental protection.","PeriodicalId":401480,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law","volume":"62 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114117926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Text(Plus-Other-Stuff)ualism:Textualists' Perplexing Use of the Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 文本(加他物)唯物论:文本主义者对《行政程序法》总检察长手册的困惑运用

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.36640/mjeal.1.1.text

K. M. Lewis

{"title":"Text(Plus-Other-Stuff)ualism:Textualists' Perplexing Use of the Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act","authors":"K. M. Lewis","doi":"10.36640/mjeal.1.1.text","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36640/mjeal.1.1.text","url":null,"abstract":"Textualist judges, such as U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, are well known for their outspoken, adamant refusal to consult legislative history and its analogues when interpreting ambiguous provisions of statutory terms. Nevertheless, in administrative law cases, textualist judges regularly quote the Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, an unenacted Department of Justice document that shares all the characteristics of legislative history that textualists find odious: unreliability, bias, and failure to pass through the bicameralism and presentment processes mandated by the U.S. Constitution. As a result, judges that rely on the Manual in administrative law cases arguably reach inaccurate results that aggrandize the Executive Branch. This Note canvasses the possible explanations for this phenomenon and ultimately concludes that there is no principled way that textualist judges can reconcile their use of the Manual with their jurisprudential philosophy. In other words, there is no principled reason to rely on the Manual while simultaneously rejecting more traditional forms of legislative history.","PeriodicalId":401480,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123973819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Making Ideas Matter: Remembering Joe Sax 创意很重要:记住乔·萨克斯

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.36640/mjeal.4.1.making

Mark Van Putten

引用次数: 0

Whose Standards Control? Maine v. McCanhy and the Federal, State, and Tribal Battle Over Water Quality Regulation 谁的标准控制?缅因州诉麦肯和联邦、州和部落关于水质管理的斗争

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.36640/mjeal.6.2.whose

Joseph Paul Mortelliti

引用次数: 0

Defining Ambiguity in Broken Statutory Frameworks and its Limits on Agency Action 破碎法律框架中的歧义界定及其对代理行为的限制

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.36640/mjeal.6.1.defining

Amanda Urban

{"title":"Defining Ambiguity in Broken Statutory Frameworks and its Limits on Agency Action","authors":"Amanda Urban","doi":"10.36640/mjeal.6.1.defining","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36640/mjeal.6.1.defining","url":null,"abstract":"“The Problem” occurs when a statute’s provisions become contradictory or unworkable in the context of new or unforeseen phenomena, yet the statute mandates agency action. The application of an unambiguous statutory provision may become problematic or unclear. Similarly, unambiguous provisions may become inconsistent given a particular application of the statute. During the same term, in Scialabba and UARG, the Supreme Court performed a Chevron review of agency interpretations of statutes facing three variations of the Problem, which this Note characterizes as direct conflict, internal inconsistency, and unworkability. In each case, the Court defined ambiguity in various, nontraditional ways and deferred to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute.\u0000\u0000The broadest definition of ambiguity provided by the Justices encompassed direct conflicts, internal inconsistencies, and unworkability. In contrast, the narrowest definition found ambiguity based only on internal inconsistency. Some Justices found no ambiguity, but allowed an agency more interpretive flexibility to resolve the Problem and accomplish the unambiguous mandate of the statute.\u0000\u0000This Note contends that ambiguity in broken statutory frameworks may influence the traditional Chevron analysis; the Court may defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation or allow an agency greater interpretive flexibility where it would not otherwise. But an agency does not have unlimited interpretive authority each time the Problem arises. Agency interpretations that alter or ignore unambiguous statutory text or functionally change the statute may still be impermissible under Chevron review. This Note raises agencies’ awareness regarding these nontraditional definitions of Chevron ambiguity, and discusses agency interpretive authority and limitations in the context of the Problem.","PeriodicalId":401480,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121773496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Cooperative Mineral Interest Development in the Lone Star State: It's Time to Mess with Texas 孤星之州的合作矿产利益开发:是时候搞乱德克萨斯州了

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.36640/mjeal.4.2.cooperative

Matthew K. Trawick

{"title":"Cooperative Mineral Interest Development in the Lone Star State: It's Time to Mess with Texas","authors":"Matthew K. Trawick","doi":"10.36640/mjeal.4.2.cooperative","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36640/mjeal.4.2.cooperative","url":null,"abstract":"Since the early discoveries of the Spindletop, King Ranch, and East Texas oil fields, the oil and gas industry has dominated the Texas economy. The industry has also played an important role in shaping state politics and culture. The oil boom of the early 1900s created thousands of jobs for ordinary workers and immense wealth for a select few. Early Texas oil barons made headlines because of their lavish lifestyles and often extreme political beliefs. Legendary wildcatter H.L. Hunt typified this oil-fueled exuberance. Hunt became one of the eight richest individuals in the United States after securing mineral rights to the East Texas oil field (the largest oil field in the contiguous United States) from an unscrupulous land man at a poker game. Hunt used his tremendous resources to support conservative politicians (including Joseph McCarthy) and to promote a conservative political agenda. Hunt’s politics, particularly his focus on the primacy of individualism and his belief that government intervention posed the greatest single threat to individual liberty, helped to shape the broader neoconservative movement. His political influence continues to resonate throughout the modern political dialogue in Texas.","PeriodicalId":401480,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133318074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

The $1.75 Trillion Lie 1.75万亿美元的谎言

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.36640/mjeal.1.1.trillion

L. Heinzerling, F. Ackerman

{"title":"The $1.75 Trillion Lie","authors":"L. Heinzerling, F. Ackerman","doi":"10.36640/mjeal.1.1.trillion","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36640/mjeal.1.1.trillion","url":null,"abstract":"A 2010 study commissioned by the Office of Advocacy of the U.S. Small Business Administration claims that federal regulations impose annual economic costs of $1.75 trillion. This estimate has been widely circulated, in everything from op-ed pages to Congressional testimony. But the estimate is not credible. For costs of economic regulations, the estimate reflects a calculation that rests on a misunderstanding of the definition of the relevant data, flunks an elementary question on the normal distribution, pads the analysis with several years of near-identical data, and fails to recognize the difference between correlation and causation. For costs of environmental regulation, the bulk of the estimate relies on decades-old studies of decades-old rules, suggesting that voluntary unemployment is the real culprit in today’s regulatory environment. The remainder of it is filled with nonexistent rules and other phantoms—as is the flawed estimate of the costs of workplace safety and health rules. It would be bad enough if this were a private study, undertaken with private funds. Even then, the viral spread of the utterly unfounded $1.75 trillion estimate would be worrying enough. But this is a study requested, funded, reviewed, and edited by a government agency, the Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy. The Office of Advocacy’s sponsorship and official embrace of the study—including defense of the study in testimony before Congress even after it had been severely criticized—embroils this public agency in an unwholesome blend of ineptitude and bias. The Office of Advocacy should acknowledge the study’s many failings and publicly disavow it.","PeriodicalId":401480,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122857622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

How Safe Is Too Safe? Exemption 7(F) and the Withholding of Critical Documents 多安全才算太安全?豁免7(F)和扣留关键文件

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.36640/mjeal.8.1.how

G. Snyder

{"title":"How Safe Is Too Safe? Exemption 7(F) and the Withholding of Critical Documents","authors":"G. Snyder","doi":"10.36640/mjeal.8.1.how","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36640/mjeal.8.1.how","url":null,"abstract":"The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is one of the main tools used by the American public to investigate the actions of its government. Congress created FOIA in an attempt to make most government documents available to the public. Today, the FOIA process favors government withholding. This bias comes from institutional issues in courts’ review of FOIA challenges.\u0000\u0000In the environmental and administrative law context, federal agencies use many exemptions to withhold government records from citizen and non-profit groups. Agencies that are tasked with permitting and regulating energy pipelines and other environmentally-sensitive infrastructure now regularly cite Exemption 7(F). These agencies claim that the release of certain infrastructure documents could be used to facilitate terrorism.\u0000\u0000This Note contends that agencies are using Exemption 7(F) in a way contrary to congressional intent. Further, this Note argues that courts should reinterpret Exemption 7(F) in light of its legislative history and precedent. At Step 1, mixed agencies should have to show that there is a direct link between the withheld document and a law enforcement purpose. At Step 2, agencies should be required to show a threat of harm to at least one reasonably specified individual. In the alternative, this Note also considers a potential balancing test based on Exemption 7(C) that is outside of traditional Exemption 7(F) jurisprudence. Finally, this Note will also address the consequences of a reinterpreted Exemption 7(F).","PeriodicalId":401480,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121180436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Fish and Federalism: How the Asian Carp Litigation Highlights a Deficiency in the Federal Common Law Displacement Analysis 鱼与联邦制:亚洲鲤鱼诉讼如何凸显联邦普通法置换分析中的缺陷

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.36640/mjeal.2.2.fish

M. Watters

{"title":"Fish and Federalism: How the Asian Carp Litigation Highlights a Deficiency in the Federal Common Law Displacement Analysis","authors":"M. Watters","doi":"10.36640/mjeal.2.2.fish","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36640/mjeal.2.2.fish","url":null,"abstract":"In response to the growing threat posed by the progress of Asian carp up the Mississippi River toward the Great Lakes, and with increased frustration with the federal response to the imminent problem, in 2010, five Great Lakes states sued the Army Corps of Engineers and the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago to force a more desirable and potentially more effective strategy to prevent the Asian carp from infiltrating the Great Lakes: closing the Chicago locks. This Note examines the federal common law displacement analysis through the lens of the Asian carp litigation. Both the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied the plaintiff States’ request for a preliminary injunction, but allowed the plaintiffs to proceed with their federal common law claim against the Army Corps of Engineers. While both the district court and court of appeals correctly determined that the plaintiff States’ federal common law nuisance claim was not displaced by congressional action and could thus continue to the merits stage, both courts failed to recognize the important and fundamental federalist function, i.e., exercising their sovereign function, that the states were performing in bringing their suit.","PeriodicalId":401480,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133860717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2