{"title":"A role-based secure database design tool","authors":"Luigi Giuri, Pietro Iglio","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1996.569700","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1996.569700","url":null,"abstract":"Starting from some previous proposals of extensions for database design methodologies, we have realised a secure database design tool. The work is based on a secure database design methodology that extends the entity relationship conceptual data model with a role based security model. The described tool features an analysis algorithm that can help detect potential security design mistakes, and a translation procedure that generates the SQL specification corresponding to the conceptual model.","PeriodicalId":400563,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134265347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Myong H. Kang, I. S. Moskowitz, B. Montrose, James J. Parsonese
{"title":"A case study of two NRL Pump prototypes","authors":"Myong H. Kang, I. S. Moskowitz, B. Montrose, James J. Parsonese","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1996.569667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1996.569667","url":null,"abstract":"As computer systems become more open and interconnected, the need for reliable and secure communication also increases. The NRL (Naval Research Laboratory) Pump was introduced by Kang and Moskowitz (1993) to balance the requirements of reliability, congestion control, fairness and good performance against those of threats from covert channels and denial-of-service attacks. In this paper, we describe two prototype efforts. One (the event-driven Pump or E-Pump) implements the Pump at the process (top) layer in terms of a 4-layer network reference model, and the other (the DOS-Pump or D-Pump) implements the Pump at the transport layer. We then discuss lessons learned and how these lessons are to be used in deciding upon the final hardware implementation of the Pump.","PeriodicalId":400563,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"110 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122124392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Innovative secure payments on the Internet using the German electronic purse","authors":"Brigitte Althen, Gerd Enste, Brigitte Nebelung","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1996.569676","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1996.569676","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, an innovative and secure method for payments on the Internet is described which uses the German electronic purse. We describe how the method of payment using the German electronic purse is used today at off-line terminals at the merchant's site. The security mechanisms of the payment system are described in detail. We discuss the adaption of this method to secure payments on the Internet.","PeriodicalId":400563,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116195181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Proxies for anonymous routing","authors":"Michael G. Reed, P. Syverson, D. Goldschlag","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1996.569678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1996.569678","url":null,"abstract":"Using traffic analysis, it is possible to infer who is talking to whom over a public network. This paper describes a flexible communications infrastructure, called onion routing, which is resistant to traffic analysis. Onion routing lies just beneath the application layer, and is designed to interface with a wide variety of unmodified Internet services by means of proxies. Onion routing has been implemented on a Sun Solaris 2.4; in addition, proxies for World Wide Web browsing (HTTP), remote logins (RLOGIN), e-mail (SMTP) and file transfers (FTP) have been implemented. Onion routing provides application-independent, real-time and bi-directional anonymous connections that are resistant to both eavesdropping and traffic analysis. Applications making use of onion routing's anonymous connections may (and usually should) identify their users over the anonymous connection. User anonymity may be layered on top of the anonymous connections by removing identifying information from the data stream. Our goal is anonymous connections, not anonymous communication. The use of a packet-switched public network should not automatically reveal who is talking to whom; this is the traffic analysis that onion routing complicates.","PeriodicalId":400563,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130100306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Security issues in an EDI environment","authors":"Ning Zhang, Q. Shi","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1996.569684","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1996.569684","url":null,"abstract":"EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) means electronic transmission, processing, and storage of commercial, business, or trade related documents. The paper surveys the security threats posed to an EDI system, and outlines the techniques and services used to counter these threats. Most importantly, the paper has gone into great depth to address an EDI specific security requirement-non repudiation of receipt. The current related work done to support this service is first discussed, and then a new and simple, but effective protocol to achieve non repudiation of receipt on a distributed and heterogeneous system platform is proposed.","PeriodicalId":400563,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130305343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Design choices for symmetric key based inter-domain authentication protocols in distributed systems","authors":"M. Hitchens, V. Varadharajan","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1996.569679","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1996.569679","url":null,"abstract":"Authentication is a key requirement in the establishment of secure interactions between network entities. Several authentication and key establishment protocols have been proposed in recent years. Most of these protocols were designed for an intra-domain environment (i.e. one where the communicating parties reside in a single domain) and then extrapolated to the inter-domain environment. In this paper, the design of inter-domain protocols is investigated. We present the different design choices that need to be carefully considered when designing inter-domain protocols in large distributed systems. We propose three different inter-domain protocols with varying degrees of responsibility placed on the client and the trusted servers. In each case, the assumptions made in the design are explicitly stated. This helps to illustrate the rationale behind the choices made. The proposed protocols use symmetric key systems and are based on Kerberos. The arguments, rationales and designs presented in this paper are also applicable to OSF's Distributed Computing Environment (DCE).","PeriodicalId":400563,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116626812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Verifying the correctness of cryptographic protocols using \"Convince\"","authors":"R. W. Lichota, G. L. Hammonds, S. Brackin","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1996.569682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1996.569682","url":null,"abstract":"The paper describes Convince, a tool being developed to facilitate the modeling and analysis of cryptographic protocols, particularly those supporting authentication. Convince uses a belief logic to facilitate the analysis and proof of desired properties of these protocols. Convince incorporates in its front-end a commercial computer aided software engineering tool, StP/OMT, so that an analyst can model a protocol using a combination of familiar graphical and textual notations. Convince uses a Higher Order Logic theorem prover with automated support, so as to minimize the need for specialized theorem proving knowledge. The paper describes how an analyst can use Convince to rapidly construct models of authentication protocols, and outlines a strategy for verifying their correctness. It discusses the integration of StP/OMT with the theorem proving component and practical analysis techniques based on experience acquired through analyzing several published protocols.","PeriodicalId":400563,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115115438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"SIGMA: security for distributed object interoperability between trusted and untrusted systems","authors":"E. Sebes, Terry V. Benzel","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1996.569690","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1996.569690","url":null,"abstract":"The SIGMA project is researching the integration and interoperation of security technologies into distributed computing environments based on CORBA, the Common Object Request Broker Architecture. The architectural results described in the paper are focused on security technologies that allow controlled, selective exchange of object oriented services among separate distributed systems that differ in security policy, mechanisms, and assurance. A central goal for our work in this area is to identify and prototype techniques that enable CORBA based application interoperation between trusted and untrusted distributed systems.","PeriodicalId":400563,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129810825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M. Esmaili, B. Balachandran, R. Safavi-Naini, J. Pieprzyk
{"title":"Case-based reasoning for intrusion detection","authors":"M. Esmaili, B. Balachandran, R. Safavi-Naini, J. Pieprzyk","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1996.569702","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1996.569702","url":null,"abstract":"Recently there has been significant interest in applying artificial intelligence (AI) techniques to the intrusion detection problem. Attempts have been made to develop rule based and model based expert systems for intrusion detection. Although these systems have been useful for detecting intruders, they face difficulties in acquiring and representing the knowledge. We present and describe a case based reasoning approach to intrusion detection which alleviates some of the difficulties of current approaches.","PeriodicalId":400563,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129019880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Implementing security policy in a large defence procurement","authors":"M. Nash, Wg Cdr, R. J. Kennett, Raf","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1996.569665","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1996.569665","url":null,"abstract":"At the 1993 ACSAC conference a previous paper was presented describing the security policy developed for a large, integrated defence procurement, the United Kingdom Royal Air Force Logistics Information Technology System (LITS). The current paper describes some of the practical difficulties encountered in implementing that security policy during subsequent stages of the LITS system development. Issues discussed include the difficulties of \"future proofing\" a security infrastructure in the real world where user security requirements can and do change in ways that were not anticipated, the tension between security policy requirements and cost effective security solutions, and the conflict between labelling data and the use of untrusted applications.","PeriodicalId":400563,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123974199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}