EnergyRN: Energy Economics (Topic)最新文献_第5页

Shock Value: Bill Smoothing and Energy Price Pass-Through 冲击值:账单平滑和能源价格传递

EnergyRN: Energy Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-04-01 DOI: 10.3386/w24558

Catherine Hausman

引用次数: 5

Strategic Demand Response to Dynamic Pricing: A Lab Experiment for the Electricity Market 动态定价的战略需求响应:电力市场的实验室实验

EnergyRN: Energy Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3221747

A. T. Atasoy, Marjolein J. W. Harmsen - van Hout, R. Madlener

{"title":"Strategic Demand Response to Dynamic Pricing: A Lab Experiment for the Electricity Market","authors":"A. T. Atasoy, Marjolein J. W. Harmsen - van Hout, R. Madlener","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3221747","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3221747","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the efforts of restructuring power markets over the last decades, the lack of demand response in the retail electricity markets remains a significant concern. Possible demand response would help to reduce prices and volatility by better matching supply and demand through improved price signals. In this paper we develop a laboratory tool to experimentally investigate the demand response in the electricity market. The baseline treatment constitutes a two-period ‘wait-or-buy’ game with an exogenous first period, an automated supplier, and twenty subject buyers. While the seller offers a fixed number of a product in the market, consumers decide on purchasing the product immediately or waiting until the next period, taking (i) price uncertainty and (ii) inventory risk into account. This treatment captures demand response in the retail market with scarce products. We design an additional treatment by removing the inventory constraint and introducing a devaluation rule, where consumers only bear the price risk – thus mimicking the demand response in the electricity market. We find that in both retail and electricity market treatments consumers play on average the equilibrium predictions and buy strategically. However, there are systematic deviations from rationality in both settings, i.e., consumers buy too soon or wait too long.","PeriodicalId":400187,"journal":{"name":"EnergyRN: Energy Economics (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126866952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 23

The Nordic/Baltic Spot Electric Power System Price: Univariate Nonlinear Impulse-Response Analysis 北欧/波罗的海现货电力系统价格:单变量非线性脉冲响应分析

EnergyRN: Energy Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-02-22 DOI: 10.21314/JEM.2018.172

P. Solibakke

{"title":"The Nordic/Baltic Spot Electric Power System Price: Univariate Nonlinear Impulse-Response Analysis","authors":"P. Solibakke","doi":"10.21314/JEM.2018.172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21314/JEM.2018.172","url":null,"abstract":"This paper revisits the conditional mean and volatility density characteristics of the system price settled by the Nordic/Baltic spot electric power market (1993–2017). The main aim of this paper is an analysis of the nonlinear impulse-response features (shocks) in the nonstorable commodity market. Initially, we extract all deterministic seasonality and nonstationary trend and scale features from the series. A strictly stationary model reports serial correlation for the mean, and clustering, asymmetry and level effects for the volatility. For the mean, the impulse-response analysis reports linear and symmetric mean reversion for any price movements. For the volatility, small price movements show symmetric and decreasing volatility. In contrast, for larger absolute price movements, the volatility shows a nonlinear increase as well as fast-growing negative asymmetries. The impulse persistence is therefore relatively short. With the entrance of renewables into the energy market, the subperiod 2008–17 reports major systematic changes in the mean, volatility, asymmetry and persistence. In fact, the renewables era has changed the fundamental features of the Nordic/Baltic electricity market.","PeriodicalId":400187,"journal":{"name":"EnergyRN: Energy Economics (Topic)","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122602546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

The Ideal Competitive Electricity Market. A Simulation for Italy 理想的竞争性电力市场。意大利的模拟

EnergyRN: Energy Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-12-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3415774

Simona Bigerna, C. Bollino, Maria Chiara D’Errico, Paolo Polinori

引用次数: 0

Promoting Supplier's Environmental Innovation via Emission Taxation 通过排放税促进供应商的环境创新

EnergyRN: Energy Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-12-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3094878

Bosung Kim, Sang Won Kim, K. Park

{"title":"Promoting Supplier's Environmental Innovation via Emission Taxation","authors":"Bosung Kim, Sang Won Kim, K. Park","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3094878","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3094878","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract With growing concerns about pollutant emissions from manufacturing processes, market-based instruments with emission taxation have become increasingly popular by many governments to incentivize firms' emission reduction efforts. In some industries, however, the amount of pollutant emissions from manufacturers largely depends on the quality of the raw materials provided by their suppliers. In that case, motivating the suppliers' environmental innovation efforts could be crucial for an effective regulatory control of pollutant emissions. Nevertheless, many governments adopt the “polluter pays” principle and impose emission taxes on the manufacturers rather than the suppliers. Hence, a key question for the regulator is whether placing an emission tax burden on manufacturers can effectively incentivize their suppliers' environmental innovation efforts through supply chain contracts that are often times chosen by profit-maximizing manufacturers. Thus motivated, this paper studies the impact of supply chain contracts on suppliers' environmental innovation in the presence of emission taxation. We consider two variants of the wholesale price contract, which are commonly used in this type of settings: the quality requirement contract and the cost sharing contract. We show that the economic incentive of the manufacturer and the environmental incentive of the regulator may not coincide (i.e., the profit-maximizing manufacturer may prefer the quality requirement contract whereas the environmental innovation is much higher under the cost sharing contract). We then show that increasing a tax pressure may discourage the supplier's innovation efforts. More importantly, our results show that a very mild level of tax intensity can maximize the supplier's investment in environmental innovation effectively. We also find that the double counting of emissions (i.e., charging the emission tax on the supplier as well) may discourage suppliers' environmental innovation.","PeriodicalId":400187,"journal":{"name":"EnergyRN: Energy Economics (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116757230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

A Simple Regulatory Incentive Mechanism Applied to Electricity Transmission Pricing and Investment 一种适用于输电定价与投资的简单监管激励机制

EnergyRN: Energy Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3070064

M. Hesamzadeh, Juan Rosellón, S. Gabriel, I. Vogelsang

引用次数: 20

The Interplay between Liberalisation and Decarbonisation in the European Internal Energy Market 欧洲内部能源市场自由化与脱碳的相互作用

EnergyRN: Energy Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-07-31 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3015809

Anna Marhold

引用次数: 1

Default Effects and Follow-On Behavior: Evidence from an Electricity Pricing Program 默认效应和后续行为:来自电力定价计划的证据

EnergyRN: Energy Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-06-01 DOI: 10.3386/W23553

M. Fowlie, Catherine Wolfram, A. Spurlock, A. Todd, Patrick Baylis, Peter A. Cappers

{"title":"Default Effects and Follow-On Behavior: Evidence from an Electricity Pricing Program","authors":"M. Fowlie, Catherine Wolfram, A. Spurlock, A. Todd, Patrick Baylis, Peter A. Cappers","doi":"10.3386/W23553","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W23553","url":null,"abstract":"We study default effects in the context of a residential electricity pricing program. We implement a large-scale randomized controlled trial in which one treatment group is given the option to opt-in to time-based pricing while another is defaulted into the program but allowed to opt-out. We provide dramatic evidence of a default effect – a significantly higher fraction of households defaulted onto the time-based pricing plan enroll in the program, even though opting out simply involved making a phone call or clicking through to a website. A distinguishing feature of our empirical setting is that we observe follow-on behavior subsequent to the default manipulation. Specifically, we observe customers’ electricity consumption in light of the pricing plan they face. This, in conjunction with randomization of the default provision, allows us to separately identify the electricity consumption response of “complacent” households (i.e., those who only enroll in time-based pricing if assigned to the opt-out treatment). We find that the complacent households do reduce electricity use during higher priced peak periods, though significantly less on average compared to customers who actively opt in. However, with complacents comprising approximately 75 percent of the population, we observe significantly larger average demand reductions among consumers assigned to the opt-out group. We examine the extent to which the behavioral responses we observe are consistent with a standard model of switching costs, or with alternative mechanisms including inattention, and preferences constructed based on contextual features of the choice setting.","PeriodicalId":400187,"journal":{"name":"EnergyRN: Energy Economics (Topic)","volume":"144 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123471675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 65

Unbundling of Ancillary Service: How Does Price Discrimination of Main Service Matter? 辅助服务的分拆:主要服务的价格歧视有何影响?

EnergyRN: Energy Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-03-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2724138

Yao Cui, Izak Duenyas, Özge Sahin

{"title":"Unbundling of Ancillary Service: How Does Price Discrimination of Main Service Matter?","authors":"Yao Cui, Izak Duenyas, Özge Sahin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2724138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2724138","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a setting where the firm sells a main service (e.g., air travel) and an ancillary service (e.g., baggage delivery) to two types of consumers (high-type and low-type, e.g., business travelers and leisure travelers). We study the firm's decision of whether to unbundle the ancillary service from the main service and charge separate prices. We analyze two types of firms: firms that use uniform pricing of main service and firms that use discriminatory pricing of main service. Our analysis highlights the differences in the structure of optimal ancillary service strategies between the two types of firms. First, a uniform-pricing firm unbundles the ancillary service if the consumers that value the main service higher are also very likely to purchase the ancillary service. On the other hand, a discriminatory-pricing firm unbundles the ancillary service if the consumers that value the main service higher are not very likely to purchase the ancillary service. Second, under uniform pricing, as the firm's proportion of high-type consumers increases, unbundling is more likely to be optimal if the correlation between consumers' main service valuations and ancillary service valuations is high, and bundling is more likely to be optimal if the correlation is low. On the contrary, under discriminatory pricing, as the firm's proportion of high-type consumers increases, bundling is more likely to be optimal if the correlation is high and unbundling is more likely to be optimal if the correlation is low. The differences hinge on the rationale that under uniform pricing, unbundling allows the firm to extract more ancillary surplus from high-type consumers; whereas under discriminatory pricing, bundling allows the firm to extract more ancillary surplus from high-type consumers. Finally, we use these findings to discuss industry practice.","PeriodicalId":400187,"journal":{"name":"EnergyRN: Energy Economics (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116191090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 34

The Prospects for Activity in the UKCS to 2050 Under 'Lower for Longer' Oil and Gas Price Scenarios, and the Unexploited Potential 在“长期低油价”和未开发潜力的情况下，到2050年英国油气活动前景

EnergyRN: Energy Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3035838

A. Kemp, L. Stephen

引用次数: 0