{"title":"Should the Law Do Anything About Economic Inequality","authors":"M. Dimick","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2723476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2723476","url":null,"abstract":"What should be done about rising income and wealth inequality? Should the design and adoption of legal rules take into account their effects on the distribution of income and wealth? Or should the tax-and-transfer system be the exclusive means to address concerns about inequality? A widely-held view argues for the latter: only the tax system, and not the legal system, should be used to redistribute income. While this argument comes in a variety of normative arguments and has support across the political spectrum, there is also a well-known law-and-economics version. This argument, known as the “double-distortion” argument, is simply stated. Legal rules that redistribute income only add to the economic distortions that are already present in the tax system. It would therefore be better for everyone, and especially the poor, to instead adopt an efficient, nonredistributive legal rule, and increase redistribution through the tax system.This Article challenges the double-distortion argument from a law-and-economics perspective. There are two main arguments, in addition to several other subsidiary points. First, in the abstract, there is no reason to believe that legal rules that have redistributive effects will always reduce efficiency; indeed, they can sometimes increase efficiency. Examples from the regulation of product markets, labor markets, and financial markets underscore this claim. In these cases, legal redistribution is more efficient than redistribution through the tax system. Second, legal rules are likely to be more attractive than taxation precisely in cases where inequality itself or normative concerns about inequality is high. Under the optimal tax policy, higher inequality or greater concern about inequality will justify larger tax distortions. Therefore, a particular legal rule is more likely to be more efficient than the optimal tax policy under these circumstances. The ultimate conclusion is that a mix of legal rules and taxation, rather than taxation exclusively, will be the best way to address economic inequality.","PeriodicalId":39833,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"63 1","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68274218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vexatious Litigants and the ADA: Strategies to Fairly Address the Need to Improve Access for Individuals with Disabilities.","authors":"H. G. Hull","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/z275q","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/z275q","url":null,"abstract":"This Article addresses the need to reform the ADA to prevent vexatious litigation and to promote the underlying goals of the Act. Part I of this Article introduces the topic of vexatious litigation and the importance of remedying the effects of exploitation of the ADA. Part II provides an overview of the ADA and its efforts to increase accessibility to individuals with disabilities, emphasizing the provisions of the Act that create incentives to engage in vexatious litigation. Part III examines and analyzes the judiciary's response to vexatious litigation under the ADA, and sanctions that have been issued to limit exploitation. Finally, Part IV provides recommendations to reform the ADA and state disability law counterparts, suggests corrective actions to address vexatious litigation, and identifies methods to promote equality for individuals with disabilities.","PeriodicalId":39833,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"26 1 1","pages":"71-100"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69641424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"International Trade Commission Exclusion Orders for the Infringement of Standard-Essential Patents","authors":"STANDARD-ESSENTIAL Patents","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3179122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3179122","url":null,"abstract":"A patent holder whose U.S. patents have been infringed may seek redress for patent infringement from the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Section 337 authorizes the ITC, among other things, to investigate and bar from entry into the United States products that infringe a valid and enforceable U.S. patent. A holder of standard essential patents (SEPs) that has committed to license its SEPs on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms typically retains the right to file a complaint with the ITC. However, as of early 2016, no SEP holder has been able to enforce an exclusion order against an infringer of SEPs. Limits on the availability of exclusion orders for SEPs have largely arisen from concerns that that remedy might facilitate patent holdup. In 2013, President Obama, acting through the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), echoed those concerns in vetoing an exclusion order that the ITC had issued against an infringer of SEPs on the grounds that the exclusion order would not serve the public interest. The USTR instructed the ITC to examine, in future investigations, whether there is evidence that patent holdup or holdout has occurred. However, a detailed analysis of the ITC’s patent decisions shows that the ITC considered those allegations even before President Obama’s veto. In addition, the ITC’s decisions issued since President Obama’s veto have confirmed that, even after examining evidence of patent holdup, public interest considerations will not necessarily weigh against the issuance of an exclusion order. Raising concerns about the theoretical risk of patent holdup and presenting unsupported allegations about the violation of a FRAND commitment will be insufficient to advise against the issuance of an exclusion order. In this article, I examine the evidence that should inform the ITC’s decision in investigations concerning SEPs. I explain that, to the extent that the ITC needs to consider patent holdup in its public interest analysis, the ITC should determine whether the SEP holder has made a FRAND offer to the respondent. If the SEP holder has extended a FRAND offer, any argument that the SEP holder is attempting to extract compensation above the boundaries of its FRAND commitment becomes moot. It is irrelevant, for the purposes of the ITC investigation, why the respondent failed to accept the SEP holder’s FRAND offer.","PeriodicalId":39833,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"26 1","pages":"125"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68569474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Matter of A-R-C-G- Matter That Much?: Why Domestic Violence Victims Seeking Asylum Need Better Protection.","authors":"Carolyn M Wald","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39833,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"25 2","pages":"527-56"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"34425674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fostering Informed Choice: Alleviating the Trauma of Genetic Abortions.","authors":"Bret D Asbury","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Each year, thousands of pregnant women learn of fetal abnormalities through prenatal genetic analysis. This discovery--made after a woman has initially declined to exercise her right to abort an unwanted pregnancy—raises the difficult and heart-wrenching question of whether to terminate on genetic grounds. Women considering a genetic abortion rely on information and support from health care providers to assist them in making their choice. Though intended to be objective and nondirective, the support women receive frequently provides them within complete and incomprehensible information having the effect of encouraging them to abort genetically anomalous fetuses. As a result, genetic terminations--which cause severe and long-standing psychological impacts such as pathological grief, depression and post-traumatic stress—are often the result of something other than a fully informed choice.Congress and eleven states have recognized the importance of better informing choice by passing legislation aimed at providing clearer and more balanced information to expectant mothers learning of fetal genetic abnormalities. But existing legislative remedies do not adequately address this problem, and this inadequacy will become more pronounced in future years as increases in access to prenatal genetic analysis further stretch the capabilities of the available support services.This Article describes the unique characteristics of terminations for a fetal abnormality, their troubling and persistent psychological impacts,and the reasons why they will become more common in future years. It then offers proposals for how to reconfigure the prenatal genetic counseling landscape in order to reduce the incidence of genetic terminations based on incomplete or misleading information, thereby alleviating their distinct psychological costs. Its overall objective is to ensure that women learning of prenatal genetic abnormalities have access to complete and comprehensible information prior to making their decision and adequate support whether or not they choose to terminate.</p>","PeriodicalId":39833,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"25 2","pages":"293-333"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"34425673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Compensating the victims of failure to vaccinate: what are the options?","authors":"Dorit Rubinstein Reiss","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This Article asks whether parents who choose not to vaccinate their child should be liable if that child, at higher risk of infectious disease than vaccinated children, transmits a vaccine-preventable disease to another. The Article argues that a tort remedy in this situation is both desirable and appropriate. It is desirable to assure compensation to the injured child and the family, who should not have to face the insult of financial ruin on top of the injury from the disease. It is appropriate to require that a family that chooses not to vaccinate a child fully internalizes the costs of that decision, and does not pass it on to others. This Article argues there should be a duty to act in the aforementioned situation, since the non-vaccinating parents create a risk. Even if not vaccinating is seen as nonfeasance, there are policy reasons to create an exception to the default rule that there is no duty to act. As an alternative, the Article suggests creating a statutory duty to act. This Article suggests that legal exemptions from school immunization requirements are not a barrier to liability, since the considerations behind those exemptions are separate from tort liability. It addresses the problem of demonstrating causation, and suggests in which types of cases showing causation would be possible, and when proximate cause is capable of extending from an index case to subsequent cases. The Article concludes by addressing potential counter arguments.</p>","PeriodicalId":39833,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"23 3","pages":"595-633"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"32759461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}