FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series最新文献

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Reallocating Liquidity to Resolve a Crisis: Evidence from the Panic of 1873 重新分配流动性以解决危机:来自1873年恐慌的证据
FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2021-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3901982
Haelim Anderson, Kinda Hachem, Simpson Zhang
{"title":"Reallocating Liquidity to Resolve a Crisis: Evidence from the Panic of 1873","authors":"Haelim Anderson, Kinda Hachem, Simpson Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3901982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3901982","url":null,"abstract":"We study financial stability with constraints on central bank intervention. We show that a forced reallocation of liquidity across banks can achieve fewer bank failures than a decentralized market for interbank loans, reflecting a pecuniary externality in the decentralized equilibrium. Importantly, this reallocation can be implemented through the issuance of clearinghouse loan certificates, such as those issued in New York City during the Panic of 1873. With a new dataset constructed from archival records, we demonstrate that the New York Clearinghouse issued loan certificates to member banks in the way our model suggests would have helped resolve the panic.","PeriodicalId":397288,"journal":{"name":"FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134043128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Capital Controls, Domestic Macroprudential Policy and the Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy 资本管制、国内宏观审慎政策与货币政策中的银行贷款渠道
FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2021-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3902070
Andrea Fabiani, Martha López, J. Peydró, Paul E. Soto, M. Guerrero
{"title":"Capital Controls, Domestic Macroprudential Policy and the Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy","authors":"Andrea Fabiani, Martha López, J. Peydró, Paul E. Soto, M. Guerrero","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3902070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3902070","url":null,"abstract":"We study how capital controls and domestic macroprudential policy tame credit supply booms, respectively targeting foreign and domestic bank debt. For identification, we exploit the simultaneous introduction of capital controls on foreign exchange (FX) debt inflows and an increase of reserve requirements on domestic bank deposits in Colombia during a strong credit boom, as well as credit registry and bank balance sheet data. Our results suggest that first, an increase in the local monetary policy rate, raising the interest rate spread with the United States, allows more FX-indebted banks to carry trade cheap FX funds with more expensive peso lending, especially toward riskier, opaque firms. Capital controls tax FX debt and break the carry trade. Second, the increase in reserve requirements on domestic deposits directly reduces credit supply, and more so for riskier, opaque firms, rather than enhances the transmission of monetary rates on credit supply. Importantly, different banks finance credit in the boom with either domestic or foreign (FX) financing. Hence, capital controls and domestic macroprudential policy complementarily mitigate the boom and the associated risk-taking through two distinct channels","PeriodicalId":397288,"journal":{"name":"FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127505188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Kansas’ Experiment with Private Deposit Insurance 堪萨斯州的私人存款保险试验
FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2021-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3902067
Lee K. Davison, Carlos D. Ramirez
{"title":"Kansas’ Experiment with Private Deposit Insurance","authors":"Lee K. Davison, Carlos D. Ramirez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3902067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3902067","url":null,"abstract":"Between 1909 and 1922 a private deposit insurance company coexisted with the state-sponsored deposit insurance program in Kansas. This paper documents its development using primary sources. In addition, it examines if affiliation with the private deposit insurance (i) had an effect on risk-taking and the probability of failure; (ii) increased confidence among depositors, and (iii) was influenced by a neighboring bank’s membership in the state’s deposit insurance. We find that affiliation with the private deposit insurance did not affect a bank’s likelihood of failure, although smaller national bank members did increase risk-taking. The evidence does not support the hypothesis that the company enhanced depositor confidence. Lastly, we do find strong evidence that a bank’s decision to join the private deposit insurance was influenced by neighboring banks’ affiliation with the Kansas deposit insurance program.","PeriodicalId":397288,"journal":{"name":"FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series","volume":"149 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127491392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
What Happens in Vegas Doesn't Always Stay in Vegas: The Dynamics of House Prices and Foreclosure Rates Across Space and Time 发生在拉斯维加斯并不总是停留在拉斯维加斯:动态的房价和止赎率跨越空间和时间
FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2019-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3628569
Hua Kiefer, Leonard C. Kiefer, Jie (Diana) Wei
{"title":"What Happens in Vegas Doesn't Always Stay in Vegas: The Dynamics of House Prices and Foreclosure Rates Across Space and Time","authors":"Hua Kiefer, Leonard C. Kiefer, Jie (Diana) Wei","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3628569","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3628569","url":null,"abstract":"This paper identifies instruments for house prices and foreclosure rates and estimates a Dynamic Spatial Simultaneous Equation System (DSSES) to investigate the dynamics of them across space and time. Shocks to the foreclosure rate in one state not only affect house prices in that state but also the foreclosure rates and house prices in nearby states. When it comes to the housing market, what happens in Vegas doesn’t always stay in Vegas. A one standard deviation foreclosure shock leads to a 2 percent decline in real house prices over the long run.","PeriodicalId":397288,"journal":{"name":"FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127230795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Your House or Your Credit Card, Which Would You Choose? Personal Delinquency Tradeoffs and Precautionary Liquidity Motives 你的房子还是你的信用卡,你会选哪个?个人犯罪权衡与预防性流动性动机
FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2010-01-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1619929
Ethan Cohen-Cole, J. Morse
{"title":"Your House or Your Credit Card, Which Would You Choose? Personal Delinquency Tradeoffs and Precautionary Liquidity Motives","authors":"Ethan Cohen-Cole, J. Morse","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1619929","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1619929","url":null,"abstract":"This paper finds strong evidence that many individuals choose to pay credit card bills even at the cost of mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures. While the popular press and some recent literature have suggested that this choice may emerge from steep declines in housing prices, we find evidence that individual-level liquidity concerns are at least as important in the decision. That is, choosing credit cards over housing suggests a precautionary liquidity preference. ; By linking the mortgage delinquency decisions to individual-level credit conditions, we are able to assess the compound impact of reductions in housing prices and retrenchment in the credit markets. Indeed, we find the availability of cash-equivalent credit to be a key component of the default decision. We find that a one standard deviation reduction in housing price changes elicits a change in the predicted probability of mortgage default that is similar in both direction and magnitude to a one standard deviation reduction in available credit (the values are -14.9% and -13.1% respectively). Availability of consumer credit appears important not only as a means of payment, but also as an insurance mechanism for individuals and a shock absorber for the economy as a whole. Our findings are consistent with consumer finance literature that finds individuals have a preference for preserving liquidity - even at significant cost.","PeriodicalId":397288,"journal":{"name":"FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series","volume":"313 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133240003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 50
Is there Cyclical Bias in Bank Holding Company Risk Ratings? 银行控股公司风险评级是否存在周期性偏差?
FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2007-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.964520
T. Curry, Gary S. Fissel, G. Hanweck
{"title":"Is there Cyclical Bias in Bank Holding Company Risk Ratings?","authors":"T. Curry, Gary S. Fissel, G. Hanweck","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.964520","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.964520","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines whether bank holding company (BHC) risk ratings are asymmetrically assigned or biased over business cycles from 1986 to 2003. In a model of ratings determination which accounts for bank characteristics, financial market conditions, past supervisory information, and aggregate macro-economic factors, we find that bank exam ratings exhibit inter-temporal characteristics. First, exam ratings exhibit some evidence of examiner bias for several periods analyzed. When the business cycle turns, examiners sometime depart from standards that they set during the previous phases of the cycle. However, this bias is not widespread or systematic. Second, exam ratings exhibit some inertia. Our results suggest that examiners rate on the side of not changing (rather than upgrading or downgrading) an institution's exam rating. Third, we find robust evidence of a secular trend towards more stringent examination BHC ratings standards over time.","PeriodicalId":397288,"journal":{"name":"FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series","volume":"150 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129907753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 50
The Effect of Bank Supervision on Loan Growth 银行监管对贷款增长的影响
FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2006-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.942299
T. Curry, Gary S. Fissel, Carlos D. Ramirez
{"title":"The Effect of Bank Supervision on Loan Growth","authors":"T. Curry, Gary S. Fissel, Carlos D. Ramirez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.942299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.942299","url":null,"abstract":"This paper quantifies the short-term and long-term impact of bank supervision (measured using CAMEL composite and component ratings) on different categories of loan growth: (a) commercial and industrial loans, b) consumer loans, and (c) real estate loans. For each of these categories, we perform dynamic loan growth equations at the state level augmented by the inclusion of CAMEL ratings for all banks in the state, after controlling for banking and economic conditions. We perform these regressions for two distinct subperiods: (1) 1985 through 1993 (which covers the credit crunch period), and (2) 1994 through 2004 (which covers the sustained recovery period). For the first period, 1985 to 1993, we find that out of the three loan categories considered, business lending is the most sensitive to changes in CAMEL ratings (both the composite and the components), although the other loan categories also show some sensitivity. Overall, however, we find little evidence suggesting that the effects of changes in any of the components of CAMEL ratings differ systematically from the effects of changes in the composite CAMEL. For the second period, we find little evidence that changes in CAMEL ratings (the composite or its components) had any systematic effect on loan growth for any of the loan categories considered.","PeriodicalId":397288,"journal":{"name":"FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122907067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Troubled Banks: Why Don't They All Fail? 陷入困境的银行:为什么他们没有全部倒闭?
FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2005-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.886684
R. Oshinsky, V. Olin
{"title":"Troubled Banks: Why Don't They All Fail?","authors":"R. Oshinsky, V. Olin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.886684","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.886684","url":null,"abstract":"A wealth of literature examines the determinants of bank failures and of bank mergers or consolidations. Also numerous are studies that develop failure- prediction models and early-warning systems. But both groups of studies use samples of all banks, and therefore most of this research focuses on pairs of outcomes: failure versus nonfailure, merger versus consolidation,1 or problem bank versus nonproblem bank. But in reality, future status is more than a binary choice. Here we study only troubled banks - banks that receive a composite CAMELS rating of either 4 or 5 when examined.2 A focus on troubled banks is valuable to the FDIC and bank researchers for four reasons. First, when a bank is troubled, failure is but one possible outcome; alternative outcomes are recovery, merger, or continuation as a problem. Second, between 1990 and 2002, 96 percent of all banks that failed had first been troubled banks. Including nonproblem banks would add bias towards non-failure as a possible outcome since a vast majority of nonproblem banks do not fail. Third, if the FDIC can better predict the number of troubled banks that will not fail, it will be better able to estimate the size of its contingent loss reserve. Finally, development of a multistate model identifying financial characteristics that contribute to recovery as well as to failure is important for the FDIC's long-term strategic planning: accurate predictions of the future states of problem banks would affect the resources applied to these banks.","PeriodicalId":397288,"journal":{"name":"FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series","volume":"390 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122481770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 74
What Caused the Bank Capital Build-Up of the 1990s? 是什么导致了上世纪90年代的银行资本积累?
FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2004-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.681245
M. Flannery, Kasturi P. Rangan
{"title":"What Caused the Bank Capital Build-Up of the 1990s?","authors":"M. Flannery, Kasturi P. Rangan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.681245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.681245","url":null,"abstract":"Large U.S. banks dramatically increased their capitalization during the 1990s, to the highest levels in more than 50 years. We document this buildup of capital and evaluate several potential motivations. Our results support the hypothesis that regulatory innovations in the early 1990s weakened conjectural government guarantees and enhanced bank counterparties' incentives to monitor and price default risk. We find no evidence that a bank holding company's (BHC's) market capitalization increases with its asset volatility prior to 1994. Thereafter, the data display a strong cross-sectional relation between capitalization and asset risk. Copyright 2008, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":397288,"journal":{"name":"FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133308268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 449
Loan-Portfolio Quality and the Diffusion of Technological Innovation 贷款组合质量与技术创新扩散
FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2004-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.886722
Robert Hauswald, R. Marquez
{"title":"Loan-Portfolio Quality and the Diffusion of Technological Innovation","authors":"Robert Hauswald, R. Marquez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.886722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.886722","url":null,"abstract":"We study the economic forces that drive innovation in credit-risk assessment and the role of regulators in fostering technological progress. Recent regulatory proposals base capital-adequacy standards on banks' own internal systems and call for regulators to establish a set of best practices for the industry. We find that the dissemination of innovations mandated by this approach generates a tension between lowering aggregate banking-system risk ex post and providing banks with incentives to innovate ex ante. Moreover, this tension arises purely from regulatory concern for bank safety and not from any interest in promoting competition. We show that achieving the optimal level of innovation requires that regulators restrict the diffusion of technology. If regulators are unable to commit to specific dissemination policies, it may be beneficial to let banks assert intellectual property rights through, for instance, the patenting of their innovations.","PeriodicalId":397288,"journal":{"name":"FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129860691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
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