Theoretical Inquiries in Law最新文献_第5页

The transformation of the art market: Law, norms, and institutions 艺术市场的转型:法律、规范和制度

Theoretical Inquiries in Law Pub Date : 2022-02-01 DOI: 10.1515/til-2022-0009

Daniel Klerman, A. Shortland

{"title":"The transformation of the art market: Law, norms, and institutions","authors":"Daniel Klerman, A. Shortland","doi":"10.1515/til-2022-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2022-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Over the last three decades, the art market has undergone a remarkable transformation. Before the 1990s, artworks were sold with hardly any concern about whether they had been stolen or looted, whereas now any reputable gallery or auction house checks the “provenance” of any substantial work before sale. This transformation reflects interlocking changes in law, norms, and institutions. New York’s and more broadly the United States’ assertion of jurisdiction and application of U.S. substantive law has destabilized title to stolen and looted goods worldwide because American statutes of limitations generally provide weaker protection for those who possess stolen or looted goods even in good faith. Application of American law has had a profound effect, especially for the high end of the market, because European or Asian investors who purchase art outside of the U.S. may eventually want to sell or display their works in the U.S. Defective title under American law thus affects prices worldwide. The tightening and broader application of American law reflects both longstanding legal principles and changes in social norms towards the redress of historical wrongs, most notably prominent campaigns relating to art confiscated or sold under duress in Nazi Germany. New institutions, most importantly searchable databases recording stolen and looted art such as the Art Loss Register, are also changing perceptions about minimum standards for good faith purchase, which in turn affects both social norms and court cases. These new norms, induced by both legal changes and better information, have influenced the market even for less valuable art, for which sale or display in the U.S. is not a relevant consideration and for which the threat of costly legal action is not credible. The fact that social and institutionalized norms play an important role in protecting original owners is probably good, because norms and institutions can be effective even where law is not and often do so at lower cost.","PeriodicalId":39577,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Inquiries in Law","volume":"69 1","pages":"219 - 242"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74111006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Frontmatter

Theoretical Inquiries in Law Pub Date : 2022-02-01 DOI: 10.1515/til-2022-frontmatter1

引用次数: 0

The unexpected effects of israeli courts’ approach to dual-listed companies 以色列法院对两地上市公司的处理方式产生了意想不到的影响

Theoretical Inquiries in Law Pub Date : 2022-02-01 DOI: 10.1515/til-2022-0003

A. Klement

引用次数: 0

Delaware’s copycat: Can delaware corporate law be emulated? 特拉华州的模仿者:特拉华州的公司法可以被模仿吗?

Theoretical Inquiries in Law Pub Date : 2022-02-01 DOI: 10.1515/til-2022-0002

Ido Baum, D. Solomon

{"title":"Delaware’s copycat: Can delaware corporate law be emulated?","authors":"Ido Baum, D. Solomon","doi":"10.1515/til-2022-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2022-0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Delaware’s famous corporate law and its highly respected specialized Court of Chancery attract entrepreneurs from all over the world, who choose the small state as their locus of incorporation and litigation forum, and global investors who choose Delaware law as the law governing their corporate investments and mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Other jurisdictions vie with Delaware in regard to these choices. This interjurisdictional competition makes Delaware a significant global norm exporter in the field of corporate law because jurisdictions emulate some of its corporate law. Israel leads the global pack. For two decades, it has been approximating its corporate law to Delaware’s and emulating its principal institutions, including by establishing a specialized Chancery-like court whose judges seek guidance in Delaware’s case law in deciding open corporate law questions. This Article employs qualitative methods—interviews with M&A practitioners from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel. We use the interviews to assess whether the project of approximating Delaware corporate law has succeeded in shifting incorporation decision preferences away from Delaware to Israel and watering down the natural reluctance of global investors to accepting an unfamiliar corporate law when engaging in cross-border corporate M&A transactions involving an Israeli party. Our findings indicate that the approximation project has countervailing effects, opinions about its success being polarized and nuanced; that approximation increases the familiarity of domestic practitioners with the foreign law being emulated, making the emulated law easier to implement; and that approximation creates more room for other aspects of interjurisdictional competition to influence private choices.","PeriodicalId":39577,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Inquiries in Law","volume":"39 1","pages":"1 - 36"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87556919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

What’s So Special About General Verdicts? Questioning the Preferred Verdict Format in American Criminal Jury Trials 一般裁决有什么特别之处?对美国刑事陪审团审判中优先裁决形式的质疑

Theoretical Inquiries in Law Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1515/til-2021-0017

A. Sood

{"title":"What’s So Special About General Verdicts? Questioning the Preferred Verdict Format in American Criminal Jury Trials","authors":"A. Sood","doi":"10.1515/til-2021-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2021-0017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Criminal juries in the United States typically deliver their decisions through a “general verdict,” expressing only their ultimate conclusion of “guilty” or “not guilty,” rather than through a “special verdict” that identifies whether each element of the charged crime has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. American courts have broadly favored the use of general verdicts in criminal cases due to concerns that the special verdict will curtail the jury’s decision-making autonomy, including its power to nullify the law in favor of the defense, potentially undermining the criminal defendant’s constitutional right to trial by jury. This Article confronts the legal status quo on verdict format and its underlying, untested assumptions. Drawing upon prior psychology findings and legal professionals’ anecdotal observations, it questions whether the general verdict poses its own under-acknowledged threats to the rights of criminal defendants and the decision-making agency of jurors. While the more guided special verdict format is presumed to threaten nullifying acquittals, the unguided general verdict format might be enabling convictions that violate constitutional norms of due process, impartial adjudication, and equal protection. Given the high-stakes values potentially implicated in the choice of verdict format in criminal cases, it is time to put the conventional wisdom in favor of general verdicts to an empirical test. This Article therefore proposes a methodological framework for investigating whether the legal status quo accurately reflects (1) current stakeholders’ preferences and predictions, and (2) experimentally testable legal and cognitive effects of general versus special verdicts in lay determinations of criminal liability. A data-informed understanding is needed to assess whether the general verdict is optimizing the integrity, fairness, and constitutionality of criminal jury decision making.","PeriodicalId":39577,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Inquiries in Law","volume":"51 1","pages":"55 - 84"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78900337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Moral Norms, Adaptive Preferences, and Hedonic Psychology 道德规范、适应性偏好和享乐心理学

Theoretical Inquiries in Law Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1515/til-2021-0016

J. Masur

引用次数: 1

Preferences and Compliance with International Law 偏好和遵守国际法

Theoretical Inquiries in Law Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1515/til-2021-0023

Adam Chilton, K. Linos

{"title":"Preferences and Compliance with International Law","authors":"Adam Chilton, K. Linos","doi":"10.1515/til-2021-0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2021-0023","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract International law lacks many of the standard features of domestic law. There are few legislative or judicial bodies with exclusive authority over particular jurisdictions or subject matters, the subjects regulated by international law typically must affirmatively consent to be bound by it, and supranational authorities with the power to coerce states to comply with international obligations are rare. How can a legal system with these features generate changes in state behavior? For many theories, the ability of international law to inform and change individual preferences provides the answer. When voters care that treaty commitments be kept, or that international norms be honored, the theory goes, leaders are more likely to be able to make choices consistent with international obligations. Over the last decade, a literature has emerged testing these theories using surveys and experiments embedded in surveys. Multiple U.S. studies find that international law and international norm arguments shift public opinion in the direction of greater compliance by 4 to 20 percentage points. However, studies in foreign contexts are more mixed, with some backlash reported in countries in which international law is highly politicized. This Article describes the state of current knowledge about whether international law actually does change preferences, explains the limitations with existing research, and proposes avenues for future study.","PeriodicalId":39577,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Inquiries in Law","volume":"22 1","pages":"247 - 298"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87417393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 12

Framed by the Law: Experimental Evidence for the Effects of the Salience of the Law on Preferences 法律的框架:法律显著性对偏好影响的实验证据

Theoretical Inquiries in Law Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1515/til-2021-0015

Tamar Kricheli-Katz

引用次数: 1

Anti-preferences Anti-preferences

Theoretical Inquiries in Law Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1515/til-2021-0024

Roy Kreitner

{"title":"Anti-preferences","authors":"Roy Kreitner","doi":"10.1515/til-2021-0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2021-0024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This Article offers a critical evaluation of preference satisfaction as a frame for normative thinking. It begins with an internal critique of the way preferences work in normative economics, distinguishing among three elements: welfare; preferences; and choices. For preference satisfaction to work well, it must be able to bridge two gaps, one between choice and preferences, and another between preferences and welfare. In contexts where both those gaps are bridged, preference satisfaction offers a workable normative framework; where at least one of those gaps is unbridgeable, the framework should be treated with extreme caution if not jettisoned altogether. The Article then goes on to pursue an external critique, by asking what price we pay for using the preference satisfaction framework when it appears to perform well. The point of the critique is that even when preference satisfaction provides a good normative framework on its own terms, the framework obscures considerations that should not be ignored. By pursuing one concrete example, the Article shows how broad considerations regarding the implications of the regime of wage labor are absent from legal contemplation when labor law is imagined and shaped through the lens of preference satisfaction. The Article concludes with a speculation about how different theories of welfare might be employed in concert, rather than as alternatives. It suggests that a pluralism of theory is a way to expose the political stakes in the kinds of policy discussion where preference satisfaction is often a dominant way of thinking.","PeriodicalId":39577,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Inquiries in Law","volume":"34 1","pages":"299 - 328"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81278984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Influencing the Preferences of Children through Legal Impacts on Parenting Style 通过法律对父母教养方式的影响影响儿童的偏好

Theoretical Inquiries in Law Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1515/til-2021-0025

S. Sugarman

{"title":"Influencing the Preferences of Children through Legal Impacts on Parenting Style","authors":"S. Sugarman","doi":"10.1515/til-2021-0025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2021-0025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The overriding theme of the conference honoring Bob Cooter and his work is the question whether law and policy can change people’s preferences. The conventional “law and economics” answer is “no.” People have preferences that are fixed. What changes in law and policy do is to change how people behave by altering the costs and benefits people face in pursuit of their preferences. Put simply, the assumption of the “law and economics” model is that people respond to financial incentives by changing how they act, not what they want. So, to take a simple example, imagine two people at the same starting point, both wanting to drive separately to visit a mutual friend. Their preference to get there promptly and safely is common to both of them, but how they act in pursuit of that goal may well differ. Moreover, government can alter how they drive to their friend’s by making changes such as putting in a freeway, or adding a new lane to the road, or installing lots of new traffic signals or stop signs along one route. The two people may have driven different routes previously, and they may alter their driving strategy in response to the policy changes government has adopted and may still decide that different routes are better for them. But they do not change their desire to see their friend in a prompt and safe manner. In this Article I offer a counterexample — an instance in which changes in law and policy can not only alter the behavior of some with fixed preferences, but also can impact the preferences of others. My example is about changes in society that can alter parenting style (of those parents with a fixed preference to have their children succeed) and can also change the underlying preferences that those children have as to how their lives should play out.","PeriodicalId":39577,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Inquiries in Law","volume":"376 1","pages":"329 - 343"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86811203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0