{"title":"Operation Forager","authors":"D. K. Mitchener","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv1q6bnxn.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1q6bnxn.9","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter is a narrative of D-day on Saipan and W-day on Guam in the Mariana Islands and a description and analysis of the planning for and the execution of naval gunfire missions in support of each assault. This is followed by an analysis of the effectiveness of that support and of the application of the lessons that had been learned at Tarawa. The lessons were modified in the case of Saipan, but they were reaffirmed in their application at Guam.","PeriodicalId":394447,"journal":{"name":"U.S. Naval Gunfire Support in the Pacific War","volume":"144 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131818837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Operation Detachment","authors":"D. K. Mitchener","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv1q6bnxn.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1q6bnxn.11","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter is a narrative of D-day on Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands and a description and analysis of the planning for and the execution of naval gunfire missions in support of the assault. This is followed by an analysis of the effectiveness of that support and of the application of the lessons that had been learned at Tarawa. The Japanese defenses on Iwo Jima rendered the lessons learned at Tarawa practically irrelevant.","PeriodicalId":394447,"journal":{"name":"U.S. Naval Gunfire Support in the Pacific War","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130488973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Operation Stalemate II","authors":"D. C. Hodges","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv1q6bnxn.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1q6bnxn.10","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract : Operation Stalemate II was conducted on 15 September 1944 to secure the Palau Islands in the Pacific Ocean. The primary purpose of this operation was to prevent the Japanese from attacking MacArthur's western flank while he conducted operations in the Philippines. The 1st Marine Division led the American attacking force on the tiny island of Peleliu. Defending the island was a resolute force of Japanese soldiers, under orders to die fighting, killing as many of the enemy as they could. American leadership anticipated a sharp fight lasting no more than 3 days. After 72 days of continuous fighting, U.S. forces had eliminated the entire Japanese garrison of 13,500 soldiers on Peleliu. But the victors paid dearly for their win; the enemy inflicted nearly 10,000 casualties, including over 2,000 dead or missing. Operation Stalemate II did not achieve its primary purpose of preventing the enemy from attacking MacArthur's flank because that purpose had already been accomplished. The commander of Japanese forces in the Palaus did not have the ability to influence actions against the Americans in the Philippines. Prior to 15 September 1944, key leadership realized the intent of Stalemate II had already been achieved. Despite this knowledge, Stalemate II was allowed to proceed because military leadership of the Pacific was hampered by an inefficient command structure. The inefficiencies manifested as disputes between personalities and services, competition for resources, and decentralized execution of two distinctly separate courses of action against Japanese forces in the Pacific. This led to duplication of efforts and execution of unnecessary tasks. Stalemate II was one such unnecessary task. Although unnecessary at the time, Stalemate II significantly contributed to today's Joint Command and Control concepts. The sacrifices made by those who participated in Stalemate II continue to pay dividends for America's modern military forces. (1 table, 4 figures, 29 refs.)","PeriodicalId":394447,"journal":{"name":"U.S. Naval Gunfire Support in the Pacific War","volume":"231 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123060952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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