{"title":"Analytical Review of the Resilience of Ukraine’s Critical Energy Infrastructure to Cyber Threats in Times of War","authors":"A. Davydiuk, V. Zubok","doi":"10.23919/CyCon58705.2023.10181813","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon58705.2023.10181813","url":null,"abstract":"The Russia-Ukraine conflict has led to a significant increase in cyber attacks on critical infrastructure in Ukraine, with the energy sector being a primary target. The goal of these cyber attacks is to support military operations on the battlefield. Enhancing the resilience of the energy sector is a primary and urgent assignment for the security and defense sector of Ukraine.This study aims to identify the cyber resilience factors of critical energy infrastructure and their possible dependencies and analyze the causes of their occurrence.Accordingly, an analysis of the problems of the resilience of the critical energy infrastructure in Ukraine has been carried out. Based on this analysis, we have identified and studied some dependencies between cyber security for power energy infrastructure and other sectors, often referred to as cascade effects. By analyzing cause-and-effect relationships in power outages, the prerequisites for the emergence of negative factors affecting the resilience of critical infrastructure in the conditions of war have been determined.Using the obtained information about cascade effects, procedures have been proposed to enhance resilience. These include implementing processes for collecting and processing big data on cyber statistics, optimizing public-private cooperation, and organizing cyber training.The goal of these processes is to increase the level of cyber security for critical infrastructure. These processes are aimed at increasing the effectiveness of responding to cyber security crises in conditions of limited time and material resources.The experience of Ukraine in conducting such research is unique. This can become the basis for the development of models and architectures for the resilience of electric power systems in other countries.","PeriodicalId":391972,"journal":{"name":"2023 15th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Meeting Reality (CyCon)","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127268163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Seeing Through the Fog: The Impact of Information Operations on War Crimes Investigations in Ukraine","authors":"Lindsay Freeman","doi":"10.23919/cycon58705.2023.10181846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/cycon58705.2023.10181846","url":null,"abstract":"As Russian forces closed in on Kyiv, a MiG-29 Fulcrum swooped in and took down six Russian jets. The next day, the same MiG shot down ten more. Stories of the hero fighter pilot spread like wildfire throughout Ukraine and across the internet, turning the “Ghost of Kyiv” into a living legend.But he was not living, or even real. The pilot and his exploits were a total fiction created as part of an influence campaign spread via social media to strike terror into Russian forces, fortify the resolve of Ukrainian citizens, and amaze the world with Ukraine’s unexpected strength and courage.The strategic use of the online information environment is only one facet of intangible warfare between Russia and Ukraine that makes this contemporary conflict particularly unique and complex. Propaganda, disinformation, and psychological operations are as old as warfare itself, but advanced digital technologies now reshape conflicts in often unanticipated, unforeseen, and surprising ways. These changing dynamics inevitably have an impact on those tasked with investigating war crimes and establishing the truth of what occurred on the battlefield.This paper examines the strategic use of digital information and communications technologies in the Russia–Ukraine conflict to better understand how they are changing the dynamics of war, war narratives, and war crimes investigations. The first section of the paper briefly explains how war crimes investigators and prosecutors are increasingly relying on digital material as evidence in their cases. The second section considers how digital information operations are being deployed and how these operations impact the investigation of war crimes. Finally, the third section highlights some of the tools that can help war crimes investigators fight back against a complex and chaotic information environment.","PeriodicalId":391972,"journal":{"name":"2023 15th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Meeting Reality (CyCon)","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126274065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I. Linkov, Kelsey Stoddard, A. Strelzoff, S. Galaitsi, J. Keisler, Benjamin D. Trump, A. Kott, Pavol Bielik, Petar Tsankov
{"title":"Toward Mission-Critical AI: Interpretable, Actionable, and Resilient AI","authors":"I. Linkov, Kelsey Stoddard, A. Strelzoff, S. Galaitsi, J. Keisler, Benjamin D. Trump, A. Kott, Pavol Bielik, Petar Tsankov","doi":"10.23919/CyCon58705.2023.10181349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon58705.2023.10181349","url":null,"abstract":"Artificial intelligence (AI) is widely used in science and practice. However, its use in mission-critical contexts is limited due to the lack of appropriate methods for establishing confidence and trust in AI’s decisions. To bridge this gap, we argue that instead of aiming to achieve Explainable AI, we need to develop Interpretable, Actionable, and Resilient AI (AI3). Our position is that aiming to provide military commanders and decision-makers with an understanding of how AI models make decisions risks constraining AI capabilities to only those reconcilable with human cognition. Instead, complex systems should be designed with features that build trust by bringing decision-analytic perspectives and formal tools into the AI development and application process. AI3 incorporates explicit quantifications and visualizations of user confidence in AI decisions. In doing so, it makes examining and testing of AI predictions possible in order to establish a basis for trust in the systems’ decision-making and ensure broad benefits from deploying and advancing its computational capabilities. This presentation provides a methodological frame and practical examples of integrating AI into mission-critical use cases and decision-analytical tools.","PeriodicalId":391972,"journal":{"name":"2023 15th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Meeting Reality (CyCon)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130482418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Irregulars: Third-Party Cyber Actors and Digital Resistance Movements in the Ukraine Conflict","authors":"Margaret W. Smith, Thomas Dean","doi":"10.23919/CyCon58705.2023.10182061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon58705.2023.10182061","url":null,"abstract":"The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent rise of the IT Army of Ukraine (IT Army) illustrate how an organized non-military, all volunteer, and multinational digital resistance movement can impact an ongoing conflict. For nation-states, third-party actors in cyberspace pose a different set of concerns than state-affiliated or state-sponsored cyber actors and are the latest incarnation of underground auxiliary forces that bring unconventional tactics to bear in a conventional conflict. To investigate the IT Army’s role in the war in Ukraine, we created a dataset of the content collected from the “IT ARMY of Ukraine” public channel on the messaging app Telegram. The channel provides the most up-to-date information on proposed targets, why those targets are important, and if attacks are deemed successful, in both Ukrainian and English. Through the lens of nonviolent action strategy and theory, we assess the IT Army’s effectiveness as a resistance movement, defined by Joint Publication 3–05, “Special Operations,” as “an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legal established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability.” The dataset enables us to develop a more complete picture of the IT Army’s evolution as a digital resistance movement since its creation on February 26, 2022, to assess how it incorporates nonviolent action strategy and elements to manage the over 200,000 volunteers and concentrate resources and strength to disrupt Russian domestic targets in and through cyberspace.","PeriodicalId":391972,"journal":{"name":"2023 15th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Meeting Reality (CyCon)","volume":"139 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131426059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lars Gjesvik, A. Khanyari, Haakon Bryhni, Alfred Arouna, Niels Nagelhus Schia
{"title":"Digital Supply Chain Dependency and Resilience","authors":"Lars Gjesvik, A. Khanyari, Haakon Bryhni, Alfred Arouna, Niels Nagelhus Schia","doi":"10.23919/CyCon58705.2023.10181978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon58705.2023.10181978","url":null,"abstract":"While a growing body of literature addresses how states increasingly aim to secure their digital domains and mitigate dependencies, less attention has been paid to how infrastructural and architectural configurations shape their ability to do so. This paper provides a novel approach to studying cyber security and digital dependencies, paying attention to how the everyday business decisions by private companies affect states’ ability to ensure security. Every mobile application relies on a multitude of microservices, many of which are provided by independent vendors and service providers operating through various infrastructural configurations across borders in an a-territorial global network. In this paper, we unpack such digital supply chains to examine the technical cross-border services, infrastructural configurations, and locations of various microservices on which popular mobile applications depend. We argue that these dependencies have differing effects on the resilience of digital technologies at the national level but that addressing these dependencies requires different and sometimes contradictory interventions. To study this phenomenon, we develop a methodology for exploring this phenomenon empirically by tracing and examining the dispersed and frequently implicit dependencies in some of the most widely used mobile applications. To analyse these dependencies, we record raw traffic streams at a point in time seen across various mobile applications. Subsequently locating these microservices geographically and to privately owned networks, our study maps dependencies in the case studies of Oslo, Barcelona, Paris, Zagreb, Mexico City, and Dublin.","PeriodicalId":391972,"journal":{"name":"2023 15th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Meeting Reality (CyCon)","volume":"10071 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122365233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Evaluating Assumptions About the Role of Cyberspace in Warfighting: Evidence from Ukraine*","authors":"E. Lonergan, Margaret W. Smith, Grace B. Mueller","doi":"10.23919/cycon58705.2023.10182101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/cycon58705.2023.10182101","url":null,"abstract":"In the lead-up to Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, many experts offered predictions about how cyberspace would play a role in the conflict. Specifically, analysts expected Russia to launch a cyber “shock and awe” campaign against Ukraine, to integrate cyber operations into conventional military operations, and to launch significant cyber attacks against the West. We leverage an original dataset, as well as an analysis of several cyber incidents, to explore the extent to which these assumptions match up with reality. While the Ukraine conflict has witnessed a significant volume and diversity of cyber incidents, our research indicates that the cyber dimension of the war has not played out as analysts initially expected. Additionally, some of the more significant cyber incidents and cyber actors were not anticipated by experts, particularly the prominence of third-party non-state actors rather than more sophisticated nation-state actors, and the former’s willingness to conduct cyber attacks beyond the theater of operations. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for future policymaking.","PeriodicalId":391972,"journal":{"name":"2023 15th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Meeting Reality (CyCon)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129527447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Unpacking Cyber Neutrality","authors":"Scott M. Sullivan","doi":"10.23919/cycon58705.2023.10181864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/cycon58705.2023.10181864","url":null,"abstract":"Since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Western states have repeatedly and adamantly insisted that they would not become directly embroiled in the conflict. According to US President Joseph Biden and other leaders, the direct involvement of Western forces would inevitably result in the next world war. However, this ironclad prohibition of direct action has apparently not included cyber operations. According to the US Cyber Command, the United States has engaged in “the full spectrum” of cyber operations in support of Ukraine. At the same time, the EU has directly deployed one of its newly formed cyber rapid response teams to Ukraine to counter Russian cyber warfare.How does the direct involvement of the US and other states in the cyber conflict fit within international legal rules regarding neutrality and co-belligerency? This article will examine what we currently know about cyber operations in the Russia–Ukraine war and filter that (admittedly limited) knowledge through competing standards of neutrality and co-belligerency. After addressing the potential implications of traditional neutrality, the article will describe how particular qualities of cyber operations pose unique challenges for the continuing viability of the legal standard of where qualified neutrality ends and co-belligerency begins.","PeriodicalId":391972,"journal":{"name":"2023 15th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Meeting Reality (CyCon)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129677142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Limits on Information Operations Under International Law","authors":"T. Dias","doi":"10.23919/cycon58705.2023.10181348","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/cycon58705.2023.10181348","url":null,"abstract":"Information or influence operations have been part and parcel of domestic and international life for centuries, having been used for a range of private and public purposes – from commercial advertisement to political propaganda. Yet, given their unprecedented scale and speed, digital information operations carried out by states and non-state actors have given rise to new international legal challenges. Notably, they have played an increasingly significant role in several offline harms – from health misinformation and disinformation hampering the fight against COVID-19 to online hate paving the way for acts of violence around the world. This calls into question the orthodox view that information operations do not violate international law. The purpose of this paper is to assess the extent to which existing international law – including general rules and principles and those specific to broadcasting and telecommunications – limits the digital deployment of information operations by states and non-state actors. It does so by first addressing the vexing yet overlooked question of factual and legal causation between those operations and some of the harmful consequences attributed to them. The paper then turns to how key international rules and principles, such as the principle of non-intervention, obligations of due diligence, and international human rights law, apply together to four key categories of information operations: propaganda, misinformation and disinformation, malinformation, and online hate speech.","PeriodicalId":391972,"journal":{"name":"2023 15th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Meeting Reality (CyCon)","volume":"205 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123376830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From Cyber Security to Cyber Power: Appraising the Emergence of ‘Responsible, Democratic Cyber Power’ in UK Strategy","authors":"J. Devanny, A. Dwyer","doi":"10.23919/CyCon58705.2023.10181804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon58705.2023.10181804","url":null,"abstract":"Across three successive strategies (2009, 2011 and 2016) ‘cyber security’ was the umbrella concept for United Kingdom (UK) cyber strategy. Conceptual continuity belied changes in substance, as the state played an increasingly active role, particularly domestically. Cyber security remains a top priority in the UK’s most recent (2022) strategy, but it was superseded as the umbrella concept by ‘cyber power’. We argue that this was a deliberate decision, global in outlook, and with complex and contestable strategic implications. The UK’s concept of ‘responsible, democratic cyber power’ (RDCP) responds to significant changes between 2016 and 2022 in the geopolitics and threat environment affecting (but not confined to) cyberspace. The UK’s new cyber strategy promises to align domestic and international actors under an integrated approach, addressing perceived strategic vulnerabilities and exploiting opportunities to pursue national interests. We investigate RDCP’s conceptual coherence and strategic utility, tracking its emergence as UK strategic discourse shifted from one of cyber security to cyber power. RDCP offers one avenue for states to coordinate cyber strategy, integrating the various components branded under ‘cyber’ as an instrument of national strategy – pursuing security, prosperity, and projection of national values and influence. However, there are different potential interpretations of RDCP and an even greater number of potential ways to implement it. In the UK, as elsewhere, effective cyber power requires prioritization about what a state values, whether in developing a resilient and competitive cyber ecosystem or in meeting the challenges and threats posed by systemic competitors. We conclude by reflecting on what it means to be a ‘medium-sized, responsible and democratic cyber power’ in an era of increasing inter-state competition in cyberspace.","PeriodicalId":391972,"journal":{"name":"2023 15th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Meeting Reality (CyCon)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130981612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Benjamin Strickson, Cameron Worsley, Stewart Bertram
{"title":"Human-centered Assessment of Automated Tools for Improved Cyber Situational Awareness","authors":"Benjamin Strickson, Cameron Worsley, Stewart Bertram","doi":"10.23919/CyCon58705.2023.10181567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23919/CyCon58705.2023.10181567","url":null,"abstract":"Attempts to deploy autonomous capabilities, including artificial intelligence (AI), within cybersecurity workflows have been met with an implementation challenge. Often the impediment is the ability of software engineers to assess and quantify the benefits of machine learning (ML) models for cyber analysts. We present a case study demonstrating the successful testing and improvement of an ML tool through human-centered assessments. For the benefit of researchers in this field, we detail our own wargaming environment, which was tested using members of a government intelligence community. The participants were presented with two cybersecurity tasks: report annotation and a situational awareness assessment. Both of these tasks were statistically assessed for the difference between task completion with and without access to automation tools. Our first experiment – report annotation – showed a task improvement of +14.0 ppts in recall and +9.19 ppts in precision; there was an overall significant positive difference in f1 values for the ML subjects (p < 0.01). Our second experiment – cyber situational awareness (CSA) – showed a 66.7% improvement in user scores and a significant positive difference for the ML subjects (p < 0.01). The conclusions of our work focus on the need to rebalance the attention of software engineers away from quantitative metrics and toward qualitative analyst feedback derived from realistic wargame testing frameworks. We believe that sharing our wargame scenario here will allow other organizations to either adopt the same testing methodology or, alternatively, share their own CSA testing framework. Ultimately, we are hoping for a more open dialogue between researchers working across the cyber industry and government intelligence agencies.","PeriodicalId":391972,"journal":{"name":"2023 15th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Meeting Reality (CyCon)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129021253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}