Neuroscience and Philosophy最新文献

What do models of visual perception tell us about visual phenomenology? 关于视觉现象学，视觉知觉模型告诉了我们什么?

Neuroscience and Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-08-19 DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/7p8jg

Rachel N. Denison, N. Block, J. Samaha

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引用次数: 8

Me, My (Moral) Self, and I 我，我的(道德)自我和我

Neuroscience and Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-08-01 DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/af7u5

J. Everett, Joshua August Skorburg, Jordan L. Livingston

引用次数: 3

The Neuroscience of Moral Judgment: Empirical and Philosophical Developments 道德判断的神经科学:经验和哲学的发展

Neuroscience and Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-05-01 DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/89jcx

Joshua May, C. Workman, Hyemin Han, Julia Haas

引用次数: 10

The Neural Substrates of Conscious Perception without Performance Confounds 没有表现混淆的意识知觉的神经基础

Neuroscience and Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-11-26 DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/8zhy3

Jorge Morales, Brian Odegaard, Brian Maniscalco

{"title":"The Neural Substrates of Conscious Perception without Performance Confounds","authors":"Jorge Morales, Brian Odegaard, Brian Maniscalco","doi":"10.31234/osf.io/8zhy3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/8zhy3","url":null,"abstract":"How does the brain give rise to consciousness? A common approach to addressing this question in neuroscience research involves analyzing differences in neural activity in experimental conditions where consciousness of a stimulus differs. However, unless careful measures are taken, conditions that differ in awareness typically also differ in perceptual task performance, e.g. stimulus detection and discrimination. A large body of research demonstrates that task performance and awareness can dissociate, indicating that they are separate mental processes with separate underlying mechanisms. Thus, task performance looms as a potential confound in consciousness science: computational and neural processes attributed to differences in consciousness may actually be better attributed to correlated but distinct differences in task performance. Here we present an extended exploration of the issue of task performance confounds in consciousness research. We describe the approach of performance matching (i.e. creating experimental conditions that yield identical task performance yet different levels of awareness) as a solution to the problem of performance confounds, and discuss why it is not appropriate to artificially match performance by post-hoc selection of trials (e.g. analyzing correct trials only). We review a growing literature demonstrating matched-performance / different-awareness effects using a variety of experimental designs and discuss signal detection theory models that can both explain extant results and guide the design of future research. Finally, we consider caveats and nuances for performance matching approaches and propose that future research could pool across multiple experimental designs with disjoint sets of confounds to triangulate on the confound-free neural substrates of consciousness.","PeriodicalId":385226,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience and Philosophy","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131857161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 20

I Did That! Biomarkers of Volitional and Free Agency 是我干的!意志和自由代理的生物标记

Neuroscience and Philosophy Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0007

引用次数: 1

The Nature of Empathy 同理心的本质

Neuroscience and Philosophy Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0006

F. Kaslow

引用次数: 1

Ethical Issues Raised by Recent Developments in Neuroscience: The Case of Optogenetics 神经科学最新发展引发的伦理问题:以光遗传学为例

Neuroscience and Philosophy Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0011

引用次数: 0

Memory Structure and Cognitive Maps 记忆结构和认知地图

Neuroscience and Philosophy Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0016

Sarah K. Robins, S. Aronowitz, A. Stolk

{"title":"Memory Structure and Cognitive Maps","authors":"Sarah K. Robins, S. Aronowitz, A. Stolk","doi":"10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0016","url":null,"abstract":"A common way to understand memory structures in the cognitive sciences is as a cognitive map . Cognitive maps are representational systems organized by dimensions shared with physical space. The appeal to these maps begins literally: as an account of how spatial information is represented and used to inform spatial navigation. Invocations of cognitive maps, however, are often more ambitious; cognitive maps are meant to scale up and provide the basis for our more sophisticated memory capacities. The extension is not meant to be metaphorical, but the way in which these richer mental structures are supposed to remain map-like is rarely made explicit. Here we investigate this missing link, asking How do cognitive maps represent non-spatial information? We begin with a survey of foundational work on spatial cognitive maps and then provide a comparative review of alternative, non-spatial representational structures. We then turn to several cutting-edge projects that are engaged in the task of scaling up cognitive maps so as to accommodate non-spatial information: first, on the spatial-isometric approach , encoding content that is non-spatial but in some sense isomorphic to spatial content; second, on the abstraction approach , encoding content that is an abstraction over first-order spatial information; and third, on the embedding approach , embedding non-spatial information within a spatial context, a prominent example being the Method-of-Loci. Putting these cases alongside one another reveals the variety of options available for building cognitive maps, and the distinctive limitations of each. We conclude by reflecting on where these results take us in terms of understanding the place of cognitive maps in memory.","PeriodicalId":385226,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience and Philosophy","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128998919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Touch and Other Somatosensory Senses 触觉和其他身体感觉

Neuroscience and Philosophy Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0013

引用次数: 0

The Scientific Study of Passive Thinking: Methods of Mind-Wandering Research 被动思维的科学研究:走神研究方法

Neuroscience and Philosophy Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0018

Samuel Murray, Zachary C. Irving, Kristina Krasich

引用次数: 0