Shrirang Mare, Jacob M. Sorber, Minho Shin, Cory Cornelius, D. Kotz
{"title":"Adapt-lite: privacy-aware, secure, and efficient mhealth sensing","authors":"Shrirang Mare, Jacob M. Sorber, Minho Shin, Cory Cornelius, D. Kotz","doi":"10.1145/2046556.2046574","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046556.2046574","url":null,"abstract":"As healthcare in many countries faces an aging population and rising costs, mobile sensing technologies promise a new opportunity. Using mobile health (mHealth) sensing, which uses medical sensors to collect data about the patients, and mobile phones to act as a gateway between sensors and electronic health record systems, caregivers can continuously monitor the patients and deliver better care. Although some work on mHealth sensing has addressed security, achieving strong security and privacy for low-power sensors remains a challenge. We make three contributions. First, we propose Adapt-lite, a set of two techniques that can be applied to existing wireless protocols to make them energy efficient without compromising their security or privacy properties. The techniques are: adaptive security, which dynamically modifies packet overhead; and MAC striping, which makes forgery difficult even for small-sized MACs. Second, we apply these techniques to an existing wireless protocol, and demonstrate a prototype on a Chronos wrist device. Third, we provide security, privacy, and energy analysis of our techniques.","PeriodicalId":384270,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124372132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Data privacy","authors":"Keith B. Frikken","doi":"10.1145/3244872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3244872","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":384270,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society","volume":"253 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125713395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stefan Schiffner, A. Pashalidis, Elmar Tischhauser
{"title":"On the limits of privacy in reputation systems","authors":"Stefan Schiffner, A. Pashalidis, Elmar Tischhauser","doi":"10.1145/2046556.2046561","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046556.2046561","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes a formal model for multiple privacy notions that apply to reputation systems and shows that, for certain classes of systems, very strong privacy notions are unachievable. In particular, it is shown that, systems where a user's reputation depends exclusively on the ratings he received, necessarily leak information about the relationship between ratings and reputations. In contrast, systems where a user's reputation depends both on the received ratings, and on the ratings received by others, potentially hide all information about this relationship. The paper concludes with guidelines for the construction of reputation systems that have the potential to retain high levels of privacy.","PeriodicalId":384270,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133066283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Protecting against physical resource monitoring","authors":"G. Ács, C. Castelluccia, William Lecat","doi":"10.1145/2046556.2046560","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046556.2046560","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers the problem of resource monitoring. We consider the scenario where an adversary is physically monitoring on the resource access, such as the electricity line or gas pipeline, of a user in order to learn private information about his victim. Recent works, in the context of smart metering, have shown that a motivated adversary can basically profile a user or a family solely from his electricity traces. However, these works only consider the case of a semi-honest-but-non-intrusive adversary that is only trying to learn information from the consumption reports sent by the user. This paper, instead, considers the much more challenging case of a intrusive semi-honest adversary, i.e. a semi-honest adversary that is in addition physically monitoring the resource by modifying the distribution network. We aim at answering to the following question: is it possible to design a resource distribution scheme that prevents resource monitoring and provides strong protection? This paper proposes and analyzes several possible solutions. The proposed solutions provide different privacy bounds and performance results.","PeriodicalId":384270,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132259736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pythia: a privacy aware, peer-to-peer network for social search","authors":"Shirin Nilizadeh, Naveed Alam, Nathaniel Husted, Apu Kapadia","doi":"10.1145/2046556.2046562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046556.2046562","url":null,"abstract":"Emerging \"live social search\" systems such as Aardvark.com allow users to pose questions to their social network in real time. People can thus obtain answers from real humans for questions that prove too complex for web searches. Centralized systems that broker such queries and answers, however, do not provide adequate privacy. The success of these systems will be limited since users may avoid asking or answering questions related to sensitive topics such as health, political activism, or even innocuous questions which may make the querier seem ignorant. Since social search systems leverage the structure of the social network to better match askers and answerers, standard ideas that hide this structure such as \"connect to Aardvark via Tor\" fall short. Thus new techniques are needed to preserve the privacy of askers and answerers beyond the currently understood anonymity techniques. We explore the new and unique challenges for privacy, and propose Pythia, a decentralized architecture based on \"controlled flooding\" to enable privacy-enhanced social search that retains some degree of social network structure.","PeriodicalId":384270,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130525007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Data mining without data: a novel approach to privacy-preserving collaborative distributed data mining","authors":"V. Ashok, R. Mukkamala","doi":"10.1145/2046556.2046578","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046556.2046578","url":null,"abstract":"With the proliferation of organizations that independently collect various types of data, with the growing awareness of corporations and public to keep their sensitive data private, and with the ever-increasing need of government and corporate policy makers to learn the behavior of their customers, there is a definite demand for data mining services even when the data owners refuse to provide their data directly. In the past, techniques such as random perturbation were used by data owners prior to sharing the data with a third-party data miner. But, as already proven, even these techniques are prone to privacy-violation. In this paper, we take a completely different approach---each data owner derives association rules locally, sanitizes them if necessary, and sends them to a third-party data miner. The data miner collects local rules from all data owners, regenerates an estimate of global data, and performs global data mining. We suggest schemes to reduce the generation of spurious rules, a possible outcome of data generation from rules. The proposed method is illustrated using an example of association rule data mining. We are currently in the process of formalizing some of the underlying techniques and to make them more efficient.","PeriodicalId":384270,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133276736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"FAUST: efficient, TTP-free abuse prevention by anonymous whitelisting","authors":"P. Lofgren, Nicholas Hopper","doi":"10.1145/2046556.2046572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046556.2046572","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce Faust, a solution to the \"anonymous blacklisting problem:\" allow an anonymous user to prove that she is authorized to access an online service such that if the user misbehaves, she retains her anonymity but will be unable to authenticate in future sessions. Faust uses no trusted third parties and is one to two orders of magnitude more efficient than previous schemes without trusted third parties. The key idea behind Faust is to eliminate the explicit blacklist used in all previous approaches, and rely instead on an implicit whitelist, based on blinded authentication tokens.","PeriodicalId":384270,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132554109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Private searching for single and conjunctive keywords on streaming data","authors":"X. Yi, E. Bertino","doi":"10.1145/2046556.2046577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046556.2046577","url":null,"abstract":"Current solutions for private searching on streaming data only support searching for \"OR\" of keywords or \"AND\" of two sets of keywords. In this paper, we extend the types of private queries to support searching on streaming data for an \"OR\" of a set of both single and conjunctive keywords. Our protocol is built on Boneh et al.'s result for the evaluation of 2-DNF formulas on ciphertexts. The size of our encrypted dictionary is O(|D|) only, which is much less than |D|2, the size of the encrypted dictionary if conjunctive keywords is treated as single keyword.","PeriodicalId":384270,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114646882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rob Smits, Divam Jain, Sarah Pidcock, I. Goldberg, U. Hengartner
{"title":"BridgeSPA: improving Tor bridges with single packet authorization","authors":"Rob Smits, Divam Jain, Sarah Pidcock, I. Goldberg, U. Hengartner","doi":"10.1145/2046556.2046569","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046556.2046569","url":null,"abstract":"Tor is a network designed for low-latency anonymous communications. Tor clients form circuits through relays that are listed in a public directory, and then relay their encrypted traffic through these circuits. This indirection makes it difficult for a local adversary to determine with whom a particular Tor user is communicating. In response, some local adversaries restrict access to Tor by blocking each of the publicly listed relays. To deal with such an adversary, Tor uses bridges, which are unlisted relays that can be used as alternative entry points into the Tor network. Unfortunately, issues with Tor's bridge implementation make it easy to discover large numbers of bridges. An adversary that hoards this information may use it to determine when each bridge is online over time. If a bridge operator also browses with Tor on the same machine, this information may be sufficient to deanonymize him. We present BridgeSPA as a method to mitigate this issue. A client using BridgeSPA relies on innocuous single packet authorization (SPA) to present a time-limited key to a bridge. Before this authorization takes place, the bridge will not reveal whether it is online. We have implemented BridgeSPA as a working proof-of-concept, which is available under an open-source licence.","PeriodicalId":384270,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society","volume":"1218 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127700739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jeremy Day, Yizhou Huang, Edward Knapp, I. Goldberg
{"title":"SPEcTRe: spot-checked private ecash tolling at roadside","authors":"Jeremy Day, Yizhou Huang, Edward Knapp, I. Goldberg","doi":"10.1145/2046556.2046565","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046556.2046565","url":null,"abstract":"Traditional stop-and-pay toll booths inconvenience drivers and are infeasible for complicated urban areas. As a way to minimize traffic congestion and avoid the inconveniences caused by toll booths, electronic tolling has been suggested. For example, as drivers pass certain locations, a picture of their licence plate may be taken and a bill sent to their home. However, this simplistic method allows the administrator of the system to build a dossier on drivers. While this may be an attractive feature for law enforcement, a society may not wish to trust the tolling agency with such detailed information. We present SPEcTRe, a suite of protocols to maintain driver privacy while ensuring that tolls are accurately collected. Existing protocols for privacy-preserving electronic toll pricing suffer from computational challenges and require an undesirable amount of location data to be collected. We present two schemes: the spot-record scheme, which requires the same amount of location data exposure as prior privacy-preserving schemes, but runs much faster, and the no-record scheme, which collects no location information from honest users and is still able to run efficiently.","PeriodicalId":384270,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133030041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}