2009 IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing最新文献_第8页

Asymmetric Dominance- and Compromise Effects in the Financial Services Domain 金融服务领域的不对称优势与妥协效应

2009 IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing Pub Date : 2009-07-20 DOI: 10.1109/CEC.2009.69

E. Teppan, A. Felfernig

引用次数: 13

From e3-value to REA: Modeling Multi-party E-business Collaborations 从e3-value到REA:多方电子商务协作建模

2009 IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing Pub Date : 2009-07-20 DOI: 10.1109/CEC.2009.58

R. Schuster, Thomas Motal

引用次数: 38

Service Innovation in Spare Parts Logistics in the Business Aviation Industry 公务航空业备件物流的服务创新

2009 IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing Pub Date : 2009-07-20 DOI: 10.1109/CEC.2009.82

Roland Klueber, H. McCann, R. Wehrle, Thomas Knopf

引用次数: 4

QoS-Driven Web Service Composition Using Learning-Based Depth First Search 基于学习的深度优先搜索的qos驱动的Web服务组合

2009 IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing Pub Date : 2009-07-20 DOI: 10.1109/CEC.2009.50

Wonhong Nam, Hyunyoung Kil, Jungjae Lee

引用次数: 8

Optimal QoS-Aware Web Service Composition 最优的qos感知Web服务组合

2009 IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing Pub Date : 2009-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CEC.2009.63

Marco Aiello, E. Khoury, A. Lazovik, Patrick Ratelband

引用次数: 36

Modeling and Validating BPMN Diagrams 建模和验证BPMN图

2009 IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing Pub Date : 2009-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CEC.2009.48

Michele Chinosi, Alberto Trombetta

引用次数: 14

Online Auctions: There Can Be Only One 网上拍卖:只能有一个

2009 IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing Pub Date : 2009-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CEC.2009.12

C. Aggarwal, Philip S. Yu

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引用次数: 5