{"title":"In Whose Interests?","authors":"E. Jackson","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198852681.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198852681.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter will argue that the core justification for the United Kingdom’s ‘blanket ban’ on assisted suicide—namely that it is necessary in order to protect ‘the vulnerable’—has tended to obscure two other important sets of interests. First, it has served to marginalize the interests of patients who are not vulnerable, and who have been used to exercising considerable control over their lives. There is evidence from countries which have legalized assisted dying that it is this non-vulnerable group of patients who are its principal users. Second, the core justification for the ‘blanket ban’ has deflected attention away from the interests of the medical profession itself, which in the United Kingdom has a long tradition of organized and powerful opposition to assisted suicide.","PeriodicalId":383940,"journal":{"name":"On Crime, Society, and Responsibility in the work of Nicola Lacey","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132653504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why Blame?","authors":"John Gardner","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198852681.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198852681.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Ever since her first book, State Punishment, a recurring theme of Nicola Lacey’s scholarship has been a hesitancy about blame—what it is for, how to assign it, and whether to let it take hold. In her later work, Lacey has disaggregated the problem of blame from the problem of responsibility, and explored ways in which responsibility could be assigned without blaming. Her suggestions have centred on the possibility of forgiveness. I admire Lacey’s humane instinct in urging us to do less blaming. However I do not think that this instinct is all that is at work in her recurring doubts about blame. For it is possible to embrace forgiveness while holding those one forgives to be blameworthy? Arguably, indeed, forgiveness presupposes blameworthiness. The deeper puzzle is about blameworthiness itself. What is it for? Why does it matter? What is its place in the architecture of the human condition? It is no answer to say that blameworthiness matters because responsibility matters. There is responsibility without blameworthiness, and responsibility matters for reasons that have nothing to do with blameworthiness. Nor is it an answer to say that blameworthiness matters because blaming matters. Only when one works out why it matters that someone is blameworthy does one begin to show why people should ever do any blaming. Or so I will argue. I will suggest that the importance of blameworthiness is genuinely mysterious. That position is associated with Bernard Williams. I think that some of Williams’ worries are shared by Lacey. However, I will suggest that, in light of my remarks, they are not exactly the right worries.","PeriodicalId":383940,"journal":{"name":"On Crime, Society, and Responsibility in the work of Nicola Lacey","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125388036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Responsibility and Explanations of Rape","authors":"H. Pickard","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198852681.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198852681.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the psychological function and consequences of responsibility ascriptions in relation to the crime of rape. Section 1 draws on recent work in the philosophy and science of causal cognition to argue that responsibility ascriptions, like explanations, are tethered to interests and perspectives: descriptive and prescriptive background norms affect not only what counts as a satisfying explanation of why something happened, but who is singled out as the bearer of responsibility for what happened. Section 2 draws on in-depth qualitative interviews with convicted rapists, together with empirical studies of the attitudes and factors that result in ‘victim-blaming’ within the general population, to detail the descriptive and prescriptive norms of rape culture. Section 3 brings these discussions together. Given the pervasive influence of rape culture norms, introducing a woman’s violation of any of them in court can serve to (implicitly or explicitly) focus attention on those violations as causally salient and explanatory of what happened, and hence on her—as opposed to him—as the bearer of responsibility for what happened. The psychological function and consequences of responsibility ascriptions may therefore contribute to the grotesque and persistent failure of the courts to convict and appropriately sentence rapists.","PeriodicalId":383940,"journal":{"name":"On Crime, Society, and Responsibility in the work of Nicola Lacey","volume":"151 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123398431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Re-Situating Criminal Responsibility","authors":"A. Loughnan","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198852681.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198852681.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Inspired by the work of Nicola Lacey as a leading critical criminal responsibility scholar, in my chapter, I offer a reflection on time and space and criminal responsibility. I introduce the notion of interstitial space as a useful analytical device to advance the field of critical scholarship on responsibility for crime. With a study of the intellectual sphere of comparative jurisprudence at around the turn of the twentieth century, which I suggest was an historical example of an interstitial space, I argue that such interstitial spaces form part of the story of the development of ideas of responsibility for crime. In comparative jurisprudence, national laws and legal systems were viewed from a transnational vantage point, and, as such, legal analysis was simultaneously embedded and disembedded, both tied to territorial space and free-floating. My examination of the first decades of the life of a key institutional text of comparative jurisprudence, the Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, shows that discussion of crime, punishment, and criminal justice encompassed an informative discussion of responsibility, with the light of comparative jurisprudence revealing the connection between criminal responsibility and broader ideas about ‘civilization’ and ‘progress’, which themselves reflected power relations between states.","PeriodicalId":383940,"journal":{"name":"On Crime, Society, and Responsibility in the work of Nicola Lacey","volume":"128 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123318141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Characters of Criminal Law","authors":"N. Naffine","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198852681.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198852681.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Criminal law theorists necessarily start their theorizing with some idea of their subject. The dominant figure in the canon is the criminal actor understood as a freestanding individual, removed from his group affiliations. I call him Model 1. Then there is the demographic or social model of the criminal person. Here our disciplinary characters are treated as members of a population that have certain propensities. Those who subscribe to this second model tend to be thinking of real historical and social people, located in places and contexts, as well as people with bodies and sexes. I call this Model 2.\u0000Most criminal laws operate on the basis of a Model 1 person, with an individual without social characteristics or context. But occasionally these demographic concerns are directly expressed in criminal laws. The English criminal law of rape is one such law. It still names men as the people of concern. The English law of rape therefore poses a challenge for Model 1 individualists, requiring them to make some sense of this population-specific law. So, when individualists write about the nature of rape and its law, as they often do, it is highly revealing of their thinking about their own criminal law character.\u0000Here I consider the work of legal philosopher John Gardner, who has written influentially about English rape law, to discover what an individualist does with a law which acknowledges its population of concern. What happens when the two paradigms conflict?","PeriodicalId":383940,"journal":{"name":"On Crime, Society, and Responsibility in the work of Nicola Lacey","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132837485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Punishment and Comparative Political Economy","authors":"D. Garland","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198852681.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198852681.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter is an exposition and critical assessment of Nicola Lacey’s work on punishment and comparative political economy. It traces the trajectory of Lacey’s work, describing how she was the first to bring the ‘varieties of capitalism’ framework to bear on the central questions of comparative penology and how she then proceeded to use an expanded version of the framework to develop an original explanation of American penal exceptionalism. The chapter then seeks to assess Lacey’s work by examining the theoretical fit between her political economy framework and the institutional characteristics of systems of criminal punishment, paying particular regard to the causal mechanism hypotheses that underpin her account.","PeriodicalId":383940,"journal":{"name":"On Crime, Society, and Responsibility in the work of Nicola Lacey","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125588042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"‘Technologies of Responsibility’","authors":"A. Ashworth, Lucia Zedner","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198852681.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198852681.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"In her important monograph, In Search of Criminal Responsibility, Lacey explores changing relations between individual and state and charts the history of growing state ‘confidence in the possibility of shaping the habits and dispositions of citizenhood’ through the criminal law and other legal measures. She concludes, ‘we are seeing not so much a replacement of one paradigm of responsibility by another, but rather an accumulation of conceptions or “technologies” of responsibility.’ This chapter considers these controversial new hybrid legal orders such as the ASBO and its successors with which the state seeks to instil habits of respectable citizenship and to secure civil order. These diverse powers engraft new techniques of ‘responsibilization’ on to existing criminal laws, designed to police ‘irregular’ citizens who occupy precarious places at the margins, such as youth, those engaging in anti-social behaviour, the poor, and the homeless. Arguably these technologies do not signify the growth of state confidence so much as its resort to regulatory fixes to intractable problems of governance. It concludes by considering the implications of these developments for the attribution of responsibility both in and outside the criminal law.","PeriodicalId":383940,"journal":{"name":"On Crime, Society, and Responsibility in the work of Nicola Lacey","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122577098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}