{"title":"II. Matters not requiring proof and judicial findings as evidence","authors":"R. Munday","doi":"10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the exceptions to the general rule that all facts in issue, or relevant to the issue, in a given case must be proved by evidence. It shows that sometimes, the judge, or trier of fact, is entitled to find a fact of their own motion: judicial notice may be taken of that fact. Alternatively, a party may formally admit a relevant matter. In addition, a matter may still be determined against a party because the law precludes them from contesting it. They are then ‘estopped’, as when the same matter has been determined against them and in favour of their opponent by a binding and conclusive judgment of a court. Finally, this chapter considers the wider question of the status of judicial findings in other proceedings.","PeriodicalId":382501,"journal":{"name":"Cross & Tapper on Evidence","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114707192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"XIV. Hearsay in criminal proceedings","authors":"R. Munday","doi":"10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers hearsay in light of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. It first discusses the relevant provisions of the act before turning to the rules relating to confessions. Along with confessions, the chapter also takes a look at the evidential value of inferences from the accused's silence. In relation to both, the chapter considers the Codes of Practice relating to different aspects of police investigation, which often form a component in the exercise of the judge's discretion to exclude evidence. In addition, the chapter examines the reforms made to the law of hearsay, including the basic policy of the reform, the general exception, special exceptions for business documents and previous statements of witnesses, the impact of discretion, and provisions relating to the authenticity and weight of hearsay.","PeriodicalId":382501,"journal":{"name":"Cross & Tapper on Evidence","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126295677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"III. Burdens and proof","authors":"R. Munday","doi":"10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers the burdens borne by both parties when an issue of fact is at stake. It explains how the nature of a burden in the law of evidence is obscured by the use of the term in a number of different senses. The two principal senses are the burden of adducing evidence and the burden of proving facts. In relation to each, questions arise as to its incidence and discharge. The chapter considers the allocation of the burden in these two senses, at common law and under statutory provisions, and the effects of presumptions of law or agreement of the parties. Finally, this chapter is concerned with the extent of the two burdens, and the way in which the burden of proof has to be explained to the jury.","PeriodicalId":382501,"journal":{"name":"Cross & Tapper on Evidence","volume":"1998 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117027369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"VII. Character in general","authors":"R. Munday","doi":"10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the evidence of the character of parties, witnesses, and third parties. Evidence of character has never been a model of coherence or clarity either at common law or under statute. It is complex, both in the connotation and means of proof of the concept of character, and in the variety of contexts in which it arises. The concept embraces both disposition, commonly described as propensity, to act in a relevant way, and sometimes the means of proof of such relevant disposition, either through reputation, the expressed belief of others of the subject's disposition, or of acts of the subject from which such disposition may be inferred. It may be relevant in any form of proceedings, and at any stage of a trial.","PeriodicalId":382501,"journal":{"name":"Cross & Tapper on Evidence","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126395883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"XVI. Proof of frequently recurring matters","authors":"R. Munday","doi":"10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0016","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter describes different ways in which evidence may be given of certain matters that frequently have to be proved in litigation. Proof of foreign law, identity, birth, death, age, marriage and legitimacy, judgments, convictions, and other orders of the court are discussed here. With foreign law, the general rule is that it must be proved by an expert witness. For questions of identification, the question of evidence becomes more complicated, with the chapter exploring direct, circumstantial, and presumptive evidence in relation to identity. After a brief look into birth, death, age, marriage, and legitimacy, the chapter finally turns to the proof of judgments and convictions.","PeriodicalId":382501,"journal":{"name":"Cross & Tapper on Evidence","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126413013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"XV. Documentary evidence","authors":"R. Munday","doi":"10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0015","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter deals with documentary evidence. It first discusses the authentication of documents, by looking at proof under the new provisions of statements in documents generally; proof of business, and public, records; procedure under the Civil Procedure Rules; and some special considerations applying to public documents and to bankers' books. Next, the chapter turns to the proof of the execution of private documents. Here, the chapter considers the proof of handwriting and attestation, alongside the special provision permitting the use of electronic signatures. Finally, this chapter concerns whether, once a transaction has been embodied in a document, evidence may be given of terms other than those it mentions, and, second, the extent to which evidence may be given of the meaning of the terms used in the document.","PeriodicalId":382501,"journal":{"name":"Cross & Tapper on Evidence","volume":"333 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115980002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"IX. Privilege","authors":"R. Munday","doi":"10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter concerns privilege. A witness is ‘privileged’ when they may validly claim not to answer a question, or to supply information relevant to the determination of an issue in judicial proceedings. Because the effect is to deprive the tribunal of relevant evidence, powerful arguments are required for such rules. Modern law has reduced their number and scope, although this is arguably balanced by an increase in their status, which has been further enhanced by implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This chapter discusses certain types of privilege: the privilege against self-incrimination, legal professional privilege, privilege for statements made without prejudice as part of an attempt to settle a dispute, and a privilege derived from the former for statements made to a conciliator.","PeriodicalId":382501,"journal":{"name":"Cross & Tapper on Evidence","volume":"113 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134440893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"VIII. Bad character of the accused","authors":"R. Munday","doi":"10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter takes up the discussion from the previous chapter by exploring the bad character of the accused. This subject matter is almost wholly governed by certain provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Thus, the chapter first considers the nature of the problem of the admission of evidence of the bad character of the accused; then attempts at reform, at common law, by recommendations of law reform bodies, and by legislation; an indication of the principal forms of continuing dissatisfaction; and finally the intentions and techniques designed to remedy them. Next, the chapter considers the structure of the bad character provisions from the 2003 legislation and the gateways it provides for admissibility. Finally, this chapter concludes with a brief appraisal of the 2003 act.","PeriodicalId":382501,"journal":{"name":"Cross & Tapper on Evidence","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128984442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"XII. Hearsay in general","authors":"R. Munday","doi":"10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter takes a look at the hearsay rule. Though it is one of the most complex and confusing of the exclusionary rules of evidence, the hearsay rule can be used as the background and foundation to understand the new statutory provisions for civil and criminal proceedings. The chapter first discusses the hearsay rule at the common law level, explaining why such an exclusionary rule was thought necessary. It also indicates the tenor of this rule's development and reform. Next, the chapter more closely examines the scope of the rule, implied assertions, res gestae, the rule against narrative, and the extent to which admissions constitute an exception to the rule.","PeriodicalId":382501,"journal":{"name":"Cross & Tapper on Evidence","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121300317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"I. Introduction","authors":"R. Munday","doi":"10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780199668601.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This introductory chapter discusses the relevance of evidence in the courtroom. It first explores the development of the law of evidence beginning from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The chapter then studies the extent to which the law of evidence applies to all of the different stages and matters considered by the courts and to other tribunals. The main purposes and categories of evidence are next considered and exemplified, together with the question of whether any broad general rules can usefully be elaborated. Finally, this chapter turns to its most fundamental principle — relevance, which is contrasted with the admissibility of evidence.","PeriodicalId":382501,"journal":{"name":"Cross & Tapper on Evidence","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122400945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}