PSN: Public Spending (Comparative) (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"First Nations Own-Source Revenue: How Is the Money Spent?","authors":"J. Richards","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2674290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2674290","url":null,"abstract":"The confluence of several factors – favourable Supreme Court of Canada decisions, the rise (until recently) in natural resource prices and the emergence of a cadre of well-educated on-reserve leaders – has encouraged the growth of First Nations commercial ventures over the past generation. This growth raises important questions: How significant is own-source revenue (much of it derived via First Nations-owned corporations) in financing First Nations governments? How are these governments spending incremental revenue that arises from market-based activities? Before the passage in 2013 of the First Nations Financial Transparency Act (FNFTA), relevant audited statements of First Nations were hard to obtain, if indeed they were publicly available. The FNFTA requires First Nations to publish online audited statements of revenues and expenditures, which enables hitherto unavailable insights into First Nations budgeting priorities. Our analysis of a sample of 72 FNFTA filings submitted by First Nations in Ontario, covering the fiscal years 2013 and 2014, finds that own-source revenue comprises, on average, nearly a third of total First Nations government revenues. First Nations with higher per capita own-source revenue increase economic development activities but only modestly increase education and health spending. They also undertake large increases in spending on general government and business management. Whether large increases in this last category are warranted is an important question for members of First Nations to address. Interpreting the audited statements of First Nations governments is difficult, however, because they do not apply standardized protocols to identify revenue and expenditure categories. Furthermore, some undetermined portion of their own-source revenue derives from impact and benefit agreements negotiated between First Nations councils and resource developers. These agreements are usually confidential and details about them in audited statements are scant. Finally, since our sample is derived from First Nations communities in Ontario, it might not be representative of pan-Canadian experience. Our results are an admittedly tentative look at the data derived from the audited statements, but two obvious policy conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, since the FNFTA is intended to help First Nations assess the budgeting activities of their respective councils, one simple policy recommendation would be to introduce more uniform and informative accounting protocols, which would considerably aid those interested in undertaking this task. Second, since many First Nations apparently do not consider it appropriate to use own-source revenue to finance basic education and health services, the onus for education funding will continue to fall squarely on the federal government. In the end, of course, it is up to First Nations people themselves to determine their financial priorities.","PeriodicalId":379216,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Public Spending (Comparative) (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131915137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corruption in Public Procurement Market","authors":"T. Mizoguchi, N. Quyen","doi":"10.1111/1468-0106.12084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12084","url":null,"abstract":"The paper presents a model of public procurement in which the contracting officer is corrupt and extracts bribes from the bidding firms. The firms submit multidimensional bids, which consist of the quality and the price of the project that they propose to realize. The firms differ in their costs of realizing the project at a given quality, and these costs are private information. The contracting official, in exchange for a bribe, abuses the power of his or her public office by distorting the quality ranking of the bids and by giving the favoured firm an opportunity to readjust its bid to undercut its rivals. Our analysis suggests that when the firms serve only the internal market, the public project is realized at low quality and inflated prices. However, when the firms are also allowed to sell the product they develop for the internal market in a foreign market, the auction is ex post efficient.","PeriodicalId":379216,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Public Spending (Comparative) (Topic)","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126000519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Relationship between Legislature Size and Fiscal Policy: A Cross-Country Examination","authors":"William B. Hankins","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2478935","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2478935","url":null,"abstract":"Using an estimation method developed by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) we study whether the size of a country's legislature impacts its fiscal response to common and country-specific shocks. The use of this method allows us to estimate the effects of legislature size while also controlling for country-specific unobserved heterogeneity; an endogeneity issue common to this literature. We also classify legislatures using a definition of bicameralism based on fiscal power that was previously used by Heller (1997). We find evidence that larger than average upper chambers are associated with more government spending as a percentage of GDP.","PeriodicalId":379216,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Public Spending (Comparative) (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124075014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Defense Government Spending is Contractionary, Civilian Government Spending is Expansionary","authors":"Roberto Perotti","doi":"10.3386/W20179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W20179","url":null,"abstract":"Impulse responses to government spending shocks in Standard Vector Autoregressions (SVARs) typically display \"expansionary\" features. However, SVARs can be subject to a \"non-fundamentalness\" problem. \"Expectations - Augmented\" VARs (EVARs), which use direct measures of forecasts of defense spending, typically display \"contractionary\" responses to a defense news shock. I show that, when properly specified, SVARs and EVARs give virtually identical results. The reason for the widespread, opposite view is that defense shocks have \"contractionary\" effects while civilian government spending shocks have \"expansionary\" effects. Existing EVARs and SVARs, however, include only total government spending. In addition, the former are typically estimated on samples that include WWII and the Korean war, when defense shocks prevailed, while the latter are estimated mostly on post-1953 samples, when civilian shocks prevailed.","PeriodicalId":379216,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Public Spending (Comparative) (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122342772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Public Environmental Expenditures in Estonia During 1995-2011","authors":"S. Pädam, Ü. Ehrlich","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2383261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2383261","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of earmarking on central government environment protection expenditure. Since central government spending for the environment relies on earmarked revenues, which is not the case of the local government, it is expected that central government expenditure is to a lesser degree affected by macroeconomic developments. The analysis indicates that this is the case because correlation between GDP change and the change in central government expenditure for environment protection is smaller than that of the local government. It is also found that increasing revenues from earmarked environmental charges have contributed to growing expenditure. However, the analysis also suggests that the main driver of this growth is the expansion is EU funds. Reliance on EU expenditure was further reinforced by changes in earmarking rules in 2008-2009.","PeriodicalId":379216,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Public Spending (Comparative) (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123336358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Financial Markets, Fiscal Constraints, and Municipal Debt: Lessons and Evidence from the Panic of 1873","authors":"John A. Dove","doi":"10.1017/S1744137413000234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137413000234","url":null,"abstract":"The current paper explores the municipal debt crisis that resulted from the panic of 1873, which caused a significant number of local governments in the United States to default on their debt obligations. The aftermath of that episode was one of constitutional change meant to constrain municipal governments from pursuing similar activities in the future. This paper empirically investigates the impact that these restrictions had on municipal borrowing costs, analyzed from bond yield data taken from several major US financial markets, so as to evaluate how binding and significant markets actually perceived these constraints to be. Overall, the results suggest that borrowing costs were lower for municipal governments that faced more stringent creditor guarantees regarding the issuing and repayment of debt, hard budget constraints, and also strict debt limits, while tax limits generally increased borrowing costs. These results not only conform too much of the current literature regarding the political economy of institutional constraints on public finance, they also add several important insights, especially when comparing defaulting to non-defaulting municipalities.","PeriodicalId":379216,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Public Spending (Comparative) (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114566123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Farm Bill 'Reform' is in the Eye of the Beholder","authors":"Sallie James","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2274379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2274379","url":null,"abstract":"For decades (most recently in 2008), Congress has set American farm policy by passing a series of acts, known commonly as the “farm bill,” every five years or so. The scope of the farm bill has expanded over time, to the point where farm subsidies, as typically understood, now make up a relatively small share of the total spending on the farm bill. Nutrition programs, including what used to be known as “food stamps,” make up the lion’s share of the budget — about $80 billion per year — and the bill now includes energy and environmental programs, too.","PeriodicalId":379216,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Public Spending (Comparative) (Topic)","volume":"172 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121719188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Insights in global public spending","authors":"M. Vafopoulos, M. Meimaris, J. Rodríguez, I. Xidias, Michalis Klonaras, G. Vafeiadis","doi":"10.1145/2506182.2506201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2506182.2506201","url":null,"abstract":"Governments around the globe are opening up public spending data in order to promote transparency and citizen awareness. However, data openness by itself is not enough to guarantee that the data is consumed efficiently and in meaningful ways. In this work public spending data from seven governments, both local and national, with total value almost 1,5 trillion euro, are processed, cleansed and converted to Linked Open Data, following best practices. Namely, the cases of Greece, the UK, the US federal government, Australia, the city of Chicago and the states of Alaska and Massachusetts are considered. Furthermore, the resulting Linked Data are interlinked with external resources and made accessible on a public SPARQL endpoint. A web portal application with several functionalities is deployed in order to make the data mashups understandable and easily consumable.","PeriodicalId":379216,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Public Spending (Comparative) (Topic)","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126520765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Making Block Grants Work: A Model for Reforming Federally Sponsored Entitlement Programs","authors":"Sven R. Larson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2304533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2304533","url":null,"abstract":"As the federal debt increases, the inevitable point comes closer when Congress will be forced to act against the deficit. They can then choose an orderly reduction or disorderly cuts as applied in, e.g., Greece. An orderly reduction involves structural reforms to permanently reduce federal spending and return funding of current government programs to taxpayers. This paper proposes a transitional model for block grant reform that turns funding and executive responsibilities for joint federal-state funded entitlement programs over to the states.","PeriodicalId":379216,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Public Spending (Comparative) (Topic)","volume":"135 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123043636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default","authors":"Michael Tomz, Mark L. J. Wright","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2239522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2239522","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we review the empirical literature about sovereign debt and default. As we survey the work of economists, historians, and political scientists, we also emphasize parallel developments by theorists and recommend steps to improve the correspondence between theory and data.","PeriodicalId":379216,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Public Spending (Comparative) (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132358779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}