{"title":"Virtue Epistemology","authors":"J. Baehr","doi":"10.1002/9781119420828.part5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119420828.part5","url":null,"abstract":"This Article pre-print is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu. Repository Citation Baehr, Jason, \"Virtue Epistemology\" (2013). Philosophy Faculty Works. 27. http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/phil_fac/27","PeriodicalId":378706,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Epistemology","volume":"244 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115603971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can It Be Rational to Have Faith?","authors":"Lara Buchak","doi":"10.1002/9781119420828.ch8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119420828.ch8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":378706,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Epistemology","volume":"216 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115515643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epistemic Permissiveness","authors":"Roger White","doi":"10.1002/9781119420828.ch18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119420828.ch18","url":null,"abstract":"A rational person doesn't believe just anything. There are limits on what it is rational to believe. How wide are these limits? That's the main question that interests me here. But a secondary question immediately arises: What factors impose these limits? A first stab is to say that one's evidence determines what it is epistemically permissible for one to believe. Many will claim that there are further, non-evidentiary factors relevant to the epistemic rationality of belief. I will be ignoring the details of alternative answers in order to focus on the question of what kind of rational constraints one's evidence puts on belief. Our main question concerns how far epistemic permission and obligation can come apart. 1 Suppose I am epistemically permitted to believe P, i.e., it would not be irrational for me to believe it. Am I thereby obliged to believe P, or are other options rationally available to me? 2 Might I be equally rational in remaining agnostic about P, or even believing not-P? Or could even a slightly stronger or weaker degree of confidence be just as reasonable? 1. Examples and Motivations for Permissive Epistemology Following Feldman (forthcoming) we can call the negative answer the Uniqueness thesis. Uniqueness: Given one's total evidence, there is a unique rational doxastic attitude that one can take to any proposition. 3 I call positions that depart from Uniqueness ''permissive'' as they entail that epistemic rationality permits a range of alternative doxastic attitudes. Many philosophers hold permissive epistemologies. Rejection of Uniqueness is promi-suggest that you are prima facie justified in maintaining your beliefs until you have a reason to abandon them.","PeriodicalId":378706,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Epistemology","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115323311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Promising Against the Evidence","authors":"Berislav Marusic","doi":"10.1002/9781119420828.ch5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119420828.ch5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":378706,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Epistemology","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127257375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：