{"title":"Judicial Expropriations - Difficulties in Drawing the Line between Adjudication and Expropriation","authors":"Sara Mansour Fallah","doi":"10.1007/978-981-13-5744-2_120-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-5744-2_120-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":378416,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Law eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117010515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Provisions on Electronic Commerce in Regional Trade Agreements","authors":"José-Antonio Monteiro, Robert R. Teh","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3005148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3005148","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reviews the different types of provisions explicitly addressing electronic commerce (e-commerce) in regional trade agreements (RTAs). The analysis covers the 275 RTAs currently in force and notified to the WTO as of May 2017. The analysis shows that e-commerce provisions have become increasingly more detailed but remain highly heterogeneous. The most common types of e-commerce provisions refer to the promotion of e-commerce, cooperation activities and the moratorium on customs duties. Other e-commerce provisions concern the domestic legal framework as well as more specific issues, such as electronic authentication, consumer protection, personal information protection and paperless trading.","PeriodicalId":378416,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Law eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124392657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Return of Voluntary Export Restraints? How WTO Law Regulates (and Doesn't Regulate) Bilateral Trade-Restrictive Agreements","authors":"G. Vidigal, Amsterdam Law RPS Submitter","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2968416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2968416","url":null,"abstract":"As part of the renegotiation of its Free Trade Agreement with the United States, South Korea has agreed to cut by 30% it steel exports to the US. In NAFTA negotiations, it is reported that Mexico has also agreed to a quota on auto exports, after which Mexican autos would be subject to more-than-MFN tariffs. Other WTO Members have accepted the application by the US of quotas on their steel an aluminium exports, avoiding additional tariffs on their products. These agreed limitations on exports bring back the spectre of ‘voluntary export restraints’, a widespread practice of the 1980s that was outlawed in the Uruguay Round Agreements. This article discusses the ways in which WTO law regulates, and does not regulate, agreements between WTO Members to limit parties’ rights under WTO law (‘WTO-minus’). While WTO-minus provisions in bilateral agreements are able to influence WTO law only under very specific circumstances, the design of WTO dispute settlement is such that measures based on WTO-minus arrangements may remain unopposed for long periods of time. At the same time, if trade-restrictive measures are challenged, WTO-minus provisions are unlikely to serve as a defense before WTO adjudicators, even where the Member that gave its consent to the WTO-inconsistent measure is the one challenging it.","PeriodicalId":378416,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Law eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131553218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Right to Regulate in International Investment Law and the Law of State Responsibility: A Hohfeldian Approach","authors":"Charalampos Giannakopoulos","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2962686","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2962686","url":null,"abstract":"The right of States to regulate for the public interest has been the focus of increased interest in recent years, finding formal recognition in multiple international investment agreements (IIAs). Formal recognition of the right to regulate has largely been considered as a positive development in terms of making IIAs more balanced and giving arbitral tribunals a clear interpretive guidance against restricting the State’s regulatory space. That notwithstanding, the right to regulate in international investment law remains somewhat undertheorized. Using Hohfeld’s work, the aim of the present contribution is to fill this gap by offering some thoughts, about how the right to regulate operates as a State argument during arbitral proceedings, and about the implications of invoking that right for a State’s international responsibility. I argue that it is possible to conceptualise the right to regulate in international investment law in two ways: first, in its default understanding, the right to regulate means that the State has a Hohfeldian legal power, and hence, provides the State with a prima facie justification for actions taken; second, the right to regulate is a Hohfeldian immunity, meaning that the State is either fully justified or excused for acting in a certain way. It is submitted that the two conceptualisations are distinct from each other, and that each one gives rise to different argumentative strategies and different legal considerations in terms of triggering the host State’s international responsibility. Finally, I argue that conceptualisations of the right to regulate as a strict entitlement (i.e. a Hohfeldian claim-right) should be viewed with caution.","PeriodicalId":378416,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Law eJournal","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116284799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rethinking the Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investments: The 2015 South Africa's Protection Investment Act","authors":"T. Gazzini","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2960567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2960567","url":null,"abstract":"The disaffection of States towards investment treaties has grown considerably in the last few years and triggered the upgrading of BITs (i.e. BIT between Morocco and Nigeria), the revision of treaty models (i.e. India and Indonesia) or the conclusion of much less ambitious facilitation agreements (i.e. Brazil-Mozambique). South Africa has opted instead for the termination of several investment treaties and adoption of a piece of domestic legislation. The South African Protection of Investment Act (2015) is largely pegged to the Constitution and based on the extension to foreign investors of the protection granted to nationals, including the provisions on expropriation and regulatory powers. This chapter attempts to discuss and compare the protection foreign investors may expect to enjoy under the Act. It argues that from both substantive and procedural standpoints, the Act offers a level of protection definitely lower of that normally provided by international investment treaties. It remains to be seen whether such rather drastic departure from treaty standards is appropriate and what the consequences of the replacement of investment treaties with the Act may be on the flow of foreign investment to South Africa.","PeriodicalId":378416,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Law eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121471034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Perceived Information, Short Interest, and Institutional Demand","authors":"C. Chung, Luke DeVault, Kainan Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2884759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2884759","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We test whether institutional investors’ demand relates to past arbitrage activity in the form of short interest. We find that changes in short interest positively predict institutional demand. Examining the reason for the positive relationship, we find that institutions do not appear to demand securities following increases in short interest to gain information. The securities in which the institutional demand following changes in short interest is concentrated, namely, securities with high short interest levels, low information uncertainty, and large increases in short interest, both earn returns equal to their risk-adjusted benchmarks and seem to have the least risky and most profitable share lending. The results are consistent with the idea that institutions place importance on share lending, leading to the predictability of institutional demand. Our study provides new evidence linking the behavior of professional money managers to that of sophisticated investors, such as short sellers.","PeriodicalId":378416,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Law eJournal","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128932764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Проблема доверия и способы ее разрешения в международных отношениях (Trust Issues and Solutions in International Investment Relations)","authors":"D. Shcherbakova, A. Medved","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3462958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3462958","url":null,"abstract":"Статья посвящена анализу институционального взаимодействия агента-принципиала с точки зрения международных инвестиционных отношений, а также фактору доверия или недоверия как возможности предупреждать оппортунистическое поведение агента. This article analyzes the institutional interaction between the agent and the principal terms of international investment relations and the factor of trust or distrust as an opportunity to prevent opportunistic behavior of the agent.","PeriodicalId":378416,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Law eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124703330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In Defense of International Investment Law","authors":"S. Schill","doi":"10.1007/978-3-319-29215-1_13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29215-1_13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":378416,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Law eJournal","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127710668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Empire Strikes Back: The Struggle to Reshape ISDS","authors":"W. Reisman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2943514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2943514","url":null,"abstract":"The Great Compact, which is the basis of ISDS, is at the heart of the contemporary international investment system. The major challenge to it now comes from Developed Countries, who seem to have lost sight of its inclusive benefits.","PeriodicalId":378416,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Law eJournal","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126925026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chinese Multilateralism in the AIIB","authors":"B. Gu","doi":"10.1093/JIEL/JGX006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JIEL/JGX006","url":null,"abstract":"The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB, or the Bank) marks the first endeavor of Asian developing countries as initiators, with China at the center, in multilateral development financing. The glamour of the AIIB lies in multilateralism—the underlying principle based on which it is institutionalized. Chinese multilateralism for the AIIB is different from American multilateralism, which is embedded in the Bretton Woods institutions and has enabled the USA as a hegemon to strengthen its leadership in the world economy. China is not a hegemon; and most importantly, it has no will to counter the existing world order through the establishment of the AIIB. Rather, the Bank has positioned itself in a complementary role in international development financing. Meanwhile, Chinese multilateralism aims to improve global governance, tilting toward balance in favor of those underrepresented. The AIIB meets both the needs of China’s domestic reforms, and the world’s expectation of a responsible stakeholder and contributor. It fulfills multilateralism in both its constitutional charter and standards.","PeriodicalId":378416,"journal":{"name":"International Economic Law eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128030961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}