{"title":"FinTech and RegTech in a Nutshell, and the Future in a Sandbox","authors":"D. Arner, J. Barberis, Ross P. Buckley","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3088303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3088303","url":null,"abstract":"The 2008 global financial crisis represented a pivotal moment that separated prior phases of the development of financial technology (FinTech) and regulatory technology (RegTech) from the current paradigm. Today, FinTech has entered a phase of rapid development marked by the proliferation of startups and other new entrants, such as IT and ecommerce firms that have fragmented the financial services market. This new era presents fresh challenges for regulators and highlights why the evolution of FinTech necessitates a parallel development of RegTech. In particular, regulators must develop a robust new framework that promotes innovation and market confidence, aided by the use of regulatory \"sandboxes.\" Certain RegTech developments today are highlighting the path toward another paradigm shift, which will be marked by a reconceptualization of the nature of financial regulation. \u0000 \u0000This paper is included in \"CFA Institute Research Foundation Review 2017\" https://ssrn.com/abstract=3483784.","PeriodicalId":376194,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation & Supervision (Topic)","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131207014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Optimal Regulation of Financial Intermediaries","authors":"Sebastian Di Tella","doi":"10.1257/AER.20161488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.20161488","url":null,"abstract":"I characterize the optimal financial regulation policy in an economy where financial intermediaries trade capital assets on behalf of households, but must retain an equity stake to align incentives. Financial regulation is necessary because intermediaries cannot be excluded from privately trading in capital markets. They don’t internalize that high asset prices force everyone to bear more risk. The socially optimal allocation can be implemented with a tax on asset holdings. I derive a sufficient statistic for the externality and use market data on leverage and volatility of intermediaries’ equity to measure it. (JEL D82, G01, G12, G20, G31, H25)","PeriodicalId":376194,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation & Supervision (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126223696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Banks’ Systemic Importance Affect Their Capital Structure and Balance Sheet Adjustment Processes?","authors":"Yassine Bakkar, Olivier De Jonghe, Amine Tarazi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2986831","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2986831","url":null,"abstract":"Frictions prevent banks to immediately adjust their capital ratio towards their desired and/or imposed level. This paper analyzes (i) whether or not these frictions are larger for regulatory capital ratios vis-a-vis a plain leverage ratio; (ii) which adjustment channels banks use to adjust their capital ratio; and (iii) how the speed of adjustment and adjustment channels differ between large, systemic and complex banks versus small banks. Our results, obtained using a sample of listed banks across OECD countries for the 2001-2012 period, bear critical policy implications for the implementation of new (systemic risk-based) capital requirements and their impact on banks' balance sheets.","PeriodicalId":376194,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation & Supervision (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128151318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Risk Shifting and Regulatory Arbitrage: Evidence from Operational Risk","authors":"Brian Clark, Alireza Ebrahim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2991789","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2991789","url":null,"abstract":"Regulations leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009 provided incentives for banks shift their risk profiles toward less regulated areas. We focus on the case of operational risk which went from being a relatively benign and largely unregulated risk type to a major risk that now accounts for about 25% of large banks' risk profile. We show that capital-constrained banks aggressively took on operational risk as a mean of regulatory arbitrage. Indeed, this contributed to operational risk's rise to prominence as a leading risk type in the financial sector and worsened the effects of the crisis.","PeriodicalId":376194,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation & Supervision (Topic)","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115279532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Macroprudential Policy and Household Wealth Inequality","authors":"J. Carpantier, J. Olivera, Philippe Van Kerm","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2989050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2989050","url":null,"abstract":"Macroprudential policies, such as caps on loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, have become part of the policy paradigm in emerging markets and advanced countries alike. Given that housing is the most important asset in household portfolios, relaxing or tightening access to mortgages may affect the distribution of household wealth in the country. In a stylised model we show that the final level of wealth inequality depends on the size of the LTV ratio, housing prices, credit cost and the strength of a bequest motive; ultimately with no unequivocal effect of LTV ratios on wealth inequality. These trade-offs are illustrated with estimations of \"Gini Recentered Influence Function\" regressions on household survey data from 12 Eurozone countries that participated in the first wave of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS). The results show that, among the households with active mortgages, high LTV ratios at the time of acquisition are related to high contributions to wealth inequality today, while house price increases are negatively related to inequality contributions. A proxy for the strength of bequest motives tends to be negatively related with wealth inequality, but credit cost does not show a significant link to the distribution of wealth.","PeriodicalId":376194,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation & Supervision (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124959231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Формирование Системы Пруденциального Надзора За Профессиональными Участниками Рынка Ценных Бумаг (Formation of a System of Prudential Supervision for Professional Participants of the Securities Market)","authors":"K. Korishchenko, S. Morozov","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2968455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2968455","url":null,"abstract":"Russian Abstract: Цель данной работы – разработка системы мер пруденциального надзора за деятельностью профессиональных участников рынка ценных бумаг для целей минимизации системных рисков и обеспечения стабильности финансовой системы, повышения уровня защиты интересов инвесторов и вкладчиков и создания справедливых и прозрачных финансовых рынков. В процессе работы проводилось исследование применения мер пруденциального надзора в отношении российских банков как основных участников отечественного финансового рынка, гармонизация существующих мер пруденциального банковского надзора по отношению к профучастникам, а также исследование мирового опыта проведения указанных мер на примере регулирующих органов Великобритании, Австралии и США. \u0000English Abstract: The purpose of this work is the development of a system of prudential supervision measures for the activities of professional participants in the securities market for the purpose of minimizing systemic risks and ensuring the stability of the financial system, enhancing the protection of investors and depositors and creating fair and transparent financial markets. In the course of the research, a study was conducted on the application of prudential supervision measures in relation to Russian banks as the main participants of the domestic financial market, the harmonization of existing prudential banking supervision measures with respect to professional participants, and a study of the world experience in carrying out these measures using the example of the regulatory bodies of Great Britain, Australia and the USA.","PeriodicalId":376194,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation & Supervision (Topic)","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122912896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Basel III Capital Buffer Requirements and Credit Union Prudential Regulation: Canadian Evidence","authors":"Hélyoth T. S. Hessou, Van Son Lai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2815731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2815731","url":null,"abstract":"Some Canadian provinces have already adopted Basel III rules for the oversight of their administrated credit unions. We analyze the importance of the Basel III additional capital buffer requirements for credit union prudential regulation. Based on a sample of the 100 largest credit unions in Canada from 1996 to 2014, we find that Canadian credit union capital buffers behave countercyclically over the business cycle. Further, credit unions hold a capital buffer bigger than the maximum buffer advocated under Basel III which is 5% of risk-weighted assets (RWA). These results suggest that, unlike commercial banks worldwide, credit unions, by and large, are already in compliance with the new Basel III buffer requirements. However, there is evidence that the capital buffers of low-capitalized credit unions are procyclical. These credit unions increased their RWA during booms but failed to build up additional capital accordingly. Hence, weakly capitalized credit unions are more likely to adjust their capital buffers if they are subject to Basel III capital buffer regulation.","PeriodicalId":376194,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation & Supervision (Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124403569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Monetary Policy, Macroprudential Regulation and Inequality","authors":"P. Monnin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2970459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2970459","url":null,"abstract":"The 2008 global financial crisis profoundly changed the role of central banks in the economy. First, central banks engaged in strong expansionary monetary policy, using new unconventional tools to boost economic activity. Second, they were key to containing financial instability, which led them to implement new macroprudential policies to foster future financial stability. The debate about whether these policies have been effective is still ongoing, and often neglects two other crucial issues: What has been the impact of these policies on income and wealth distribution? Does inequality of income and wealth affect whether central bank policies reach their targets? This note highlights research on these two questions presented during a CEP IMF workshop on “Monetary Policy, Macroprudential Regulation and Inequality” and puts them into perspective with other recent theoretical and empirical results. Evidence shows that monetary policy and macroprudential regulation are not neutral in terms of income and wealth distribution. Conventional and unconventional expansive monetary policy both appear to decrease income inequality, mainly through their impact on the labor market, and to increase wealth inequality. Theoretically, macroprudential regulation could also affect inequality, but empirical studies exploring this hypothesis are scarce. Income and wealth distribution also influences the transmission of monetary policy impulses to the aggregate economy. To design effective monetary policy, it is crucial to assess whether the current income and wealth structures in a country accentuate or dampen monetary impulses, and to what extent they do so. Moreover, theoretical and empirical evidence points to an effect of inequality on financial stability. A thorough understanding of this impact is key to shaping optimal monetary policy and macroprudential regulation.","PeriodicalId":376194,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation & Supervision (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126859178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Evaluating Regulation within an Artificial Financial System – A Framework and Its Application to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio Regulation","authors":"J. Riedler, Frank Brueckbauer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2966007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2966007","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a general model of the financial system that allows for the evaluation of bank regulation. Our framework comprises the agents and institutions that have proved crucial in the propagation of the subprime mortgage shock in the U.S. into a global financial crisis: Commercial banks and investment banks, which can also be interpreted as shadow banks, interact on wholesale debt markets. Beside a market for short term interbank loans and long term bank bonds, other funding sources include insured customer deposits, uninsured investor deposits and repos. While credit to the real sector is the principal asset of commercial banks, investment banks specialize in trading securities, which may differ according to risk, maturity and liquidity. As a first application of the model we implement the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) regulation and analyze its impact on bank balance sheets, interest rates, the transmission of monetary policy and the stability of bank lending in the face of shocks. We find that the LCR regulation reduces the supply of loans to the real sector, increases the maturity and interest rate of long term wholesale debt, and strongly diminishes the role of the overnight interbank market as a funding source. Our simulations suggest that the transmission of changes to short term monetary policy rates is severely impaired when the LCR regulation is binding. Furthermore, we find that a strong confidence shock can lead to a protracted credit crunch under the liquidity regulation.","PeriodicalId":376194,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation & Supervision (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131711779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Modeling of Bank Capital Adequacy Ratios via a Lévy Process-Driven Model","authors":"F. Chakroun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2942453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2942453","url":null,"abstract":"Our study is motivated by banking regulation that emphasizes risk minimization practices associated with assets and regulatory capital. In an attempt to address the problem of compliance to minimum capital adequacy ratios (CAR) and under assumptions about retained earnings, loan-loss reserves, the market and shareholder-bank owner relationships, we construct a stochastic dynamic model to describe the evolution of a bank capital adequacy ratios (CAR) via capital to total assets ratio (TCAR) and capital to risk weighted assets ratio (T1CAR) in a stochastic setting. In order to model the dynamics of the TCAR and T1CAR we derive stochastic differential equations driven by levy processes. In this case, the simulation analysis is employed to verify the results.","PeriodicalId":376194,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation & Supervision (Topic)","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127133861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}