{"title":"Propositional and doxastic justification","authors":"Sven Rosenkranz","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198865636.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198865636.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"Drawing on the results of previous chapters, the proposal is made to interpret the complex operator ⌜¬K¬K⌝ as encoding propositional justification and the complex operator ⌜¬K¬K⌝ as encoding doxastic justification—where in each case justification is understood to be justification all things considered. Accordingly, not only propositional but also doxastic justification is construed as a feature of one’s epistemic situation rather than a feature of one’s beliefs. On this view, both types of justification are non-factive. The proposed account is defended against a number of putative counterexamples, the allegation that it confuses epistemic permissibility with epistemic blamelessness, and the charge that it fails to heed plausible reliabilist constraints on justification. At crucial junctures this defence relies on the availability of theorems governing the aforementioned complex operators that were proved in chapter 5.","PeriodicalId":375036,"journal":{"name":"Justification as Ignorance","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129791831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Outline of a theory of justification","authors":"Sven Rosenkranz","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198865636.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198865636.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"Core theses of the novel account of justification to be developed are first stated: one has propositional justification for p just in case one is in no position to know that one is in no position to know p; and one has doxastic justification for p just in case one is in no position to know that one does not know p. Unlike other theories that conceive of justification in terms of the metaphysical possibility of knowing, the present account thus construes it as a distinctive kind of epistemic possibility. It treats propositional justification as non-factive, both its presence and its absence as luminous conditions, and by assuming a weak non-normal modal logic for knowledge and being in a position to know, validates principles of positive and negative introspection for it. The account thereby attributes features to justification that internalists care about. But it does so without construing justification as an internal condition. The account allows one to systematically distinguish between the condition of being justified and the metaphysical grounds for its obtaining, thereby heeding externalist insights into the difference between the good cases and the bad cases envisaged by radical scepticism. Lines of argument that show the account’s potential, e.g. in dealing with the preface and lottery paradoxes, are previewed, and so are lines of defence against challenges and objections, including prominent anti-luminosity arguments.","PeriodicalId":375036,"journal":{"name":"Justification as Ignorance","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130937924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competing views","authors":"Sven Rosenkranz","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198865636.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198865636.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The present account, which construes justification as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing, or of being in a position to know, competes with three recently advanced theories of justification. Of these competitors, the first two construe doxastic justification as the metaphysical possibility of knowing. While they differ in some details, these views share certain problematic features: they fail to yield a corresponding account of propositional justification, have trouble vindicating an intuitive principle of closure for justified belief, and fail to comply with the independently plausible principle that if one has a justified belief, one is in no position to rule out that one has knowledge. The present account does not have these problematic features. According to the third competitor, |φ| is propositionally justified in one’s situation just in case it would be abnormal—and so require explanation—if |φ| were to be false in the presence of the evidence that one possesses in that situation. This normic theory of justification validates the principle that propositional justification agglomerates over conjunction, and in so doing, violates the constraint that propositions of the form ⌜φ & ¬Kφ⌝ never be justified. It likewise contradicts the independently plausible principle that whenever |φ| is propositionally justified all things considered, |¬Kφ| is not. The present account does not face these problems, since it rejects the relevant agglomeration principle and treats the condition encoded by ⌜¬K¬Kφ⌝ as luminous.","PeriodicalId":375036,"journal":{"name":"Justification as Ignorance","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126127467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Applications","authors":"Sven Rosenkranz","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198865636.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198865636.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"To earn their keep, theories of justification must be shown to have fruitful applications and to provide the means to address well-known puzzles and paradoxes. It is argued that the present account of justification does very well on this score. Not only does it prove amenable to the idea that standards for knowledge and justification may shift, it allows for an explanation of why they shift in tandem. It lends itself to a justificationist conception of the rules that may guide the formation of beliefs, to the extent that these beliefs aspire to be knowledgeable. The present account moreover affords principled solutions to the preface paradox, the lottery paradox, the related but distinct lottery puzzle, and a more recent sceptical challenge targeting doxastic justification.","PeriodicalId":375036,"journal":{"name":"Justification as Ignorance","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129128832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Concluding Remarks","authors":"Sven Rosenkranz","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198865636.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198865636.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"According to the account of epistemic justification developed in this book, one has propositional justification for p just in case one is in no position to know that one is in no position to know p; and one has doxastic justification for p just in case one is in no position to know that one does not know p. The account gives internalists much of what they want from a theory of justification—in particular, a notion of justification according to which propositional justification is non-factive and luminous, underwrites principles of positive and negative introspection, and remains available to the victims of systematic deception. All the while, that notion is explained in terms of other notions that clearly belong to the knowledge-firsters’ toolkit, and coheres with an externalist account of the grounds for justification.","PeriodicalId":375036,"journal":{"name":"Justification as Ignorance","volume":"185 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133240708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On being in a position to know","authors":"Sven Rosenkranz","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198865636.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198865636.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"The notion of being in a position to know contrasts with that of knowledge, and yet, both notions are intimately related. Just as one can only know what is true, one can only be in a position to know what is true. To the extent that knowledge requires safe belief, being in a position to know implies being in a position to safely believe. For any p, if one knows p, one is in a position to know p, whereas the converse does not hold. Doing the best that one is in a position to do to decide a given question may be less than doing everything that one is in a position to do to decide that question, because one cannot do every such thing at once. If one is in a position to know p, one has the opportunity to come to know p upon doing the best that one is in a position to do to decide whether p holds. It is explained what this opportunity involves and what is involved in seizing it.","PeriodicalId":375036,"journal":{"name":"Justification as Ignorance","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127902418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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