{"title":"Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya: From Terrorism to Nonviolence","authors":"I. E. Matesan","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197510087.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197510087.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"In 1981, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Over the next two decades, the group transformed from one of the most active terrorist groups in Egypt to an Islamist group that officially renounced armed action. The chapter first traces the rise of the group and investigates what pushed it to resort to violence. The increased scale and scope of violence was generated by the same causal mechanisms that explained the Muslim Brotherhood’s turn to violence: politicization, mistrust of government, a sense of betrayal by the regime, desire for revenge, and a slippery slope of militarization. The chapter then looks at the transformation of the organization starting with the 1997 Nonviolence Initiative. The analysis reveals that the high audience cost of violence and growing public condemnation led al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s leaders to rethink the group’s mission and push for permanent disengagement from violence.","PeriodicalId":372814,"journal":{"name":"The Violence Pendulum","volume":"280 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115602180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"I. E. Matesan","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197510087.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197510087.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter summarizes the findings of the book and discusses their implications for our understanding of violence and nonviolence. Despite their differences, all four Islamist groups started legitimizing armed resistance when their grievances were high and violence was widespread. The groups turned to violent behavior once they began facing internal pressures from organizational fragmentation or external pressures from the state. Disengagement from violence does not occur when grievances cease to exist or groups no longer face pressures. Groups renounce violence when armed resistance becomes unsustainable, pressures turn to disillusionment, and leaders are willing to rethink tactics and strategies. The case studies examined in the book shed light on the contradictory findings on the effects of repression, by showing that that the impact of repression is filtered through organizational dynamics and social context. An effective long-term approach to terrorism should strive to design exit options from violence, resolve conflicts, and promote trust in the government.","PeriodicalId":372814,"journal":{"name":"The Violence Pendulum","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128733194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}