Conclusion

Abstract

This chapter summarizes the findings of the book and discusses their implications for our understanding of violence and nonviolence. Despite their differences, all four Islamist groups started legitimizing armed resistance when their grievances were high and violence was widespread. The groups turned to violent behavior once they began facing internal pressures from organizational fragmentation or external pressures from the state. Disengagement from violence does not occur when grievances cease to exist or groups no longer face pressures. Groups renounce violence when armed resistance becomes unsustainable, pressures turn to disillusionment, and leaders are willing to rethink tactics and strategies. The case studies examined in the book shed light on the contradictory findings on the effects of repression, by showing that that the impact of repression is filtered through organizational dynamics and social context. An effective long-term approach to terrorism should strive to design exit options from violence, resolve conflicts, and promote trust in the government.