Comparative Corporate Governance最新文献

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Corporate law and economic development 公司法与经济发展
Comparative Corporate Governance Pub Date : 2021-06-17 DOI: 10.4337/9781788975339.00011
Vikramaditya S. Khanna
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引用次数: 0
Controlling shareholders and their duties 控股股东及其职责
Comparative Corporate Governance Pub Date : 2021-06-17 DOI: 10.4337/9781788975339.00026
Gaia Balp, Marco Ventoruzzo
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引用次数: 0
Public versus private enforcement in corporate governance 公司治理中的公共执法与私人执法
Comparative Corporate Governance Pub Date : 2021-06-17 DOI: 10.4337/9781788975339.00031
Pierre-Henri Conac
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引用次数: 0
Who decides executive pay? A comparative perspective 谁决定高管薪酬?比较视角
Comparative Corporate Governance Pub Date : 2021-06-17 DOI: 10.4337/9781788975339.00022
Li-wen Lin
{"title":"Who decides executive pay? A comparative perspective","authors":"Li-wen Lin","doi":"10.4337/9781788975339.00022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788975339.00022","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":372646,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Corporate Governance","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122953680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Introduction to comparative corporate governance 比较公司治理概论
Comparative Corporate Governance Pub Date : 2021-06-17 DOI: 10.4337/9781788975339.00008
Afra Afsharipour, Martin Gelter
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引用次数: 0
Accounting and convergence in corporate governance: doctrinal or economic path dependence? 公司治理中的会计与趋同:理论依赖还是经济路径依赖?
Comparative Corporate Governance Pub Date : 2021-06-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3613684
Martin Gelter
{"title":"Accounting and convergence in corporate governance: doctrinal or economic path dependence?","authors":"Martin Gelter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3613684","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3613684","url":null,"abstract":"Convergence in corporate governance has been debated for more than 20 years. This paper seeks to explain convergence – and the lack thereof – in accounting laws and standards, within the context of this debate. One could argue about whether accounting has undergone international convergence. One the one hand, the two major accounting systems, IFRS and US GAAP, share the same goal of providing timely and useful information to investors. On the other hand, differences between the two sets of standards remain, and the SEC still does not permit domestic issuers to use IFRS. Moreover, while EU publicly-traded firms are required to use IFRS for their consolidated financial statements, many Member States, continue to require or permit the use of domestic accounting standards for private firms and for entity-level accounting. \u0000 \u0000This paper seeks to explain this persistent divergence with path dependence. Path dependence is often driven by interest groups. However, there is also the possibility of doctrinal path dependence, which can be explained with the difficulty of making fundamental changes given that legal professionals aim for certain and seek to preserve the value of their specialized human capital. A major factor in accounting reform are the interests of accounting professionals, particularly in large international firms (the “Big 4”). Divergence may in part be because the interests of this key constituency differ between the US and Continental European countries. In Europe, the internationalization of accounting has generally been favored by large firms because of the possibility of increasing their market share at the expense of purely domestic firms. This explains the compromise implemented in the Member state options of the IFRS Regulation. By contrast, the US already had a fully developed set of accounting standards focused on capital markets when IFRS became an option, which means there were no rents to capture for large firms as a result of changes in the audit market. In addition, a key feature of US corporate governance distinguishes it from other systems, including the UK, namely the prevalence of investor litigation. Consequently, a rules-based system serves the interest of the accounting profession better than the arguably more standards-based IFRS.","PeriodicalId":372646,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Corporate Governance","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114789896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Diversified enterprises with controlling shareholders: a theoretical analysis of risk-sharing, controlvoting leverage and tunneling 控股股东多元化企业:风险分担、控股投票杠杆与隧道效应的理论分析
Comparative Corporate Governance Pub Date : 2021-06-17 DOI: 10.4337/9781788975339.00029
S. Kang
{"title":"Diversified enterprises with controlling shareholders: a theoretical analysis of risk-sharing, controlvoting leverage and tunneling","authors":"S. Kang","doi":"10.4337/9781788975339.00029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788975339.00029","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":372646,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Corporate Governance","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132475296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Direct and derivative shareholder suits: towards a functional and practical taxonomy 直接股东和衍生股东诉讼:走向功能性和实用性分类
Comparative Corporate Governance Pub Date : 2021-06-17 DOI: 10.4337/9781788975339.00032
Alan K. Koh, Samantha S. Tang
{"title":"Direct and derivative shareholder suits: towards a functional and practical taxonomy","authors":"Alan K. Koh, Samantha S. Tang","doi":"10.4337/9781788975339.00032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788975339.00032","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":372646,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Corporate Governance","volume":"57 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114117444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The structure of the board of directors: boards and governance strategies in the US, the UK and Germany 董事会结构:美国、英国和德国的董事会和治理战略
Comparative Corporate Governance Pub Date : 2021-06-17 DOI: 10.4337/9781788975339.00016
K. Hopt, Patrick C. Leyens
{"title":"The structure of the board of directors: boards and governance strategies in the US, the UK and Germany","authors":"K. Hopt, Patrick C. Leyens","doi":"10.4337/9781788975339.00016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788975339.00016","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter continues and advances our earlier research on ‘Board Models in Europe’.** We explore ‘The Structure of the Board of Directors’ with a view to the basic governance structure as provided by a board model vis-a-vis techniques of structuring the decision-making body, which can be used independent of the chosen board model. We focus on boards of large business corporations with a stock exchange listing to secure cross-country comparability. Our three sample jurisdictions are the US, the UK and Germany. France and Italy are also considered to round out the discussion of selected issues. Our key findings are as follows: \u0000 \u00001. Board models like the one-tier board, as used in the US and the UK, or the two-tier board, as used in Germany, provide a basic governance structure that enables the use of specific governance strategies. It is the use of specific governance strategies, not the choice of a board model, which determines the role of the board in alleviating agency problems between owners and managers, controlling and non-controlling shareholders, and shareholder and stakeholder constituencies. Based on this finding, the choice of the suitable board model should be left to private parties. \u0000 \u00002. The market for corporate control is known as a removal strategy that alleviates the agency problem between owners and managers of potential target companies. To achieve this effect, it must be ensured that takeover defenses are adopted in the interest of shareholders rather than as a means to shield the incumbent board from removal by the acquirer. The governance options include focusing the board structure through the allocation of decision-making power to independent directors (US) or to the supervisory board (Germany), and, as an alternative, reinstalling shareholder decision-making and thus removing the board from its coordination task (UK). Counter-intuitively, one might group US and German law together, despite differences in their basic board structures and despite the European Union’s adoption of UK-style control shift regulation. \u0000 \u00003. The three sample jurisdictions follow a similar pattern for securing fairness of related party transactions (RPTs). The UK relies on a structuring of the shareholder body, requiring ex-ante approval of the disinterested shareholders (MOM approval), a strategy that is also used in France but in a weaker form due to the possibility of ex-post authorization. In the US, the predominant choice seems to be structuring the board so as to leave the decision to independent directors, a strategy that Italy has, on one hand, sought to enhance with the obligatory involvement of a minority appointed director but, on the other hand, has weakened by allowing the board to override a recommendation of the independent directors. Germany also relies on board structuring in that it requires supervisory board approval of RPTs, but compared to the use of independent directors, the cooperation between the two boards provides a bas","PeriodicalId":372646,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Corporate Governance","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133551351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Comparative and transnational developments in corporate social responsibility 企业社会责任的比较与跨国发展
Comparative Corporate Governance Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4337/9781788975339.00014
Cynthia A. Williams
{"title":"Comparative and transnational developments in corporate social responsibility","authors":"Cynthia A. Williams","doi":"10.4337/9781788975339.00014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788975339.00014","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":372646,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Corporate Governance","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130520416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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