{"title":"The Relationship Between the Reporting of Environmental Capital Expenditure in the 10-K Reports and Online Sustainability Reporting of U.S. Largest Energy and Utilities Companies","authors":"Elgeritte Adidjaja, J. E. Morhardt","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1605329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1605329","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is a study of the 45 largest U.S. energy and utilities companies demonstrating a correlation between the inclusion by these companies of data on environmental capital expenditures (ECE) in their 2008 10-K annual financial reports and the score that the companies attain on the Pacific Sustainability Index (PSI) - a rating system developed by the Roberts Environmental Center at Claremont McKenna College of the same year. ECE is defined as capitalized environmental costs that are made voluntarily or by government mandate to prevent future environmental contamination, while the PSI is a scoring system measuring the breadth and depth of companies’ online sustainability reporting (CSR). Neither the reporting of ECE in the 10-K reports nor CSR is currently regulated, resulting in a wide variation in companies’ sustainability disclosures. ECE reporters achieve higher PSI scores. A higher ratio of ECE to total capital expenditures or to assets predicts a higher level of PSI scores.","PeriodicalId":371292,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Social Responsibility & Public Policy (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116813753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Double Irreversibility and Environmental Policy Design","authors":"A. Pommeret, Fabien Prieur","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1392729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1392729","url":null,"abstract":"The design of environmental policy typically takes place within a framework in which uncertainty over the future impact of pollution and two different kinds of irreversibilities interact. The first kind of irreversibility concerns the sunk cost of environmental degradation; the second is related to the sunk cost of environmental policy. Clearly, the two irreversibilities pull in opposite directions: policy irreversibility leads to more pollution and a less/later policy while environmental irreversibility generates less pollution and a more/sooner policy. Using a real option approach and an infinite time horizon model, this paper considers both irreversibilities simultaneously. The model first is developed by paying particular attention to the option values related to pollution and policy adoption. Solving the model in closed form then provides solutions for both the optimal pollution level and the optimal environmental policy timing. Finally, the model is \"calibrated\" with the purpose of appraising which irreversibility has the prevailing effect and what is the overall impact of both irreversibilities on pollution and policy design.","PeriodicalId":371292,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Social Responsibility & Public Policy (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117344896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"SMEs: Rising Opportunities in the Emerging Blue Economy","authors":"D. Dey","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1021236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1021236","url":null,"abstract":"UNFCCC in one of its reports (August 2007) has made an analysis of the projected future investments and financial flows across different regions of the world, for the year 2030.The report predicted that between 2000 and 2030, developing Asia’s share in the global investment would rise sharply and the slower economic growth of OECD regions would pull their share of global investment to a lower level. The study has also indicated that between 2000 and 2030, total fuel consumption and emission – both would rise steeply in the developing countries. In the developed OECD countries, it is projected to decline substantially. Thus, the developing economies of the South would increasingly turn ‘blue’ and the developed economies of the North would become ‘green’. It is expected that the economic condition of the hungry millions will improve though at the cost of their health and environment. However, it may be assumed that with the improvement of the economic condition, more funds would be diverted towards development of better production techniques to control/mitigate pollution. As the possibility of parceling pollution to other less developed regions does not exist (there is no south to south pole!), with the improved production techniques, all the economies across the globe would turn ‘green’ in the long run. May be, the regulatory issues on ‘global warming’ are playing the role of a great equalizer, by default.","PeriodicalId":371292,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Social Responsibility & Public Policy (Topic)","volume":"41 9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129928534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral Hazards, Bankruptcy Costs, and International Financial Capital Mobility","authors":"S. Banerji, Ngo van Long","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9361.2007.00404.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2007.00404.x","url":null,"abstract":"Using a model with moral hazard and bankruptcy costs, we show that the direction of intertemporal trade between countries depends on differences in their autarkic distributions of wealth. We also examine the consequences of redistribution policies and bail-out policies in this framework. We show that, in the presence of bankruptcy cost and capital market imperfections due to moral hazard, the very rich and the very poor do not undertake any risk and choose to be passive lenders. Only individuals whose wealth lies within an intermediate range choose to become entrepreneurs. Redistributive policies influence the supply of entrepreneurship and autarkic interest rates.","PeriodicalId":371292,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Social Responsibility & Public Policy (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123747398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hold-Up Problems with Respect to R&D Investment and Licensing in Environmental Regulation","authors":"Joerg Breitscheidel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.869372","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.869372","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the design of self-financing tax-subsidy schemes to solve hold-up problems in environmental regulation. The announcement of the tax rate seems to be preferable to solve hold-up problems with respect to the investment in environmental R&D. In contrast, only the announcement of the subsidy rate is adequate to solve hold-up problems with respect to the licensing of environmentally friendly technologies. Altogether, the announcement of the subsidy rate yields higher expected social welfare than the announcement of the tax rate or the standard emission taxation if the marginal damage of emissions exceeds a certain level.","PeriodicalId":371292,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Social Responsibility & Public Policy (Topic)","volume":"126 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115062266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}