{"title":"Connections or Performance: What Determines Turnover of Bankers?","authors":"Clara Graziano","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1190805","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1190805","url":null,"abstract":"We study top executive turnover in Italian Banks for the period 1993-2001. We relate the probability of survival of top executives (President, CEO, General Manager) to bank performance and local connections of the manager, controlling for (observable and unobservable) bank and manager characteristics by exploiting longitudinal information on bank-manager appointments. We measure the degree of local connections of managers by the distance between the province of the bank headquarter and the province of birth of the manager, so that higher distance implies lower connections. We show that top managers of Italian banks tend to be local in the sense that the distribution of the distance is heavily skewed towards zero. Moving from this evidence, we address two questions. First, we investigate whether connections affect the duration of the appointment at bank. Second, we ask whether connections entrench managers at the expense of bank performance. We find that connections generally increase survival probabilities at bank and that the positive effect of performance (which has been largely documented by executive turnover literature) is weakened once connections are accounted for. We find only very weak evidence in favour of the hypothesis that managerial connections contain valuable information to help bank performance. Our evidence instead points in the direction that connections are a collusion device to maintain and share rents and lower the probability of survival of the bank. Consistently with this we find that the only ones to benefit from connections are the top managers themselves whose survival probability (for Presidents and General Managers) significantly increases with connections.","PeriodicalId":370682,"journal":{"name":"21st Australasian Finance & Banking Conference 2008 (Archive)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121634334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Earnings Management and Performance of Indian Equity Rights Issues","authors":"Narayan Rao Sapar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1155027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1155027","url":null,"abstract":"Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structural transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported financial performance. Many research studies are conducted to investigate the earnings management in developed economies. Due to regulated operating environment of in India until 1992 earnings management was not a fertile topic for research. But, post-1992 companies are given freedom to price their capital issues. This freedom motivates the issuers to manage their earnings prior to capital issues. The objectives of the study are to investigate if firms in India manage earnings prior to launching of equity rights issues (known as seasoned equity offerings in the USA and Europe) and the post issue performance of the firms. We used discretionary current accruals (DCAs) to measure the extent of earnings management. Modified Jones Model is used to estimate DCAs during three years prior to the rights issue (pre-issue period) and three years after the rights issue (post-issue period). DCAs of rights issue firms are adjusted for DCAs of control sample (non-rights issuers).Adjusted mean DCAs of pre-issue period is compared with adjusted mean DCAs of the post-issue period to detect earnings management. The results suggest that there has been earnings management prior to the rights issues. Analysis of pre-and-post issue performance the sample firms corroborate the findings based on DCAs. Study period is 1993-94 to 2003-04. Sample size is 259.","PeriodicalId":370682,"journal":{"name":"21st Australasian Finance & Banking Conference 2008 (Archive)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124781059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Decision to Cross-List: The Case of Chinese IPOs and ADRs","authors":"Xinde Zhang, T. D. King","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1148946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1148946","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the cross-listings by Chinese companies in Hong Kong, Singapore, and the U.S. markets from 1993 to 2005. Our sample consists of 101 firms cross-listed in Hong Kong, 43 firms in the U.S. and 77 firms in Singapore and a sample of 1,247 domestic listings. We find that the limitations of the domestic markets motivate the issuers to cross-list overseas. We also find that issuers are motivated to cross-list due to the legal and economic environments of the foreign markets, a better access to capital markets, and a lower cost of capital. The results of the Cox hazard model suggest that lower-leveraged, larger, and better-performing firms in the developed regions of China are more likely to cross-list. The multinomial probit model regressions indicate that, relative to their domestic counterparts, the firms cross-listed in the three foreign markets have lower leverage ratios and a larger EBITDA. However, the firms cross-listed in Singapore are significantly smaller in size and are more likely from the developed region. Subsequent to the cross-listing events, the issuers experience a significant increase in sales, total assets, and total profits, but a significant drop in profit margins. Excess returns after the cross-listings are generally negative for cross-listed stocks. Finally, underpricing is most severe in the listings on Chinese exchanges and the cross-listings on NASDAQ.","PeriodicalId":370682,"journal":{"name":"21st Australasian Finance & Banking Conference 2008 (Archive)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117295701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. Vieito, Antonio Cerqueira, Elísio Brandão, Walayet A. Khan
{"title":"Executive Compensation: New vs. Old Economy and the Impact of NASDAQ Crash and Sarbanes Oxley Act","authors":"J. Vieito, Antonio Cerqueira, Elísio Brandão, Walayet A. Khan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1139544","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1139544","url":null,"abstract":"This is a new study which examines whether the determinants and the forms of compensation in new versus old economy US firms are the same over time and if the structure of compensation for executives in both groups changes after the NASDAQ crash and the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley act.The results reveal that the new economy executives receive, on average, much more than the executives from the old economy, primarily due to stock options, but in the last few years the difference in compensation between the executives of both groups is decreasing.We find that the NASDAQ crash and the Sarbanes-Oxley act had a significant impact upon the structure of the components of executive compensation in both new and old economy firms. Firms in both groups have reduced the use of stock options and have instead increased the use of bonuses and restricted stocks.We also find that the factors that explain executive compensation in new and old economy firms are generally different, and in the case of the variables that are the same, like firm size component, the intensity of the factors is different.","PeriodicalId":370682,"journal":{"name":"21st Australasian Finance & Banking Conference 2008 (Archive)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116450646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}