Credit and Capital Markets最新文献

{"title":"The Independence of the European Central Bank","authors":"Ulrike Neyer","doi":"10.3790/ccm.52.1.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.52.1.35","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract\u0000 The ECB is formally independent of instructions from any government. During and after the financial crisis and the acute sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, the ECB has used new instruments and has taken on new tasks and responsibilities. This has led to discussions about the independence of the ECB. Against this background, this paper discusses two questions. First, do the new instruments and tasks imply that the independence of the ECB is under threat? Second, is the use of the instruments and the taking on of the new tasks and responsibilities by an independent institution justified in a democracy or is there a relevant democratic deficit? With respect to these two questions the result of this paper is that especially the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) have to be judged critically.\u0000 Zusammenfassung\u0000 Die EZB ist formal unabhängig von Weisungen der Regierungen. Während und nach der Finanzkrise und der akuten Staatsschuldenkrise im Euroraum hat die EZB neue Instrumente eingesetzt und neue Aufgaben und Verantwortlichkeiten übernommen, die zu Diskussionen über die Unabhängigkeit der EZB geführt haben. Vor diesem Hintergrund diskutiert diese Arbeit zwei Fragen. Erstens, stellen die neuen Instrumente und Aufgaben der EZB eine Gefahr für ihre Unabhängigkeit dar? Zweitens, ist der Einsatz der neuen Instrumente und die Übernahme der neuen Aufgaben von einer unabhängigen Institu­tion in einer Demokratie zu rechtfertigen, oder besteht ein relevantes Demokratiedefizit? Bezüglich dieser beiden Fragen kommt die Arbeit zu dem Ergebnis, dass insbesondere das Programm zum Ankauf von Anleihen des öffentlichen Sektors (Public Sector Purchase Programme, PSPP) und die von der EZB übernommene Bankenaufsicht (Single Supervisory Mechanism, SSM) kritisch zu beurteilen sind.\u0000 JEL Classification: E42; E52; E58","PeriodicalId":36966,"journal":{"name":"Credit and Capital Markets","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74778823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"49. Konstanzer Seminar zur Geldtheorie und Geldpolitik 2018","authors":"Kai Arvai, Matthias Gnewuch","doi":"10.3790/CCM.52.1.115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3790/CCM.52.1.115","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":36966,"journal":{"name":"Credit and Capital Markets","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79036467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"New Chicago Views on Inflation Control: The Neo-Fisherian Approach and the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level","authors":"Peter Spahn","doi":"10.3790/ccm.52.1.69","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.52.1.69","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Whereas in former times, the ‘Chicago View’ in monetary policy stood for the Quantity Theory and money supply control, it is now the centre of unconventional approaches in macro theory. The Neo-Fisherian proposal suggests, in the case of low inflation and nominal interest rates pegged to the zero-lower bound, to increase policy rates immediately to the long-run equilibrium value that corresponds to the ‘natural’ real interest rate and the inflation target. The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level believes that goods prices jump to a level that validates the long-run sustainability condition of government debt even if central banks abstain from monetising. Both views are criticized for analytical and empirical reasons. Zusammenfassung Während in früheren Zeiten die ‘Chicago-Sicht’ in der Geldpolitik für die Quantitätstheorie und das Konzept der Geldmengensteuerung stand, werden heute damit unkonventionelle Positionen in der makroökonomischen Theorie assoziiert. Der neue Fisher-Ansatz empfiehlt, im Fall niedriger Inflation und einer Beschränkung durch die Null-Zins-Grenze die Zentralbankzinsen direkt auf das Niveau anzuheben, dass durch den ‘natürlichen’ Realzins und die Zielinflationsrate bestimmt ist. Die Fiskalische Theorie der Preise behauptet, dass das Güterpreisniveau auf einen Wert springt, der die langfristige reale Tragfähigkeit der Staatsschulden sichert, selbst wenn die Notenbank keine Monetisierung betreibt. Beide Positionen können empirisch nicht überzeugen und werden einer analytischen Kritik unterzogen. JEL Classification: E52, E58","PeriodicalId":36966,"journal":{"name":"Credit and Capital Markets","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76686079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital: Volume 52, Issue 1","authors":"","doi":"10.3790/ccm.52.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.52.1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36966,"journal":{"name":"Credit and Capital Markets","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43358617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What Can We Learn from the Real Bills Doctrine?","authors":"J. Tarkka","doi":"10.3790/CCM.52.1.89","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3790/CCM.52.1.89","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The historical development of bank liquidity doctrines is surveyed from the real bills doctrine and its antecedents to the present day. The underlying ideas of the succession of several dominant liquidity doctrines are analysed and compared, with attention to their historical contexts and respective weaknesses as exposed by experience. While the real bills doctrine is obsolete as such, its central idea that the liquidity of banks requires their credit to be linked to real income generation in the economy is unique among the different liquidity doctrines and can be useful as the liquidity regulation of banks is now subject to renewed interest. Zusammenfassung Der Artikel bietet einen Überblick über die historische Entwicklung von Theorien der Bankenliquidität seit der Real Bills Doktrin. Die den unterschiedlichen Liquiditätstheo­rien zugrundeliegenden Ideen werden analysiert und verglichen, mit besonderem Augenmerk auf ihren historischen Kontext und ihre jeweiligen Schwächen. Auch wenn die Real Bills Doktrin weitgehend überholt ist, so bleibt trotzdem ihre Kernidee, dass die Liquidität der Banken eine Koppelung der Bankkredite an die Schaffung realen Einkommens erfordert, einzigartig unter den verschiedenen Liquiditätsdoktrinen. In Zeiten ­eines erneuten Interesses an der Liquiditätsregulierung von Banken kann sich diese Idee als nützlich erweisen. JEL Classification: B12; B26; G21","PeriodicalId":36966,"journal":{"name":"Credit and Capital Markets","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81976134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Weltoffenes Warschau? – Informationen zur EFA-Jahrestagung 2018 in Warschau, Polen, und Vergleich des Publikationserfolgs für die DGF-Tagungen 2003 und 2015","authors":"W. Breuer","doi":"10.3790/CCM.52.1.127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3790/CCM.52.1.127","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":36966,"journal":{"name":"Credit and Capital Markets","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72418024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Conference Report on the 51. Radein Research Seminar “Monetary Policy: Current and Future Challenges”","authors":"Ansgar Prof. Dr. Belke, Malte Prof. Dr. Krueger","doi":"10.3790/ccm.51.4.507","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.51.4.507","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36966,"journal":{"name":"Credit and Capital Markets","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82537056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Swiss Sovereign Money Initiative","authors":"Katrin Assenmacher, Claus Brand","doi":"10.3790/ccm.51.4.621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.51.4.621","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract\u0000 On 10 June 2018, Switzerland voted against a constitutional amendment to introduce a system of sovereign money or Vollgeld. The proposal foresaw that all money be created by the central bank and that commercial banks be banned from creating demand deposits. Demand deposits would have been required to be held in off-balance sheet accounts at commercial banks. We discuss the specific features of this proposal and compare them to its historical predecessor, the Chicago plan. We argue that the Swiss initiative would not have tangibly enhanced financial, monetary, and economic stability. Specifically, if implemented earlier, it would not have addressed the root causes of the Global Financial Crisis and would have been ineffective in changing its course and its consequences for Switzerland. Though the Vollgeld proposal would have turned commercial bank into central bank money, close-money substitutes would likely have remained on the liability side of commercial bank balance sheets. Vollgeld would also unlikely have redeemed promises of ancillary effects such as a reduction in public debt, more sustainable economic growth, and less complex regulation. Forestalling and tackling financial imbalances requires limiting leverage and safeguarding liquidity buffers through bank-level and system-wide rules and regulation.\u0000 Zusammenfassung\u0000 Am 10. Juni 2018 lehnten drei Viertel der Schweizer Stimmberechtigten eine Verfassungsänderung ab, die ein Vollgeldsystem in der Schweiz eingeführt hätte. Der Vorschlag hätte der Notenbank das alleinige Recht zur Geldschöpfung gegeben und den Geschäftsbanken die Schaffung von Sichteinlagen verboten. Zahlungsverkehrskonten hätten von den Geschäftsbanken ausserhalb ihrer Bilanz geführt werden müssen. Wir diskutieren die Einzelheiten des Vorschlags und vergleichen sie mit dessen Vorgänger aus den 1930er Jahren, dem Chicago Plan. Wir argumentieren, dass sich die monetäre und wirtschaftliche Stabilität sowie die Finanzstabilität in der Schweiz durch die Annahme der Initiative nicht wesentlich verbessert hätten. Ein bestehendes Vollgeldsystem hätte nicht bei den Ursachen der Finanzkrise angesetzt und wäre unerheblich für ihren Verlauf und ihre Folgen für die Schweiz gewesen. Obwohl mit Vollgeld Sichteinlagen bei Geschäftsbanken in Zentralbankgeld umgewandelt worden wären, hätten geldnahe Einlagen auf der Passivseite der Bilanz weiter existiert. Vollgeld hätte auch Versprechen wie eine Senkung der Staatsverschuldung, ein nachhaltigeres Wachstum und eine weniger komplexe Bankenregulierung nicht erfüllt. Die Verhinderung und Bewältigung von finanziellen Ungleichgewichten erfordert eine Regulierung sowohl auf Bankenebene als auch für das Finanzsystem insgesamt, um die gesamtwirtschaftliche Verschuldung zu beschränken und Liquiditätspuffer zu schaffen.\u0000 JEL Classification: E42, E50","PeriodicalId":36966,"journal":{"name":"Credit and Capital Markets","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79971603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital: Volume 51, Issue 4","authors":"","doi":"10.3790/ccm.51.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.51.4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36966,"journal":{"name":"Credit and Capital Markets","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45915645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Money and Credit: Lessons of the Irish Bank Strike of 1970","authors":"M. Krueger","doi":"10.3790/CCM.51.4.645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3790/CCM.51.4.645","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract\u0000 In Ireland, there was a bank strike that led to a complete shut-down of the main part of the banking system from May to November 1970. The effects of this strike were surprisingly limited. This had led some observers to conclude that trade credit can easily substitute for bank deposits as a means of payment. In this paper, it is shown how cash and cheques were used as substitutes and complements allowing for “business as usual” for an extended period of time. This paper argues that such a situation would not have prevailed much longer. The lack of a proper settlement mechanism implied that risks were rising for almost all transactors. In order to contain risks the use of trade credit would have declined and economic performance would have deteriorated progressively.\u0000 Zusammenfassung\u0000 In Irland hat 1970 ein Streik der Bankangestellten dazu geführt, dass wesentliche Teile des Banksystems von Mai bis November geschlossen waren. Die Auswirkungen dieses Streiks waren erstaunlich gering. Dies hat einige Beobachter zu der Schlussfolgerung veranlasst, dass Bankeinlagen als Zahlungsmittel sehr leicht durch Handelskredit ersetzbar sind. In dem vorliegenden Beitrag wird gezeigt, wie Bargeld und Schecks sowohl als Substitute als auch als Komplemente einen weitgehend störungsfreien Fortgang des geschäftlichen Lebens ermöglicht haben. Es wird jedoch argumentiert, dass dieser Zustand nicht sehr viel länger Bestand gehabt hätte. Ohne die Verfügbarkeit eines Settlement-Mediums nahmen die Risiken aller am Wirtschaftsleben Beteiligten ständig zu. Im Laufe der Zeit hätte die Vergabe von Handelskredit zunehmend eingeschränkt werden müssen, um diese Risiken zu begrenzen. Eine solche Einschränkung hätte die wirtschaftliche Aktivität zunehmend belastet.\u0000 JEL Classification: E02, E59, G21, N14","PeriodicalId":36966,"journal":{"name":"Credit and Capital Markets","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85439320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}