Operations Strategy eJournal最新文献_第8页

Medco's Transition to a Transparent Business Model Medco向透明商业模式的转变

Operations Strategy eJournal Pub Date : 2006-09-05 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2849276

L. Abrams

引用次数: 3

ERP System and Implementation-Process Benefits: Implications for B2B E-Procurement ERP系统和实施过程效益:对B2B电子采购的启示

Operations Strategy eJournal Pub Date : 2005-04-01 DOI: 10.1108/01443570510585516

E. Bendoly, T. Schoenherr

引用次数: 145

An Asymptotic Analysis of Hierarchical Control of Manufacturing Systems Under Uncertainty 不确定条件下制造系统层次控制的渐近分析

Operations Strategy eJournal Pub Date : 1991-08-01 DOI: 10.1287/moor.16.3.596

J. Lehoczky, S. Sethi, H. Soner, M. Taksar

引用次数: 70

A Bargaining Framework in Supply Chains (The Assembly Problem) 供应链中的议价框架(装配问题)

Operations Strategy eJournal Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1021602

M. Nagarajan, Y. Bassok

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引用次数: 5

Supply Chain Management 供应链管理

Operations Strategy eJournal Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2758860

Lauren Xiaoyuan Lu, Jayashankar M. Swaminathan

引用次数: 4