{"title":"Eliminating formal flows in automated information flow analysis","authors":"S. T. Eckmann","doi":"10.1109/RISP.1994.296594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RISP.1994.296594","url":null,"abstract":"Automated flow tools for formal specification languages have the potential to increase assurance and productivity of covert channel analysts by automating much of the work, but they are not reaching that potential now. Perhaps the most serious flaw in existing flow tools is that they typically report large numbers of so-called formal flows. The paper examines the causes of formal flows and describes a technique for eliminating many of them. The result is more practical automated flow analysis. The paper describes an extension for eliminating the formal flows identified by T. Fine (1992), as the major flaw in the ft-policy, and a technique for implementing the extended ft-policy in flow tools. The technique uses a construct called an opaque definition, which is essentially a hint from the specification writer to the flow tool, suggesting semantic information that might be useful in the flow analysis.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":361305,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of 1994 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116634059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Collecting garbage in multilevel secure object stores","authors":"E. Bertino, L. Mancini, S. Jajodia","doi":"10.1109/RISP.1994.296588","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RISP.1994.296588","url":null,"abstract":"This paper addresses the problem of garbage collection in persistent object stores that are multilevel. The proposed approach is able to preserve referential integrity, while ensuring that security is not violated. we first discuss some general principles that should underlie any approach to garbage collection in secure environments. Then, we present a secure garbage collection algorithm, based on the copying approach.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":361305,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of 1994 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121209219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ensuring data security in interrelated tabular data","authors":"Ram Kumar","doi":"10.1109/RISP.1994.296589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RISP.1994.296589","url":null,"abstract":"Several service agencies including government organizations are engaged in publishing tabular economic data. On the one hand, it is desirable to publish as much data as possible, for use by the public. On the other hand, it is necessary to ensure that confidential data is not divulged. Cell suppression is a popular method that is used for this purpose. Earlier research has focused on cell suppression at the level of individual tables. We present a method that considers interrelationships between tables while attempting to ensure data confidentiality. The method is general enough to be applied to tables with different geometrical structures, and accommodates different cell suppression procedures at the table level.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":361305,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of 1994 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126134136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Elimination of inference channels by optimal upgrading","authors":"M. Stickel","doi":"10.1109/RISP.1994.296583","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RISP.1994.296583","url":null,"abstract":"An inference channel exists if it is possible for a low-clearance user to infer high-classification data from low-classification data. Inference channels can be blocked by upgrading the security classification of some of the low-level data. The task of eliminating inference channels is formulated for solution by the Davis-Putnam theorem-proving procedure. The procedure is augmented to search for solutions with minimum total upgrade cost.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":361305,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of 1994 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116742766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A low cost, high speed encryption system and method","authors":"G. Mayhew","doi":"10.1109/RISP.1994.296585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RISP.1994.296585","url":null,"abstract":"Multiple independent binary bit streams per clock cycle are produced from a single underlying shift register based keystream generator with multiple combining circuits. Logic designs are derived from de Bruijn functions. Multiplicity of keystream facilitates using just a single cryptographic device to support high speed, large quantity data transfers over networks. Low cost implementations are also possible since the underlying algorithm operates at some fraction of the network data rate. Empirical tests indicate the keystream satisfies many statistical randomness metrics.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":361305,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of 1994 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130666593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Extending the schematic protection model. I. Conditional tickets and authentication","authors":"V. Varadharajan, Claudio Calvelli","doi":"10.1109/RISP.1994.296579","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RISP.1994.296579","url":null,"abstract":"The Schematic Protection Model, SPM, allows us to specify the protection structure of a system and gives an algorithm to reason about the transmission of privileges in the system. This paper extends the SPM model to include for conditional tickets and to provide authentication. We also extend the decision algorithm of the safety problem to take into account these modifications.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":361305,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of 1994 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy","volume":"207 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114652011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inference channel-free integrity constraints in multilevel relational databases","authors":"Xiaolei Qian","doi":"10.1109/RISP.1994.296584","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RISP.1994.296584","url":null,"abstract":"A multilevel relational database with tuple-level labeling is a relational database together with a mapping, which associates a set of levels in a security lattice with every tuple in every relation in the database. Integrity constraints represent the invariant properties of data in a multilevel relational database. We study the relationship between integrity and secrecy, and show that they are not necessarily in fundamental conflict. We identify common classes of constraints whose enforcement is free of both static and dynamic inference channels. We also extend the integrity checking mechanism by proper update semantics to remove dynamic inference channels in the enforcement of more general classes of constraints.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":361305,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of 1994 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130556201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Simple timing channels","authors":"I. S. Moskowitz, Allen R. Miller","doi":"10.1109/RISP.1994.296592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RISP.1994.296592","url":null,"abstract":"We discuss the different ways of defining channel capacity for certain types of illicit communication channels. We also correct some errors from the literature, offer new proofs of some historical results, and give bounds for channel capacity. Special function techniques are employed to express the results in closed form. We are interested in a specific type of covert channel, a timing channel. A timing channel exists if it is possible for High to interfere with the system response time to an input by Low. Therefore, a timing channel is a communication channel where the output alphabet is constructed from different time values. However, the thrust of the paper is the analysis of timing channels that are discrete, memoryless, and noiseless. We call such a timing channel a simple timing channel (STC).<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":361305,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of 1994 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134300348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A general theory of composition for trace sets closed under selective interleaving functions","authors":"J. McLean","doi":"10.1109/RISP.1994.296590","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RISP.1994.296590","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a general theory of system composition for \"possibilistic\" security properties. We see that these properties fall outside of the Alpern-Schneider safety/liveness domain and hence, are not subject to the Abadi-Lamport composition principle. We then introduce a set of trace constructors called selective interleaving functions and show that possibilistic security properties are closure properties with respect to different classes of selective interleaving functions. This provides a uniform framework for analyzing these properties and allows us to construct a partial ordering for them. We present a number of composition constructs, show the extent to which each preserves closure with respect to different classes of selective interleaving functions, and show that they are sufficient for forming the general hook-up construction. We see that although closure under a class of selective interleaving functions is generally preserved by product and cascading, it is not generally preserved by feedback, internal system, composition constructs, or refinement. We examine the reason for this.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":361305,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of 1994 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy","volume":"862 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122264226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the minimality of testing for rights in transformation models","authors":"R. Sandhu, Srinivas Ganta","doi":"10.1109/RISP.1994.296578","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RISP.1994.296578","url":null,"abstract":"Defines and analyzes a family of access control models, called transformation models, which are based on the concept of transformation of rights. In these models, propagation of access rights is authorized entirely by existing rights for the object in question. Transformation models are useful for expressing various kinds of consistency, confidentiality, and integrity controls. These models also generalize the monotonic transform model of Sandhu, and its non-monotonic extension (NMT) by Sandhu and Suri. The authors argue that NMT is inadequate for expressing the document release example discussed by Sandhu and Suri, because it can test only one access matrix cell in its state changing commands. They then analyze the relative expressive power of testing two access matrix cells in state changing commands versus testing more than two. The conclusion is that it suffices to allow testing for two cells.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":361305,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of 1994 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125052780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}