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Extrapolation and Cognitive Dissonance in the Market for Credit Risk 信用风险市场的外推与认知失调
CSN: Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3740487
Arben Kita
{"title":"Extrapolation and Cognitive Dissonance in the Market for Credit Risk","authors":"Arben Kita","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3740487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3740487","url":null,"abstract":"A measure of heterogeneous beliefs based on the high-frequency credit market information is associated with an increase in the firm's debt issuance and investments and a decrease in the cost of debt the following month. Inferring an elevated credit-market belief as investors' optimistic outlook on firms' prospects predicts future credit returns. Expectations move with the leverage (\"moneyness\") levels and correlate with risk factors. The existence of predictable mean reversion in credit market conditions reinforces these results.","PeriodicalId":360616,"journal":{"name":"CSN: Economics (Topic)","volume":"110 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133631302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Engagement in Earnings Conference Calls 参与财报电话会议
CSN: Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-07-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3329077
Kristina Rennekamp, Mani Sethuraman, Blake A. Steenhoven
{"title":"Engagement in Earnings Conference Calls","authors":"Kristina Rennekamp, Mani Sethuraman, Blake A. Steenhoven","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3329077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3329077","url":null,"abstract":"Research on earnings conference calls documents that the question and answer (Q&A) portion is informative to market participants. However, prior studies on earnings calls focus on the attributes of managers and analysts individually. In this study, we use the interaction itself as our unit of analysis, and examine whether conversational engagement between managers and analysts in earnings calls is informative to market participants. Using a controlled experiment, we first demonstrate that linguistic style matching (LSM), a form of verbal coordination, is a reasonable proxy for conversational engagement. We further demonstrate using an additional quasi-experiment that investors respond to differences in engagement. Finally, using a unique hand-collected archival dataset comprised of audio recordings and textual transcripts from over 2,400 earnings calls, we show that LSM in manager-analyst conversations during the Q&A portion of earnings calls is positively associated with absolute stock returns during the conversation, suggesting that interactions with greater engagement are more informative to capital market participants.","PeriodicalId":360616,"journal":{"name":"CSN: Economics (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125258584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Being up Front about Income Inequality 直面收入不平等
CSN: Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-01-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3515349
B. Hill
{"title":"Being up Front about Income Inequality","authors":"B. Hill","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3515349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3515349","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes universal provision of information about the income inequality involved in the creation of a good as a means of moderating income inequality. Existing evidence suggests that a section of the population would be willing to pay more for goods whose production involves less excessive income inequality. We show, on a simple model, that supplying inequality information to such a population under competitive markets will in general lead to a reduction in global income inequality. The effect will be stronger the more inequality averse the population. Moreover, the outcome will be socially efficient. Possibilities for (de-centralized) implementation are also discussed.","PeriodicalId":360616,"journal":{"name":"CSN: Economics (Topic)","volume":"123 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116275356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lying in Two Dimensions 躺在二维空间里
CSN: Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-10-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3381277
Diogo Geraldes, Franziska Heinicke, S. Rosenkranz
{"title":"Lying in Two Dimensions","authors":"Diogo Geraldes, Franziska Heinicke, S. Rosenkranz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3381277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3381277","url":null,"abstract":"The expanding literature on lying has exclusively considered lying behavior within a one-dimensional context. While this has been an important first step, many real-world contexts involve the possibility of simultaneously lying in more than one dimension (e.g., reporting one’s income and expenses in a tax declaration). In this paper, we experimentally investigate individual lying behavior in both one- and two-dimensional contexts to understand whether the multi-dimensionality of a decision affects lying behavior. In the one-dimensional treatment, participants are asked to roll two dice in one hand and to report the sum of both dice. In the two-dimensional treatment, participants are asked to roll two dice at the same time, but one in each hand, and to report the two dice separately. Our paper provides the first evidence regarding lying behavior in a multi-dimensional context. Using a two-dimensional die-roll task, we show that participants lie partially between dimensions, which results in greater overreporting of the lower outcome die. These findings suggest a thought-provoking policy to tackle the infamous societal challenge of tax fraud: Tax report checks should focus on the item(s) for which a taxpayer profile hints at higher self-benefits in case of misreporting.","PeriodicalId":360616,"journal":{"name":"CSN: Economics (Topic)","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121395485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Effect of Social Information in the Dictator Game with a Taking Option 社会信息在带有选择的独裁者博弈中的作用
CSN: Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-07-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3428449
T. O’Garra, V. Capraro, P. Kujal
{"title":"The Effect of Social Information in the Dictator Game with a Taking Option","authors":"T. O’Garra, V. Capraro, P. Kujal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3428449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3428449","url":null,"abstract":"We experimentally study how redistribution choices are affected by positive and negative information regarding the behaviour of a previous participant in a dictator game with a taking option. We use the strategy method to identify behavioural ‘types’, and thus distinguish ‘conformists’ from ‘counter-conformists’, and unconditional choosers. Unconditional choosers make up the greatest proportion of types (about 80%) while only about 20% of subjects condition their responses to social information. We find that both conformity and counter-conformity are driven by a desire to be seen as moral (the ‘symbolization’ dimension of moral identity). The main difference is that, conformity is also driven by a sensitivity to what others think (‘attention to social comparison’). Unconditional giving (about 30% of players) on the other hand is mainly driven by the centrality of moral identity to the self (the ‘internalization' dimension of moral identity). Social information thus seems to mainly affect those who care about being seen to be moral. The direction of effect however depends on how sensitive one is to what others think.","PeriodicalId":360616,"journal":{"name":"CSN: Economics (Topic)","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127088230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Majority Rule or Dictatorship? The Role of Collective-Choice Rules in Resolving Social Dilemmas with Endogenous Institutions 多数人统治还是独裁?集体选择规则在内生制度下解决社会困境中的作用
CSN: Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-04-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3379647
Manwei Liu, Eline van der Heijden
{"title":"Majority Rule or Dictatorship? The Role of Collective-Choice Rules in Resolving Social Dilemmas with Endogenous Institutions","authors":"Manwei Liu, Eline van der Heijden","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3379647","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3379647","url":null,"abstract":"Collective-choice rules aggregate individual choices into a group choice. This study addresses the role of collective-choice rules in a social dilemma situation in which group members can repeatedly choose a combination of institutions to achieve self-governance. Specifically, we investigate three collectivechoice rules: majority voting, dictatorship and rotating dictatorship. We identify a direct and an indirect channel through which collective-choice rules may affect groups’ behavior and performance in the game. Our main findings are: (1) In terms of the direct effects, there is no evidence of a “democracy premium\" (i.e., cooperation level is higher under the institutions chosen via a democratic rule than when the same institutions are chosen via a non-democratic rule). (2) In terms of the indirect effects, institutional choices produced by a fixed dictator are more stable than produced by rotating dictators. (3) Overall, groups with a fixed dictator earn the highest payoffs.","PeriodicalId":360616,"journal":{"name":"CSN: Economics (Topic)","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130699506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal Exit Time from Casino Gambling: Strategies of Pre-Committed and Naive Gamblers 赌场赌博的最佳退出时间:预承诺和幼稚赌徒的策略
CSN: Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-03-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2684043
X. He, Sang Hu, J. Obłój, X. Zhou
{"title":"Optimal Exit Time from Casino Gambling: Strategies of Pre-Committed and Naive Gamblers","authors":"X. He, Sang Hu, J. Obłój, X. Zhou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2684043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2684043","url":null,"abstract":"We employ the casino gambling model in He et al (2015) (available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2534936) to study the strategies of a pre-committed gambler, who commits her future selves to the strategy she sets up today, and of a naive gambler, who fails to do so and thus keeps changing plans at every time. We identify conditions under which the pre-committed gambler, asymptotically, adopts a stop-loss strategy, exhibits the behavior of disposition effect, or does not exit. For a specific parameter setting when the utility function is piece-wise power and the probability weighting functions are concave power, we derive the optimal strategy of the pre-committed gambler in closed-form whenever it exists. Finally, we study the actual behavior of the naive gambler and highlight its marked differences from that of the pre-committed gambler.The appendices for this paper are available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2682637","PeriodicalId":360616,"journal":{"name":"CSN: Economics (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123923788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
The Nature of Excessive Behavior (ISRAF) in the Islamic Economic Framework 伊斯兰经济框架中过度行为的本质
CSN: Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-03-17 DOI: 10.35609/jber.2019.4.1(6)
Zein Muttaqin
{"title":"The Nature of Excessive Behavior (ISRAF) in the Islamic Economic Framework","authors":"Zein Muttaqin","doi":"10.35609/jber.2019.4.1(6)","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35609/jber.2019.4.1(6)","url":null,"abstract":"Objective - The objective of this paper is to unfold the nature of excessive behavior in the Islamic economics framework.\u0000\u0000Methodology/Technique - This is a library research based on the various studies that specifically discuss excessive behavior and Islamic consumer behavior. The study uses a rating system to identify the relevance of content to the study and analyze content analysis.\u0000\u0000Findings - The nature of excessive behavior is condemned by Islam and is fully agreed upon by Muslim scholars. The extent of excessive behavior is not limited to certain levels of consumption. The Muslim consumer may unaware of doing the practice under the influence of a particular setting, where the pleasure of the practice is felt temporarily.\u0000\u0000Novelty - This study clarifies the terminology and nature of excessive behavior, which is unclear in previous studies conducted by Muslim scholars.\u0000\u0000Type of Paper: Review.\u0000\u0000Keywords: Excessive Behavior; Islamic Economics; Consumer Behavior; Miscellaneous.\u0000\u0000JEL Classification: A13, D01, P40, Y80\u0000\u0000DOI: https://doi.org/10.35609/jber.2019.4.1(6)","PeriodicalId":360616,"journal":{"name":"CSN: Economics (Topic)","volume":"118 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129924253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Schmeduling Heuristic, Financial Literacy and Rural Students’ Willingness to Study 计划启发式、金融素养与农村学生学习意愿
CSN: Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-03-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3346419
Cheng Yuan, Li Lin, Xiaoxiao Wang
{"title":"Schmeduling Heuristic, Financial Literacy and Rural Students’ Willingness to Study","authors":"Cheng Yuan, Li Lin, Xiaoxiao Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3346419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3346419","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the effect of rural students’ understanding of education investment on their willingness to study from the perspective of financial literacy. We set up a two-period model of human capital investment to show how schmeduling induces students with poor financial literacy to deviate their study effort from the optimal level. We employ the “ironing heuristic” approach to model students’ cognitive bias and misperception of education investment. Using a survey data collected in four rural junior middle schools in Southwest China, we then provide empirical evidences on it. We measure students’ willingness to remain in education in three aspects, namely their self-assessed opportunity costs of schooling, preference for saving for future education, and recognition of economic return to education. Our empirical study reveals a close correlation between rural students’ understanding of the philosophy of investment and their willingness to study. Specifically, knowledge of personal financing is significantly positively correlated with students’ self-assessed opportunity costs of attending school as well as their recognition of returns to education. Our findings suggest that improving students’ financial literacy, particularly with respect to the knowledge of money management, will foster their understanding of human capital investment, reinforce their incentive to invest time and efforts in study, and enhance their competency to make rational decisions of education.","PeriodicalId":360616,"journal":{"name":"CSN: Economics (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125255625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Investor Motivations and Decision Criteria in Equity Crowdfunding 股权众筹中的投资者动机与决策标准
CSN: Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-02-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3263434
Anna Lukkarinen, J. Wallenius, T. Seppälä
{"title":"Investor Motivations and Decision Criteria in Equity Crowdfunding","authors":"Anna Lukkarinen, J. Wallenius, T. Seppälä","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3263434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3263434","url":null,"abstract":"Online equity crowdfunding is a novel form of entrepreneurial finance, through which ventures can sell shares to large numbers of small investors. We analyze the motivations and decision criteria of equity crowdfunding investors using responses to a large-scale survey. We find, first, that investors form three distinct motivation-based clusters: donation-oriented supporters, return-oriented supporters, and pure investors. Second, investors use five main investment decision criterion factors: campaign specifications, target attractiveness, familiarity, campaign scale, and personal acquaintances. Third, investors’ decision criteria are related to their motivations. The results contribute to literature on entrepreneurship and new venture financing.","PeriodicalId":360616,"journal":{"name":"CSN: Economics (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131368523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
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