{"title":"The Duties of Immigrants and the Controversy Over Face Veils","authors":"G. D. Muzio","doi":"10.5840/ijap20201230136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ijap20201230136","url":null,"abstract":"The passing of the French law that prohibits face coverings, such as the Islamic burqa, in public places ignited a complex philosophical and legal debate. Participants in the debate have typically focused on the boundaries between individual and religious liberties, on the one hand, and state-imposed limitations on public behaviors, on the other. The author of this paper wishes to introduce a change in perspective by concentrating instead on the duties immigrants have to the citizens of the countries that host them. The author finds that, under certain circumstances, immigrants may have a moral duty to conform to the ethical preferences of the communities they have come to live and interact with.","PeriodicalId":35847,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"34 1","pages":"1-17"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43216331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Will Autonomous Vehicles Eliminate a Right to Drive?","authors":"J. Kranak","doi":"10.5840/ijap20201217134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ijap20201217134","url":null,"abstract":"In the future, autonomous vehicles are predicted to be much safer than current vehicles and affordable enough for all vehicle owners. At such a point, should we still allow people to manually drive non-autonomous vehicles? Can we say people who want to drive have a right to drive? In this paper, we first attempt a deontological justification of a right to drive, by trying to derive the right from more uncontroversial rights, like the right to freedom of movement, but fail. Looking at the right on consequentialist grounds, both in terms of paternalistic justifications of denying the right and the externalities caused by manual driving, we are able to justify a right to drive. However, the externalities caused by manual driving (especially the risks imposed on non-drivers and the property damage) are enough to limit this right to drive to non-public roads.","PeriodicalId":35847,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"34 1","pages":"43-55"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49632817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is Non-Suicidal Self-Harm in Youth a Mental Disorder?","authors":"Snita Ahir-Knight","doi":"10.5840/IJAP2021127141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/IJAP2021127141","url":null,"abstract":"Non-suicidal self-harm is common in youth. The behavior may have negative and sometimes dangerous consequences, such as feelings of guilt, scars, nerve damage and accidental death. Is this behavior a mental disorder? This question is attracting serious consideration. I want to say that non-suicidal self-harm in youth is never a mental disorder in its own right. Yet, I do not want to commit to saying what is a mental disorder. So I identify the characteristic features and functions of non-suicidal self-harm in youth and show that these features and functions are also seen in non-disordered behaviors in youth. This, I say, shows that non-suicidal self-harm in youth is non-disordered too. I say that non-suicidal self-harm in youth is a characteristic youth behavior that when seen in youth has an understandable practical function. I offer to the general discussion about mental disorder the strategy I use.","PeriodicalId":35847,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"34 1","pages":"57-71"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43051429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Doing Wrong to ‘Lulu’ and ‘Nana’? Applying Parfit to the He Jiankui Experiment","authors":"N. Swazo","doi":"10.5840/IJAP2021118140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/IJAP2021118140","url":null,"abstract":"In November 2018, Dr. He Jiankui announced the birth of two baby girls born through the use of in vitro fertilization technology and the use of the gene-editing tool CRISPR-Cas9. There has been nigh uniform international condemnation of the clinical trial for violating international norms governing genomic research, especially research in human embryos that has implications for the germline. At issue also is the question whether the parents and the clinical research team harmed, and therefore wronged, the two girls. Here this question is engaged through application of the reasoning Derek Parfit has provided on the non-identity problem. One concludes that on this reasoning the parents are not morally culpable on that argument, although there is other reasoning that is to be considered to resist the Parfitian conclusion.","PeriodicalId":35847,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"34 1","pages":"157-170"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41762216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Virtues for the Vocation of Politics","authors":"Hilliard Aronovitch","doi":"10.5840/ijap20201210132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ijap20201210132","url":null,"abstract":"This article aims to rebut the claim about Dirty Hands (DH) in politics and reorient the issue. Allegedly, decent politicians must sometimes do what is right by means that are deeply wrong and they are morally tainted as a result. DH is here rejected as contradictory since there can be no dirtying or guilt given the presumption of ultimate rightness, and politics is demeaned by supposing otherwise. DH is not entailed by moral complexity or conflicting duties or circumstantial regret, and does not hinge on utilitarianism versus deontology. A significant real-world case is explored where DH might seem manifest but is not. With DH dissolved, the refocussed and urgent question involves discerning apt personality-types for politics and its hard cases. The ideal: persons exceptional in being morally conscientious but more tough-minded than tender-hearted.","PeriodicalId":35847,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"34 1","pages":"73-88"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43340748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Undocumented Immigrants, Healthcare, and the Language of Desert","authors":"B. Manninen","doi":"10.5840/IJAP2021112138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/IJAP2021112138","url":null,"abstract":"Arguments both in favor and against including undocumented immigrants in healthcare reform abound. However, many of these arguments, including ones that are favorable towards immigrants, are ethically problematic, and for the same reason; namely, that they either support or deny the inclusion of undocumented immigrants in healthcare reform based on their perceived level of desert, due to their alleged contribution to our social utility, or lack thereof. This encourages gauging the lives and worth of undocumented immigrants in terms of their productivity or output, rather than viewing them as intrinsically valuable human beings. This, in turn, contributes to the instrumentalization of undocumented immigrants’ welfare; for even arguments in favor of including them in healthcare reform encourage viewing them as, in Kantian language, mere means instead of ends in themselves. In this paper, I will be critical of arguments that either seek to exclude or include undocumented immigrants from healthcare reform or access based on social utility and will, instead, champion arguments in favor of inclusion that rely on fostering a sense of solidarity and identification amongst citizens and migrants.","PeriodicalId":35847,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"34 1","pages":"19-30"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44164960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Ethics and Politics of Blood Plasma Donation","authors":"J. Taylor","doi":"10.5840/IJAP2021127142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/IJAP2021127142","url":null,"abstract":"Legal prohibitions on the financial compensation of donors are frequently justified by appealing either to concerns about patient safety or to concerns about the putatively unethical nature of such compensation. But jurisdictions that legally prohibit the financial compensation of donors routinely import plasma that has been collected from financially compensated donors—and they do so knowing its origins. I outline some possible ways in which this puzzle could be resolved and find them all wanting. Focusing on Canada I draw upon public documents to explain how many provinces came to have its apparently puzzling approach to plasma procurement. I then argue that the actions of those who support this approach to plasma procurement are immoral.","PeriodicalId":35847,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"34 1","pages":"89-103"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41553617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Should Humanitarians be Heroes?","authors":"J. Edwards","doi":"10.5840/IJAP2021413152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/IJAP2021413152","url":null,"abstract":"Humanitarian aid workers typically reject the accolade of hero as both untrue and undesirable. Untrue when they claim not to be acting beyond the call of duty, and undesirable so far as celebrating heroism risks elevating “heroic” choices over safer, and perhaps wiser ones. However, this leaves unresolved a tension between the denial of heroism and a sense in which certain humanitarian acts really appear heroic. And, the concern that in rejecting the aspiration to heroism an opportunity is lost to inspire more and better humanitarian action. Having set out this problem in more detail in Part I, the argument in Part II will suggest that a virtue ethics approach to humanitarian moral obligations can make good sense of our intuitions concerning the role of heroism in humanitarian action. In Part III I will argue that at least “professional” humanitarians, instead of rejecting heroism, should aim to be heroes, in the sense of displaying a virtue of humanity in high-stakes contexts, because this is consistent with the aim of humanitarian action. Finally, some lingering problems of demandingness and motivation are considered.","PeriodicalId":35847,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71211197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can Humans Find Security in Augmented and Virtual Realities?","authors":"E. Cohen","doi":"10.5840/ijap20201210133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ijap20201210133","url":null,"abstract":"Logic-Based Therapy (LBT), a mode of philosophical counseling I invented beginning in the mid 1980s, under the auspices of Cognitive Behavior Therapy (CBT) founder Albert Ellis, takes metaphysical security (security about reality itself) as a sin qua non for human happiness. The goal of LBT is to help people overcome irrational thinking that leads to metaphysical insecurity and to help build constructive, philosophical thinking that promotes metaphysical security. However, the advent of augmented and digital reality are beginning to present new challenges to obtaining metaphysical security. Applying the tenets of LBT, this paper examines the implications for attaining metaphysical security in this brave new world of advancing technologies.","PeriodicalId":35847,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"34 1","pages":"31-41"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71210088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Love is Independent of Moral Responsibility","authors":"Stephen Kershnar","doi":"10.5840/ijap20201217135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ijap20201217135","url":null,"abstract":"A concern that accompanies the recognition that people are not morally responsible is how this affects our relationships. In particular, there is concern as to whether the absence of these things eliminates or lessens love. Love is relevant on some of the most plausible theories of well-being. In particular, it might be thought to cause pleasure and fulfill desires and thus bring about well-being on hedonist and desire-fulfillment theories of well-being. It might also be included on the objective list of things that make someone’s life go better independent of pleasure and desire-fulfillment. In this article, I argue for the Intense Pro-Attitude Theory, specifically, that love is a disjunctive combination of intense affective, cognitive, intentional, and valuational pro-attitudes that focus on something’s well-being. If this account is correct, then love is empirically and conceptually independent of moral responsibility. Hence, love is independent of moral responsibility.","PeriodicalId":35847,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"158 1","pages":"137-155"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71210210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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