{"title":"Selection on Welfare Gains: Experimental Evidence from Electricity Plan Choice","authors":"Koichiro Ito, Takanori Ida, Makoto Tanaka","doi":"10.1257/aer.20210150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210150","url":null,"abstract":"We study a problem in which policymakers need to screen self-selected individuals by unobserved heterogeneity in social welfare gains from a policy intervention. In our framework, the marginal treatment effects and marginal treatment responses arise as key statistics to characterize social welfare. We apply this framework to a randomized field experiment on electricity plan choice. Consumers were offered welfare-improving dynamic pricing with randomly assigned take-up incentives. We find that price-elastic consumers—who generate larger welfare gains—are more likely to self-select. Our counterfactual simulations quantify the optimal take-up incentives that exploit observed and unobserved heterogeneity in selection and welfare gains. (JEL C93, D12, L11, L94, L98)","PeriodicalId":358465,"journal":{"name":"The American Economic Review","volume":"109 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135220792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is There a VA Advantage? Evidence from Dually Eligible Veterans","authors":"David C. Chan, David Card, Lowell Taylor","doi":"10.1257/aer.20211638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211638","url":null,"abstract":"We study public versus private provision of health care for veterans aged 65 and older who may receive care provided by the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and in private hospitals financed by Medicare. Utilizing the ambulance design of Doyle et al. (2015), we find that the VA reduces 28-day mortality by 46 percent (4.5 per centage points) and that these survival gains are persistent. The VA also reduces 28-day spending by 21 percent and delivers strikingly different reported services relative to private hospitals. We find suggestive evidence of complementarities between continuity of care, health IT, and integrated care. (JEL H51, I11, I12, I18, J14)","PeriodicalId":358465,"journal":{"name":"The American Economic Review","volume":"120 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135217611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abel Brodeur, Scott Carrell, David Figlio, Lester Lusher
{"title":"Unpacking p-Hacking and Publication Bias","authors":"Abel Brodeur, Scott Carrell, David Figlio, Lester Lusher","doi":"10.1257/aer.20210795","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210795","url":null,"abstract":"We use unique data from journal submissions to identify and unpack publication bias and p-hacking. We find initial submissions display significant bunching, suggesting the distribution among published statistics cannot be fully attributed to a publication bias in peer review. Desk-rejected manuscripts display greater heaping than those sent for review; i.e., marginally significant results are more likely to be desk rejected. Reviewer recommendations, in contrast, are positively associated with statistical significance. Overall, the peer review process has little effect on the distribution of test statistics. Lastly, we track rejected papers and present evidence that the prevalence of publication biases is perhaps not as prominent as feared. (JEL A11, A14, C13, L82)","PeriodicalId":358465,"journal":{"name":"The American Economic Review","volume":"44 8-9","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135161041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Sufficient Statistics Approach for Macro Policy","authors":"Régis Barnichon, Geert Mesters","doi":"10.1257/aer.20220581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20220581","url":null,"abstract":"The evaluation of macroeconomic policy decisions has traditionally relied on the formulation of a specific economic model. In this work, we show that two statistics are sufficient to detect, often even correct, nonoptimal policies, i.e., policies that do not minimize the loss function. The two sufficient statistics are (i) forecasts for the policy objectives conditional on the policy choice and (ii) the impulse responses of the policy objectives to policy shocks. Both statistics can be estimated without relying on a specific structural economic model. We illustrate the method by studying US monetary policy decisions. (JEL E24, E31, E32, E43, E52, E58)","PeriodicalId":358465,"journal":{"name":"The American Economic Review","volume":"120 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135217612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Nageeb Ali, B. Douglas Bernheim, Alexander W. Bloedel, Silvia Console Battilana
{"title":"Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Legislature","authors":"S. Nageeb Ali, B. Douglas Bernheim, Alexander W. Bloedel, Silvia Console Battilana","doi":"10.1257/aer.20221578","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20221578","url":null,"abstract":"We model legislative decision-making with an agenda setter who can propose policies sequentially, tailoring each proposal to the status quo that prevails after prior votes. Voters are sophisticated, and the agenda setter cannot commit to future proposals. Nevertheless, the agenda setter obtains her favorite outcome in every equilibrium regardless of the initial default policy. Central to our results is a new condition on preferences, manipulability, that holds in rich policy spaces, including spatial settings and distribution problems. Our findings therefore establish that, despite the sophistication of voters and the absence of commitment power, the agenda setter is effectively a dictator. (JEL D71, D72, D78)","PeriodicalId":358465,"journal":{"name":"The American Economic Review","volume":"97 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135222156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Philippe Aghion, Antonin Bergeaud, John Van Reenen
{"title":"The Impact of Regulation on Innovation","authors":"Philippe Aghion, Antonin Bergeaud, John Van Reenen","doi":"10.1257/aer.20210107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210107","url":null,"abstract":"We present a framework that can be used to assess the equilibrium impact of regulation on endogenous innovation with heterogeneous firms. We implement this model using French firm-level panel data, where there is a sharp increase in the burden of labor regulations on companies with 50 or more employees. Consistent with the model’s qualitative predictions, we find a fall in the fraction of innovating firms just to the left of the regulatory threshold. Furthermore, we find a reduction in the innovation response of firms to demand shocks just below the threshold. Regulation reduces aggregate innovation by 5.7 percent. (JEL D22, K31, L11, L25, L51, O31, O34)","PeriodicalId":358465,"journal":{"name":"The American Economic Review","volume":"121 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135217606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Beyond Teachers: Estimating Individual School Counselors’ Effects on Educational Attainment","authors":"Christine Mulhern","doi":"10.1257/aer.20200847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200847","url":null,"abstract":"Counselors are a common school resource for students navigating complicated and consequential education choices. I estimate counselors’ causal effects using quasi-random assignment policies in Massachusetts. Counselors vary substantially in their effectiveness at increasing high school graduation and college attendance, selectivity, and persistence. Counselor effects on educational attainment are similar in magnitude to teacher effects, but they flow through improved information and assistance more than cognitive or noncognitive skill development. Counselor effectiveness is most important for low-income and low-achieving students, so improving access to effective counseling may be a promising way to increase educational attainment and close socioeconomic gaps in education. (JEL H75, I21, I24, I28)","PeriodicalId":358465,"journal":{"name":"The American Economic Review","volume":"89 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135222194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Measuring Upward Mobility","authors":"Debraj Ray, Garance Genicot","doi":"10.1257/aer.20220316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20220316","url":null,"abstract":"We conceptualize and measure upward mobility over income or wealth. At the core of our exercise is the Growth Progressivity Axiom: transfers of instantaneous growth rates from relatively rich to poor individuals increases upward mobility. This axiom, along with mild auxiliary restrictions, identifies an “upward mobility kernel” with a single free parameter, in which mobility is linear in individual growth rates, with geometrically declining weights on baseline incomes. We extend this kernel to trajectories over intervals. The analysis delivers an upward mobility index that does not rely on panel data. That significantly expands our analytical scope to data-poor settings. (JEL D31, D63, I32, O15, O40)","PeriodicalId":358465,"journal":{"name":"The American Economic Review","volume":"56 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136102420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu, Philipp Strack, Mengxi Zhang
{"title":"Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses, and Adverse Selection","authors":"Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu, Philipp Strack, Mengxi Zhang","doi":"10.1257/aer.20221247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20221247","url":null,"abstract":"We study a generalization of the classical monopoly insurance problem under adverse selection (see Stiglitz 1977) where we allow for a random distribution of losses, possibly correlated with the agent’s risk parameter that is private information. Our model explains patterns of observed customer behavior and predicts insurance contracts most often observed in practice: these consist of menus of several deductible-premium pairs or menus of insurance with coverage limits–premium pairs. A main departure from the classical insurance literature is obtained here by endowing the agents with risk-averse preferences that can be represented by a dual utility functional (Yaari 1987). (JEL D81, D82, D86, D91, G22)","PeriodicalId":358465,"journal":{"name":"The American Economic Review","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135324807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}