ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control最新文献

{"title":"Decentralized user-role assignment for Web-based intranets","authors":"R. Sandhu, Joon S. Park","doi":"10.1145/286884.286887","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/286884.286887","url":null,"abstract":"The intricacy of security administration is one of the most challenging problems in large networked systems. This problem is especially serious in the Web environment, which consists of synthesis of technologies and composition of various constituents. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) can reduce the complexity and cost of security administration in large networked applications. Using RBAC itself to manage RBAC provides additional administrative convenience. The main contribution of this paper is to extend the RBAC/Web system (developed at NIST) with the URA97 model for user-role assignment (developed at GMU) to decentralize the details of RBAC administration on the Web without losing central control over the system policy.","PeriodicalId":355233,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126625756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Comparing simple role based access control models and access control lists","authors":"John F. Barkley","doi":"10.1145/266741.266769","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/266741.266769","url":null,"abstract":"The RBAC metaphor is powerful in its ability to express access control policy in terms of the way in which administrators view organizations. The functionality of simple Role Based Access Control (RBAC) models are compared to access control lists (ACL). A very simple RBAC model is shown to be no different from a group ACL mechanism from the point of view of its ability to express access control policy. RBAC is often distinguished from ACLs by the inclusion of a feature which allows a session to be associated with a proper subset of the roles (i.e., groups in ACL terms) authorized for a user. Two possible semantics for this feature are described: one which requires a similar amount of processing as that required by ACLs, and another which requires significantly more processing than that required by ACLs. In addition, the capability to define role hierarchies is compared to an equivalent feature in ACLs.","PeriodicalId":355233,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130952601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A role-based access control model for protection domain derivation and management","authors":"T. Jaeger, F. Giraud, N. Islam, J. Liedtke","doi":"10.1145/266741.266764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/266741.266764","url":null,"abstract":"We present a role-based access control (RBAC) model for deriving and managing protection domains of dynamically-obtained, remote programs, such as downloaded executable content. These are programs that are obtained from remote sources (e.g., via the web) and executed upon receipt. The protection domains of these programs must be limited to prevent content providers from gaining unauthorized access to the downloading principal’s resources. However, it can be difficult to determine the proper, limited protection domain for a program in which downloading principals need to share some of their resources. Current systems usually rely on one of a number of possible principals to specify the content protection domains, but the exclusion of input from other principals limits the flexibility in which protection domains can be derived and managed. In this paper, we describe a RBAC model for deriving protection domains and managing their evolution throughout the execution of the content. This model accounts for the variety of principals that may be involved in domain derivation and how their input is managed. We demonstrate the use of this model to specify a variety of protection domain derivation and management policies.","PeriodicalId":355233,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128731197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Team-based access control (TMAC): a primitive for applying role-based access controls in collaborative environments","authors":"Roshan K. Thomas","doi":"10.1145/266741.266748","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/266741.266748","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we introduce the notion of TeaM-based Access Control (TMAC) as an approach to applying rolebased access control in collaborative environments. Our focus is on collaborative activity that is best accomplished through organized teams. Thus, central to the TMAC approach is the notion of a “team” as an abstraction that encapsulates a collection of users in specific roles with the objective of accomplishing a specific task or goal. We were led to the idea of TMAC when our investigations revealed two interesting requirements for certain collaborative environments. The first was the need for a hybrid access control model that incorporated the advantages of broad, role-based permissions across object types, yet required fine-grained, identity-based control on individual users in certain roles and to individual object instances. The second was a need to distinguish the passive concept of permission assignment from the active concept of context-based permission activation. It remains to be seen whether these requirements should lead to yet another variation of one or more models of RBAC, or whether such requirements and TMAC concepts should form another access control model layered on top of RBAC. It is hoped the RBAC workshop will help researchers advance discussions on this issue. the notion of roles is an enterprise or organizational concept. As such, RBAC allows us to model security from an enterprise perspective since we can align security modeling to the roles and responsibilities in the enterprise. Second, RBAC is more scaleable than user-based security specifications since security can be administered as a whole for all users belonging to a role. This reduces the cost and administrative overhead associated with fine-grained security administration at the level of individual users, objects, and permissions. In this paper, we introduce the notion of TeaM-based Access Control (TMAC) as an approach to applying rolebased access control in collaborative environments such as those involving workflows [l 1, 121. Our focus is on collaborative activity that is best accomplished through organized teams. Thus, central to the TMAC approach is the notion of a “team” as an abstraction that encapsulates a collection of users in specific roles with the objective of accomplishing a specific task or goal. We were led to the formulation of TMAC during the course of our investigations on a recent DARPA funded research project [14]. The focus was on security issues for clinical workflows associated with patient care. Our goal was to come up with a security paradigm that recognized collaborations in clinical workflows in order to meet three objectives. The first was to provide a security environment that was nonintrusive to clinical staff. The second objective was to provide very tight, just-in-time permissions so that only the appropriate clinical staff could get access to a patient’s records and only when they were providing care for the patient. The thi","PeriodicalId":355233,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133521001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"RBAC support in object-oriented role databases","authors":"R. Wong","doi":"10.1145/266741.266765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/266741.266765","url":null,"abstract":"‘I’hc research on object-oriented role databases has bccoiiif~ a,ctive recc>ntly. Parallel to this, the concept of roles have also been proposed in the context of access control and security management. It is interesting to irrvestigate whether the role concept proposed in these two di flerent contexts can be unified. This paper proposes the framework for ot)ject-orietlt,ed role database syst,ems which can be used as the basis for specifying and implementing rob-based access control (RHAC). The paper firstly surveys the state of the art in object-oriented role database concepts and models. To do this, we summarize our recently proposed object-oriented role database called DOOR., which includes most of the features of existing objt:ct-orierlted role systems. We then describe the authorization and security mechanisms of DOOR., and how to support RBAC with these mechanisms. In particular, we emphasize the RHAC issues to support authorization changes during object evolution.","PeriodicalId":355233,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130457611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mandatory access control and role-based access control revisited","authors":"Sylvia L. Osborn","doi":"10.1145/266741.266751","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/266741.266751","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we reexamine the interaction between role-based access control and mandatory access control. We examine the question: from the perspect,ive of a given role graph in which the objects have been assigned security classifications, can its roles be assigned to subjects without violating mandai.ory access control rules? A detailed study of the structure of individual roles and edges in a role graph is undertaken. We show that the combinai,ion of the structure imposed by the role graphs and the MAC rules means that the possible structure of a role graph in which roles are assignable to subjects without violating MAC rules is greatly restricted.","PeriodicalId":355233,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control","volume":"112-113 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124001611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Role based access control with the security administration manager (SAM)","authors":"Roland Awischus","doi":"10.1145/266741.266758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/266741.266758","url":null,"abstract":"Security administration in large computer environments is a complex and expensive task. Many companies handle it by giving security administrators ownership of all data. If an update is required, a more or less automated workflow is in place to notify the administrator. This process is slow and error-prone. This practice is not mandatory access control (MAC) (no data labeling, etc.), it is rather a “degenerated” form of discretionary access control (DAC).","PeriodicalId":355233,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control","volume":"143 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124586004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A flexible model supporting the specification and enforcement of role-based authorization in workflow management systems","authors":"E. Bertino, E. Ferrari, V. Atluri","doi":"10.1145/266741.266746","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/266741.266746","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, workflow management systems (WFMSs) have gained popularity both in research as well as in commercial sectors. WFMSs are used to coordinate and streamline business processes of an organization. Often, very large WFMSs are used in organizations with users in the range of several thousands and number of process instances in the range of tens of thousands. To simplify the complexity of security administration, it is a common practice in many business organizations to allocate a role to perform each activity in the process and then assign one or more users to each role, and granting an authorization to roles rather than to users. Typically the security policies of the organization are expressed as constraints on users and roles. a well-known constraint is separation of duties. Unfortunately, current role-based access control models are not adequate to model such constraints. To address this issue, in this paper, (1) we present a language to express authorization constraints as clauses in a logic program, (2) provide formal notions of constraint consistency, and (3) propose algorithms to check for the consistency of the constraints and to assign roles and users to the workflow tasks in such a way that no constraints are violated.","PeriodicalId":355233,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124140980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reconciling role based management and role based access control","authors":"Emil C. Lupu, M. Sloman","doi":"10.1145/266741.266770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/266741.266770","url":null,"abstract":"Role Based Access Control is only a subset of the security management and distributed systems management. Yet, the characteristics and use of the role objects in RBAC or Role Based Management (RBM) may differ significantly. In this paper we outline a Role Management Framework based on the specification of policies and examine its differences and similarities with the RBAC concepts. In particular, two aspects of roles required in RBM are emphasised: the need for obligation policies which changes the way roles are used within the system and the Object Oriented role model which uses inheritance for re-use of the specification rather than implementing set-subset relationships on access rights.","PeriodicalId":355233,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control","volume":"281 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122090228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mutual exclusion of roles as a means of implementing separation of duty in role-based access control systems","authors":"D. Richard Kuhn","doi":"10.1145/266741.266749","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/266741.266749","url":null,"abstract":"Role based access control (RBAC) is attracting increasing attention as a security mechanism for both commercial and many military systems. Much of RBAC is fundamentally different from multi-level security (MLS) systems, and the properties of RBAC systems have not been explored formally to the extent that MLS system properties have. This paper explores some aspects of mutual exclusion of roles as a means of implementing separation of duty policies, including a safety property for separation of duty; relationships between different types of exclusion rules; properties of mutual exclusion for roles; constraints on the role hierarchy introduced by mutual exclusion rules; and necessary and sufficient conditions for the safety property to hold. Results have implications for implementing separation of duty controls through mutual exclusion of roles, and for comparing mutual exclusion with other means of implementing separation of duty policies.","PeriodicalId":355233,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133882520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}