{"title":"IoT Forensics: Analysis of Ajax Systems' mobile app for the end user","authors":"Evangelos Dragonas, C. Lambrinoudakis","doi":"10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224992","url":null,"abstract":"Security appliances that protect modern homes are ubiquitous IoT products. Due to their popularity, such appliances may witness incidents occurring to the IoT security systems they form. These systems are remotely configured and monitored by the end users through mobile applications. Ajax Systems is a manufacturer of such IoT devices which provides a variety of applications that allow remote configuration and monitoring of its products. Research regarding digital forensics of such applications is limited yet this unexplored piece of evidence may hide vital information for a number of investigative questions. In this paper the Ajax Systems' mobile application for the end user is thoroughly analyzed in both Android and iOS operating systems in pursue of evidentiary data that could reside within. Exploiting findings of this study authors developed a Python utility, namely Ajax Systems Log Parser, that can assist investigators with the examination of some of the artifacts found.","PeriodicalId":354918,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)","volume":"20 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115826464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Beny Nugraha, Krishna Yadav, Parag Patil, T. Bauschert
{"title":"Improving the Detection of Unknown DDoS Attacks through Continual Learning","authors":"Beny Nugraha, Krishna Yadav, Parag Patil, T. Bauschert","doi":"10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224989","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224989","url":null,"abstract":"Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are popular with network security researchers due to their good detection capability and low false alarm rate especially concerning Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. However, as the attack pattern usually changes over time, the performance of an IDS that was trained with original data degrades. Moreover, as the changing attack pattern and the emergence of unknown DDoS attacks create more unknown or unlabeled data, a supervised learning approach is not suitable. To mitigate this effect, we propose a robust continual learning method which consists of a semi-supervised approach for pseudo-labeling the unknown data and a sliding window-based retraining scheme. The proposed method is evaluated by using the custom CIC-IDS 2017 dataset, which contains both slow DDoS and flooding DDoS attacks. Three classifiers are considered, namely K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), XGBoost, and Multilayer Perceptron (MLP). Our evaluation shows that our method is able to improve the detection performance which verifies the quality of the generated pseudo labels.","PeriodicalId":354918,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125673867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alessandro Bellini, E. Bellini, Massimo Bertini, Doaa Almhaithawi, S. Cuomo
{"title":"Multi-party Computation for Privacy and Security in Machine Learning: a Practical Review","authors":"Alessandro Bellini, E. Bellini, Massimo Bertini, Doaa Almhaithawi, S. Cuomo","doi":"10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224826","url":null,"abstract":"Machine Learning, particularly Deep Learning, is transforming society in any of its fundamental domains - healthcare, culture, finance, transportation, education, just to mention a few. However Machine Learning suffers from serious weaknesses in privacy and security due to the large amount of data (datasets for training and parameters in trained models) and the probabilistic approximation inherent in any ML function. Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is a family of techniques and tactic with a sound scientific and operative base that can be applied to mitigate some relevant weaknesses of ML. In particular, privacy in training may be assured by MPC with federated learning techniques (these may be considered particular interpretations and implementation of a general MPC method) and also security in training and inference may be enforced by continuous model testing using MPC is a technique that allows multiple parties to evaluate a machine learning model on their private data without revealing it to each other. This brief paper is a practical and essential review on how to use MPC to mitigate privacy and security issues in ML.","PeriodicalId":354918,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127034847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Default Credentials Vulnerability: The Case Study of Exposed IP Cams","authors":"Stefano Perone, L. Faramondi, R. Setola","doi":"10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224944","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224944","url":null,"abstract":"The spread of IoT devices poses always major challenges to the issue of network security. In this paper, the study focus on the risks linked to the usage of default credentials in IoT devices, in particular, there is a focus on IP cameras. Many cameras on the Internet, in fact, use the manufacturer's default passwords and this makes it extremely easy to access them by a malicious actor. The importance of the problem should not be underestimated. Starting from an unauthorized access to the device, an attacker has access not only to images but also to a whole series of data that can be extrapolated and that can be used as a preliminary step for criminal actions. The risks of leaving credentials by default are closely related to the lack of attention during the design phase and the resulting vulnerabilities present in tools that do not respect the security-by-design standard; the producers, in fact, take often lightly this concept, leaving the whole task of ensure device security to the user. The main issue related to this vulnerability is the lack of legal protection; there are indeed a lot of tools that make available this open data to everyone without any possible legal restriction. In this paper we propose a practical study considering two case studies showing that the number of IP cam directly connected on Internet with default credential is incredible high. The first case focus on a cheap IP Cam model widely used in several contexts. The second one focus on an IP Cam model that corresponds to an high-end security camera intended purely for high-quality video surveillance and thermal imaging.","PeriodicalId":354918,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121500256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pandu Ranga Reddy Konala, Vimal Kumar, D. Bainbridge
{"title":"SoK: Static Configuration Analysis in Infrastructure as Code Scripts","authors":"Pandu Ranga Reddy Konala, Vimal Kumar, D. Bainbridge","doi":"10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224925","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224925","url":null,"abstract":"This SoK paper presents findings from a survey conducted on the current state of tools and techniques used in the static configuration analysis of Infrastructure as Code (IaC). Our findings highlight the increasing importance of ensuring the quality of IaC scripts through techniques such as detecting code and security smells. Our findings reveal that regular expressions are widely used, but this may not be a long-term or fully automated solution for detecting smells. Additionally, our study found that the majority of the tools and techniques are developed for infrastructure provisioning, rather than configuration management and image building. This raises concerns because configuring software is a high-risk task, with malicious actors constantly targeting software systems. Therefore, it is crucial for researchers to develop efficient and advanced techniques for detecting defects in configuration management and image building. The aim of this paper is to provide a detailed overview of the current state of research in this field, and to identify areas for future development.","PeriodicalId":354918,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121705131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
K. Umezawa, Sven Wohlgemuth, Keisuke Hasegawa, K. Takaragi
{"title":"Evaluation of Applying LDA to Redacted Documents in Security and Safety Analysis","authors":"K. Umezawa, Sven Wohlgemuth, Keisuke Hasegawa, K. Takaragi","doi":"10.1109/csr57506.2023.10224991","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/csr57506.2023.10224991","url":null,"abstract":"Cyber attacks are often executed by imitating existing attacks and combining them. Using existing vulnerability databases, we have presented a way to semi-automatically determine the presence of vulnerabilities in the design documents of products under development. We have calculated the similarity between documents using the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) technology and compared the design document of the new product with the vulnerability database. When this comparison processing is conducted by a third party as a service, it may be desirable to not inadvertently disclose a part of the design document of the new product to the third party. In this study, we used the LDA technique to experimentally verify that the calculated similarity value does not deteriorate even when a portion of the design document is encrypted or obfuscated. In conclusion, we discovered no substantial difference in similarity with the original document; however, there are changes in numerical values depending on the words to be encrypted/obfuscated. In particular, the degradation of similarity is very small when the version number is encrypted/obfuscated.","PeriodicalId":354918,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)","volume":"207 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122184003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Randomized Addressing Countermeasures are Inefficient Against Address-Bit SCA","authors":"I. Kabin, Z. Dyka, Peter Langendoerfer","doi":"10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224968","url":null,"abstract":"The resistance of cryptographic implementations against SCA attacks is highly important if devices are physically accessible. The vulnerability of public key approaches to address-bit attacks is not solved yet. Different randomization approaches proposed in the literature as countermeasures have been successfully attacked in the past. In contrast to these countermeasures the low-cost countermeasure presented in [1] was not yet reported as successfully attacked. We present our idea of how the processed scalar can be revealed even when this countermeasure is implemented. We explain how the well-known address randomization countermeasures [1] and [2] can be broken attacking a single trace.","PeriodicalId":354918,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123548770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Breaking AES-128: Machine Learning-Based SCA Under Different Scenarios and Devices","authors":"Sara Tehranipoor, Nima Karimian, Jacky Edmonds","doi":"10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10225009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10225009","url":null,"abstract":"Machine learning-based side-channel attacks (MLSCAs) have demonstrated the capability to extract secret keys from AES by learning the correlation between leakages from power traces or timing of AES execution. Previous work has focused on unmasked AES, the captured power traces for profiling and testing have been collected from the same device, and they are primarily implemented on microcontrollers. In this paper, we present a comprehensive MLSCA that considers both masked and unmasked AES running on software and hardware with a side-channel leakage model under four scenarios involving two target boards (Artix-7 XC7AI00T FPGAs and STM32F415 microcontrollers) and different keys for training and testing the model. Our implementation results indicate that support vector machines outperformed other machine learning techniques on masked software and unmasked software AES with only 4 traces. Long short-term memory networks were found to outperform other techniques on unmasked hardware AES (FPGA) with only 283 power traces.","PeriodicalId":354918,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131734414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Taxonomy for Tsunami Security Scanner Plugins","authors":"G. Lima, Vitor Hugo Gonçalves, Pedro Pinto","doi":"10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224998","url":null,"abstract":"Vulnerability scanning tools are essential in detecting systems weaknesses caused by vulnerabilities in their components or wrong configurations. Corporations may use these tools to assess a system in advance and fix its vulnerabilities, thus preventing or mitigating the impact of real attacks. A set of these tools are organized by plugins, each intended to check a specific vulnerability, such as the case of the Tsunami Security Scanner tool released in 2020 by Google. Multiple plugins for this tool were proposed in a community-based approach and thus, it is important for the users and research community to have these plugins in a framework consistently categorized across multiple sources and types. This paper proposes a comprehensive taxonomy for all the 61 plugins available, hierarchically sorted into 2 main categories, 4 categories, 4 subcategories, and 7 types. An analysis and a discussion on statistics by categories and types over time are also provided. The analysis shows that, so far, there are 4 main contributors, being Google, Community, Facebook, and Govtech. The Google source is still the top contributor counting 39 out of 61 plugins and the highest number of plugins available are in the RCE subcategory. The plugins available are mainly focused on critical and high vulnerabilities.","PeriodicalId":354918,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129967941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nishanth Laxman, Daniel Krohmer, Markus Damm, R. Schwarz, P. Antonino
{"title":"Understanding Resilience: Looking at Frameworks & Standards - A Systematic Study from Cyber Perspective","authors":"Nishanth Laxman, Daniel Krohmer, Markus Damm, R. Schwarz, P. Antonino","doi":"10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSR57506.2023.10224958","url":null,"abstract":"Resilience as a system attribute and concept has gained importance and relevance in recent years as the world becomes more complex and interdependent. Most of our so-called critical infrastructures require strong IT support and infrastructure, and our reliance on their continuous availability and quality of service, makes them significant, as even short outages might cause dramatic economic losses. The systems must able to cope up with unexpected disturbances and compensate for them adequately, thereby being resilient. We found that the term resilience is being used in vastly different fields ranging from social sciences, ecology, or economics to engineering disciplines. As a first step toward understanding resilience, its notions and contexts, how such systems can be built and so on, we conducted a systematic study from cyber perspective. In this paper we provide our methodology, brief highlights, excerpts, and inferences specifically on frameworks and standards, we drew from from our study.","PeriodicalId":354918,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134528574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}