{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoab009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoab009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60671861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoab015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoab015","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60671974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoab013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoab013","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60671965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoab008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoab008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60671815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoab012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoab012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60671921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"VI—Panpsychism and Free Will: A Case Study in Liberal Naturalism","authors":"Philip Goff","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoaa009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 There has been a resurgence of interest in panpsychism in contemporary philosophy of mind. According to its supporters, panpsychism offers an attractive solution to the mind–body problem, avoiding the deep difficulties associated with the more conventional options of dualism and materialism. There has been little focus, however, on whether panpsychism can help with philosophical problems pertaining to free will. In this paper I will argue (a) that it is coherent and consistent with observation to postulate a kind of libertarian agent causation at the micro-level, and (b) that if one if believes in libertarian agent causation at the macro-level, there are significant advantages in also postulating its existence at the micro-level.","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46732961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"VII—Spinoza’s Unquiet Acquiescentia","authors":"Alexander X. Douglas","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoaa008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 For Spinoza, the highest thing we can hope for is acquiescentia in se ipso—acquiescence in oneself. As an ethical ideal, this might appear as a complacent quietism, a licence to accept the way you are and give up hope of improving either yourself or the world. I argue that the opposite is the case. Self-acquiescence in Spinoza’s sense is a very challenging goal: it requires a form of self-understanding that is extremely difficult to attain. It also involves occupying a daring and radical political position, one that obstructs the psychological mechanisms by which political power is typically maintained.","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42164265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"XII—What’s Wrong with the Consequence Argument: A Compatibilist Libertarian Response","authors":"C. List","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoz018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoz018","url":null,"abstract":"The most prominent argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism is Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument. I offer a new diagnosis of what is wrong with this argument. Proponents and critics typically accept the way the argument is framed, and only disagree on whether the premisses and rules of inference are true. I suggest that the argument involves a category mistake: it conflates two different levels of description, namely, the physical level at which we describe the world from the perspective of fundamental physics and the agential level at which we describe agents and their actions. My diagnosis is based on an account of free will as a higher-level phenomenon. I call this account ‘compatibilist libertarianism’, for reasons that will become clear. Although the paper addresses a primarily metaphysical question, it uses tools similar to those employed in philosophy-of-science work on determinism and indeterminism, higher-level phenomena, and dynamical systems.","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/arisoc/aoz018","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49198918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Cluelessness Objection Revisited","authors":"Lok Lam Yim","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoz016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoz016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Lenman (2000)'s cluelessness objection against consequentialism states that we are almost entirely clueless to the actual consequences of our action. In ‘Cluelessness,’ Hilary Greaves (2016) distinguishes between ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ cases of cluelessness and argues that the principle of indifference applies to ‘simple’ cases, thereby rescuing the ‘simple’ cases from the cluelessness objection. In this discussion note, I argue that Greaves's distinction between ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ cases fails and cluelessness is more problematic than Greaves believes.","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/arisoc/aoz016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46836805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"XI—Responsibilities and Taking on Responsibility","authors":"C. Calhoun","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoz017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoz017","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 There is a familiar, everyday notion of a responsibility. Much of daily life on and off the job is consumed by taking care of responsibilities in this sense. But what is a responsibility, and how are responsibilities related to obligations? Reflection on the phenomenon of taking on responsibilities suggests that the concept of ‘a responsibility’ is distinct from that of ‘an obligation’, and that not all responsibilities are also obligations, even though many are.","PeriodicalId":35222,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/arisoc/aoz017","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49555522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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